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Abstract
This thesis investigates emerging stock markets in the Pacific Basin with particular 
reference to the Korean stock market, which is representative of typical, fast-growing 
emerging markets. Using a broader range of econometric models, the short-run and 
long-run behaviour of stock prices, the impact of changes of a price limit system, and 
derivatives trading on the stock market are investigated.
In the first two chapters, recent performance of emerging stock markets in the
Pacific Basin and the development of the Korean stock market are examined.
, <
Chaprer 3 investigates the behaviour of Korean stock market volatility is investigated.
The results find that the GARCH( 1,1)-AR( 1) and the GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) seemed to 
be the best fit models among the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH) class models. The nexus between Korean stock market returns and 
macroeconomic variables is investigated in Chapter 5. The evidence suggests that 
changes in the exports/imports ratio is the most important determinant in forecasting 
the variance of stock returns in the Korean export-oriented economy. Chapter 6 
provides tests of long-run equilibrium among Pacific-Basin stock markets for a period 
spanning the Asian financial market crises. Using unit root tests, which allow for a 
possible crash, the results find that four of the series are trend stationary. Among the 
remaining 1(1) series, little evidence of cointegration is found. In Chapter 7, the 
consequences of price limits for weak-form efficiency is investigated for the first 
time. The evidence suggests that the stock market as a whole approaches a random 
walk as price limits are relaxed. Chapter 8 investigates the impact on the spot market 
of trading in KOSPI 200 futures. Empirical results show that futures trading 
increases the speed at which information is impounded into spot market prices. The 
lead-lag relation is asymmetric with stronger evidence that the stock index futures 
market leads the spot market.
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1 Introduction
This thesis investigates the Korean stock market, which is one of the emerging stock 
markets in the Pacific Basin, using financial econometrics techniques. Other 
emerging markets in this region, for instance Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, Taiwan, are also analysed in some of the chapters. However, the main focus
A
of the research is on the stock market in Korea. Investigating the Korean stock market 
is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the Korean stock market is 
representative of a typical emerging market. It is relatively small compared to major 
markets but the stock market in Korea has been growing fast in terms of market 
capitalisation, trading volume and number of listed companies on the stock exchange 
since the 1980s. Secondly, it used to be one of the most restricted and controlled 
markets among emerging markets. However, it has experienced fast changes and has 
matured qualitatively since its opening-up to foreign investors in January 1992. 
Thirdly, with a price limit system and the introduction of derivative securities 
trading, there are interesting features in the Korean market that are present in some 
but not all. Finally, little research has been carried out on the market opening-up and 
recent developments in the Korean stock market. Therefore, a closer examination of 
this market is useful in its own right and may also help jis to understand particular 
aspects of other emerging stock markets, especially in the Pacific Basin.
Although the literature on developed stock markets is extensive much less
empirical evidence exists for emerging stock markets and only a few studies have 
focused on the stock market in Korea. In this thesis, the short-run and long-run 
behaviour of stock returns in Korea and impact of derivatives trading on the stock 
market as well as its historical development are investigated using a broader range of 
econometric models, including variance ratio test, Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH), cointegration tests, innovation accounting analysis and
tests of causality models. Although the last four decades are covered, the main focus
/  !
is drawn on internationalisation of the stock market in the 1980s and opening of the 
stock market to foreign investors in the 1990s. In particular, in some of the chapters 
the data series are divided into two subperiods, pre- and post-opening periods, for a 
closer examination of the consequence of stock market opening to foreign investors in 
1992.
The outline of the remainder of this thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews emerging stock markets in the Pacific Basin. Although 
growing speed of emerging stock markets has been slow since several main crashes, 
i.e., the Mexican crisis in 1994/5 and the Asian financial market crashes in 1997, 
growth in overall stock market performance has been dramatic, especially in those 
countries where experienced rapid economic growth as well as in countries that 
government have embarked on liberalisation measures. In this context, examining 
emerging stock markets in the Pacific Basin is of interest for examination. In fact, the 
term, ‘emerging stock market’ has been used without being known its precise 
meaning, despite the fact that it is no longer to be new one. Therefore, this chapter 
aims to define the term, ‘emerging stock market’ and outline the nature and recent 
performance of emerging markets in particular focusing on those in the Pacific Basin.
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Chapter 3 examines a comprehensive review of the different aspects of the 
Korean stock market including its historical development and main features. The 
main focus is on how the Korean stock market has been developed and liberalised 
since its first opening in the 1950s. This chapter aims to provide some background to 
understanding changes in the trading system, relevant regulation system and the 
liberalisation program in a historical context. Also, the recent development of the 
market including the introduction of derivative securities trading and cyber on-line 
stock trading as well as the Korean financial market crisis in 1997 are noted. 
Although there have been some studies about the Korean stock market, most of the 
studies have concentrated on comparative analysis with other markets rather than 
examining the Korean stock market in depth. Little work has been done on the
r
historical background including the stock market opening-up and recent development. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to fill this gap by examining the Korean stock market in 
a comprehensive way especially focusing on its liberalisation and recent development 
of the market. We also describe impact of the Korean financial market crisis in 1997.
In Chapter 4, the empirical distribution of Korean stock market returns is 
analysed and the best-fit models for the distribution of the stock market returns 
among a family of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and 
Generalised ARCH models are investigated. Very few studies have compared these 
methods empirically. For this reason it is of interest to apply each o f the techniques 
studied previously to our data set, with the aim of investigating the different 
implications each might have for the predictability of volatility.
Chapter 5 investigates the nexus between Korean stock market returns and 
macroeconomic variables for the period from January 1987 to June 1997. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to explore whether changes in macroeconomic variables
16
contain important information for stock market participants in Korea. The chapter 
analyses the effects of changes in major macroeconomic variables on stock market 
returns in Korea using cross correlation analysis and a multivariate vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework together with innovation accounting procedures to 
assess the economic implications of the model.
In particular, our macroeconomic variables including the current account 
balance, money supply, interest rates and exchange rates, and stock price series are 
analysed dividing into two subperiods, pre-opening (from January 1987 until the end 
of 1991) and post-opening (from the early of 1992). While most economic variables 
included in the analysis have been used in different forms in stock price analysis the 
effects of changes in macroeconomic variables on stock returns before and after stock 
market opening-up in Korea has not been analysed empirically. This chapter also 
aims to evaluate the usefulness of the relationships between macroeconomic variables 
and stock returns as a forecasting tool in the implementation o f investment strategies.
Chapter 6 provides tests of long-run equilibrium among Pacific Basin stock 
markets over the period starting in March 1988 and ending in April 2000, a period 
spanning the Asian financial market crises. Total returns indices, which include 
dividends, paid and reinvested, are used. This chapter re-examines the question of the 
interdependence of Pacific Basin equity markets. It extends the previous literature in 
five principal ways. First, a larger set of stock markets is considered; eleven Pacific 
Basin markets are examined. Second, both developed and emerging markets are 
included together with those of the UK and the US. Third, data on total returns, which 
includes dividends paid and reinvested is used, since these are what matter to 
international investors. Fourth, a common currency, the US$, is used. Previous results 
of work in local currency and in a common currency differ. Where exchange rates
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change significantly it would seem important not to ignore currency risk by using 
equity prices denominated in local currency. Fifth, the data span the period of/Asian 
financial market crises. Consequently unit root tests are used which allow for a 
possible crash and tests of cointegration are carried out for two periods: the first 
period ends immediately before Black Wednesday on the Bangkok stock exchange, 
the start o f the Asian crisis, and the entire sample ends in April 2000. Therefore, 
preliminary results o f the consequences of the Asian crisis for long-run equilibria 
between stock markets in the region are reported.
Chapter 7 provides tests of whether stock prices in Korea follow a random 
walk under price limits over the period from March 1988 to December 1998. During 
this time there are five regimes of daily price limits. A sample of 55 actively traded 
stocks, selected to cover a wide range of industries and with a marked number of limit 
moves, is used to test the random walk hypothesis under each price limit regime. 
Whilst there have been numerous studies of the efficient markets hypothesis, none of 
them has investigated the consequences of price limits for weak-form efficiency. 
Since the price limits in the Korea Stock Exchange have been modified several times 
as the bands have widened, the random walk hypothesis is tested under the different 
regimes of price limits. This chapter differs from previous studies in several ways. 
First, the multiple variance ratio (MVR) test developed by Chow and Denning (1993) 
is used to examine whether prices of individual stocks follow a random walk process 
under price limits. Secondly, the data cover a longer time span-over ten years of daily 
observations. In order to avoid the problem of missing observations some of which 
are associated with price limits, all six trading days in the week are included in the 
data. Thirdly, the effects of the relaxation of price limits are considered: as price 
limits are relaxed do some equity prices follow a random walk process? Finally, the
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impact of the Korean financial crisis on the weak-form efficiency of the stock market 
is noted.
In Chapter 8, the impact on the spot market of trading in stock index futures 
in Korea is investigated. Stock index futures are perceived as one of the most 
successful financial innovations of the 1980s and much of the futures trading in 
emerging markets is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although Korea is one of the 
fastest growing emerging markets, it was not until 3 May 1996 that a futures contract 
based on the Korea Stock Price Index 200 (KOSPI 200) was introduced on the Korea 
Stock Exchange (KSE). Trading in these stock index futures has grown remarkably. 
In the two and a half years following their introduction, trading activity expanded 
almost 1,300% in value terms and 2,500% in terms of trading volume.
While the impact of derivative trading on spot price volatility has been 
widely investigated for developed markets, there is very little work, which 
investigates the impact of stock index futures trading in emerging markets. This 
chapter contributes to the sparse literature; it is the first to examine the impact on the 
Korean spot market of trading in futures. Data are used from the start of futures 
trading on 3 May 1996 to the end of December 1998, for cointegration tests, 
estimation o f error correction models, Granger tests of causality and examination of 
the lead-lag relationship. This chapter differs from previous studies, which use 
closing prices for futures and spot prices, by using data with matched closing times. 
This is desirable because in Korea, trading in index futures and trading in stocks 
finish at different times. By using matched closing times, we avoid comparing 
nonsynchronous closing prices of the spot index and futures contracts, which might 
lead to a significant source of error.
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2 A Review of Emerging Stock Markets in the 
Pacific Basin
2.1 Introduction
Interest in emerging markets has developed since the first half of the 1980s as both 
academia and international investors became increasingly aware of the very rapid 
economic growth rates of some developing countries. In particular, academic studies 
that specifically examine emerging stock markets are merely a recent trend. To sum up 
the findings of the recent literature, emerging stock markets are typically, but not 
always, associated with the following characteristics
• higher returns but a higher degree of volatility than developed markets;
• thin trading activity;
• increasing interest by international investors but some barriers for 
foreign investors;
• a transparency problem due to lack of corporate information and 
a nonstandarised accounting system;
• unstable political environment.
However, despite apparent strong interest, relatively little is known about emerging 
stock markets. Although emerging stock markets’ growth has been slow following 
several main crashes, e.g. the Mexican crisis in 1994/5 and the Asian financial market 
crises in 1997, overall stock market performance has been dramatic, especially in 
those countries which experienced rapid economic growth and those where
20
government has embarked on liberalisation measures. These particular characteristics 
stimulate interest in examining emerging stock markets in the Pacific Basin. 
Frequently, the term, ‘emerging stock market’ is generally used without its precise 
meaning being stated. The main purposes of this chapter are (i) to define the term 
‘emerging stock market’ and (ii) outline the nature and recent performance of 
emerging markets in the Pacific Basin.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents a 
brief review of existing literature on the different ways in which the term ‘emerging 
markets’ is defined. Section 2.3 focuses on the recent development and market 
performance of six emerging and five developed markets in the Pacific Basin. The 
impact of the Asian financial crisis on the emerging stock markets in this region is 
also noted. Section 2.4 provides a brief conclusion.
2.2 What is an Emerging Stock Market?
The term ‘emerging stock markets’ most often is intended to mean stock markets 
based in developing economies. Even with this simple definition, emerging stock 
markets vary tremendously in size, liquidity, and sophistication. Initially the phrase 
‘emerging markets' was coined by Antonie W. van Agtmael, who was an official of 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1981. Since then the phrase has caught on, 
although this phrase has different meanings for different people.
One of the earliest attempts to classify emerging markets into homogeneous 
groupings was made by Errunza (1983). While this classification affords no definition, 
it does provide a guide as to the financial markets that the term, ‘emerging markets’ 
may embrace. Errunza suggested that the term subsumes three general categories of
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financial market, although these are by no means mutually exclusive. The first 
category includes the old-established markets, many of which have been in place for 
over a century. For example, the first attempt to establish a stock market in Caracas, 
Venezuela, took place as early as 1805, when a group of businessmen founded the 
Commerce Exchange. Indeed, many markets in the Latin America date back to the 
1800s. The second category includes those markets that owe their growth and 
development to special situations. For example, active government support, turmoil in 
the Middle East and OPEC money are three factors largely responsible for the growth 
in size and sophistication of the Jordanian market. The final category includes new 
markets which have been organised to foster economic growth. An example of such a 
market is Korea, which has grown over the ten years from the beginning of the 1980s 
to the start of the 1990s from being a small market, largely unknown to international 
institutional investors, to become one of the worlds leading emerging markets. For 
example, by 1994 Korea had attracted 4.6% of total net assets invested in emerging 
markets, and approximately 10% of the total number of funds that invested in 
emerging markets. This classification highlights the fact that the definition of an 
emerging market is not solely a question of age or size.
The IFC definition is one of the most frequently adopted, but it has changed in 
recent years. Before 1997: “an emerging stock market is one in an economy with GNP 
per capita not exceeding the threshold adopted by the World Bank for classification as 
'high income’ (for instance, US$ 9,386 in 1995 and US$ 9,656 in 1997), i.e., if a 
country was eligible to borrow from the World Bank, its stock market was said to be 
emerging.” In 1997: “ The term ‘emerging market5 can imply that a process of change 
is underway, with stock markets growing in size and sophistication, in contrast to 
markets that are small and stagnant. The term can also refer to any market in a
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developing economy, with the implication that all have the potential for development. 
A stock market might then be said to be ‘emerging’ if it meets at least one of two 
general criteria: (i) an Emerging Economy criterion, and (ii) a Developing Stock 
Market Criterion.” The least liquid emerging markets are known as ‘frontier markets' 
The most recent definition: “IFC classifies a stock market as ‘emerging’ if it meets at 
least one of two general criteria: (i) it is located in a low- or middle-income economy 
as determined by the World Bank and (ii) its investable market capitalisation is low 
relative to its most recent GDP figure.” This definition takes into account both 
economic and stock market criteria. There are also many qualitative features to be 
considered. For example, operational efficiency of stock markets, quality of market 
regulation, supervision and enforcement, transparency, and level of accounting 
standards are all important features. However, a significant problem arises when 
emerging markets are defined on the basis of GNP per capita. This aggregate measure 
does not show the degree of income inequality in society Data on GNP per capita give 
a distorted picture of the level of well-being of the general population in countries 
where oil output is very large, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Other literature adopts a variety of definitions. Keppler and Lechner (1997, p. 
9) argued that, although no uniform definition currently exists for the term ‘emerging 
markets,’ usually emerging markets are understood as ‘rapidly growing markets’ or 
‘stock markets in newly industrialised countries,’ In general emerging markets are not 
referred to as ‘developing countries’ or as ‘third-world countries’ because these terms 
usually evoke images of extreme poverty, starvation, debt crises, hyper-inflation, 
corruption, and political instability— images that no linger truly characterise a 
majority of the emerging markets. For example, while Wilcox (1992) followed the 
definition by the IFC, Divecha, Drach and Stefek (1992) defined emerging stock
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markets more narrowly compared to the IFC’s definition. They classified an emerging 
stock market as one which securities trade in a public market that is not a developed 
stock market (as defined by countries covered within the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Indices or Financial Times Indices). Also it is of interest to global 
institutional investors and has a reliable source of data. On the other hand, Price 
(1994) intuitively defined emerging markets to include countries experiencing or 
having the potential for high economic growth but facing substantial political, 
economic, and/or market-specific risks. In terms of market returns, investors can be 
well rewarded for taking the risk.
Kuczynski (1994) argued that the emerging market phenomenon is a 
sequential one that began in the first half o f the 1980s as investors, both portfolio and 
direct investors, became increasingly aware of the very rapid economic growth rates 
of countries such as the four Asian dragons. He indicated that the term ‘emerging 
markets’ is by its nature general and applies to a very diverse and changing cast of 
countries but argues that the term is not necessarily tied to stock markets, that is, it is 
simply a reflection of the pace of the economy. Usually the term refers to stock 
markets that are developing from an incipient stage toward a more modern and 
eventually more mature stage. In addition, Hale (1994) claimed that the term 
‘emerging market’ is itself a transitional concept and likely to disappear sometime 
during the next decade. Instead, investors will probably use concepts such as “high 
growth-middle income,” “high income-mature,” or “low growth-low income” to 
categorise global stock markets. Glen and Pinto (1994) stated that growth in emerging 
stock market prices has been dramatic, especially in those countries where 
governments have embarked on liberalisation measures, as well as in countries that 
have experienced rapid economic growth. Furthermore, Clemente (1994) argued that
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emerging markets are far from being a homogeneous group, and wide variations in 
staicture, behaviour and performance can be observed.
Apart from the variety of definitions, the category of emerging stock markets 
is also very broad. Stock markets currently classified as emerging include (i) some of 
the largest and most liquid markets in the world, (ii) several long-established markets 
where trading still takes place over tea, and (iii) many markets where the latest 
technology has been installed to expedite trading, settlement, market supervision, and 
information dissemination. As the end of 1996, based on the criterion of a GNP per 
capita that did not exceed the World Bank’s threshold for being a high income 
country, there are approximately 170 countries around the world that meet/definition 
of emerging markets. However, only seventy-nine of these countries have functioning 
securities exchanges whereas twenty-three national markets are defined as developed 
markets.1 In 1993, the IFC introduced IFC Investable indexes, which were designed 
specifically to be benchmarks for international portfolio managers. Among the 
seventy-nine markets mentioned above, however, only thirty-one markets met the 
minimum technical requirement of having a functioning, regulated securities exchange 
with an appropriate minimum market capitalisation. Also, in these thirty-one markets, 
foreign investors are permitted to make direct purchases of shares. For this reason, 
these markets are all included in the IFC Investable (IFCI) Composite index. For 
example, Asian emerging stock market group in the IFCI Composite index includes 
large, well-developed stock markets in Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan; increasingly active, 
fast-growing markets in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand; embryonic markets 
both large, in China and India, and small, in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Among the NIEs
1 According to the IFC, developed markets include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US.
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(Newly Industrialising Economies), however, Singapore and Hong Kong, whose 
growth rates have been considerably high for decades and its values o f GNP per capita 
reached to US$26,910 and US$24,260 as the end of 1996, respectively, can no longer 
be refereed to as emerging markets in any sense although they retain political risks 
characteristic o f emerging markets.
The definition of emerging markets according to GNP per capita is only one of 
several ways o f identifying attractive, rapidly growing markets around the world that 
enjoy a certain level o f political stability. Another important requirement is that the 
market should possess a regulated and functioning securities exchange, or be in the 
process of developing one. Further, the shares traded on the exchange must be 
available for purchase by foreign investors, even if subject to certain restrictions, and 
the repatriation of dividend and interest income, capital gains, and the originally 
invested capital must be largely free and unrestricted.
2.3 Performance of Emerging Stock Markets in the Pacific Basin
In spite of the fact that emerging stock markets can be found in various regions such 
as Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific Basin, it is 
obvious that stock markets in the Pacific Basin have become widely recognised as the 
most dynamic ones. These markets have undertaken substantial financial reform 
which includes removing barriers to domestic and international capital inflows and 
stock market liberalisation. In particular, they have been in a difficult situation so that 
the speed of development seems to have slowed down since the Asian financial 
market crises. However, it is worthwhile to include them since they have grown 
remarkably and have relative large stock markets compared to the rest of the emerging
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markets, although the speed of development has been slow in the late of the 1990s due 
to the East and Southeast Asian financial market crisis. In this section, we focus on 
six emerging markets in the Pacific Basin—  Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, together with five developed markets—  Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Japan, Australia and New Zealand since (i) these developed markets are
located in the same region and (ii) stock market linkages within the region are
, , , o  °
discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, comparison is usefi.il. Although China is one of 
the fast growing emerging markets in the region appropriate data for empirical 
analysis are only available from the early 1990s. For this reason, China is excluded 
from this empirical analysis.
Emerging markets in the Pacific Basin have grown remarkably in size in recent 
years owing not only to quantitative growth but also to market developments 
including liberalisation and deregulation. At the end of 1996, emerging stock markets 
were located in countries having 84% of the world’s population but only 19% of its
i
GNP and 9% of the world total market capitalisation (see Figure 2.1 through 2.3). At 
the end of the year, the total market capitalisation of all emerging markets amounted 
to US$2,230 billion. This total includes not only the markets comprising the IFCI 
Composite Index but also smaller markets that meet the definition of emerging 
markets but whose securities exchanges do not yet satisfy the criteria for admission to 
the IFCI Composite Index. In 1996, the total of six emerging stock markets' GNP 
accounts for 22.9% of the total emerging markets’ GNP although it accounts 4% of 
the world GNP. For instance, by 1998, three emerging markets, Korea, Taiwan and 
Malaysia had larger capitalisation than the smallest Pacific Basin developed markets, 
New Zealand and Singapore.
Liquidity is also an important attribute of stock market development because
theoretically liquid markets improve the allocation of capital and enhance prospects of 
long-term economic growth. Although many theoretical definitions of liquidity have 
been suggested by academia, investors and analysts generally use the term refer to the
I
ability to buy and sell stocks easily. Since adequate liquidity allows investors to alter 
their portfolios quickly and cheaply, it makes investment less risky and facilitates 
longer-term, more profitable investments. However, excessively high and excessively 
low turnovers are both matters of concern for investors. Excessively high turnover 
implies immature markets and/or speculative market conditions. On the contrary, 
excessively low turnover may prevent alternations of investors’ portfolios effectively. 
Market liquidity, measured by turnover ratio, also varies widely, particularly among 
emerging markets. With the exception of Taiwan and Korea, the emerging markets in 
the Pacific Basin tended to have, in general, lower turnover ratios than those of the 
developed markets. As shown in Table 2.1, Taiwan and Korea were two of the most 
liquid emerging markets in the world in 1996, and ranked 2nd and 7th, respectively. In 
1998, Taiwan became the most liquid market in the world and Korea ranked 5th 
among the FIBV member exchanges. With the turnover ratio of 29.8%, Malaysia 
ranked 14th in 1996, but the turnover ratio halved to 29.8% in 1998. By the measure, 
the Philippines is perhaps the least liquid among emerging markets in the Pacific 
Basin (see also section 6.3 of Chapter 6 for further details).
Although many emerging markets are small, some o f them contain a large 
number of listed companies. With more than 600 listed companies, for instance, Korea 
and Malaysia ranked 11th and 15th among 55 FIBV (Federation Internationale des 
Bourses de Valeurs) member exchanges in 1996, and ranked 5th and 8th among 
emerging stock markets, respectively. Whereas the stock exchanges in Thailand, 
Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines had a relatively small number of listed
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companies (see Figure 2.5). According to the IFC, in terms of total trading value, in 
1996 Korea with US$177 billion trading value became the 3rd largest emerging stock 
markets in terms of trading value after Taiwan (US$470 billion) and China (US$256 
billion) and followed by Malaysia (US$174 billion). In 1997, Korea ranked 4th largest 
emerging market even during the financial market crisis period. Up until the end of
1996 the Korean stock market was the 5th largest emerging market in terms of total 
market capitalisation whereas it ranked 19th in the world. Due to the outbreak of the 
Korean financial market crisis in the second half of 1997, however, its world ranking 
plummeted to 33rd, and it became the 13th largest emerging market at the year-end.
Most of the emerging markets in the Pacific Basin suffered a sharp downfall in 
their stock price indices during the 1997 Asian financial market crises. However, the 
Taiwanese market performance was rather surprising because its stock market index 
increased by 18% compared to the year before, whereas the declines in stock market 
indices in other countries in this region range from as little as 37% (Indonesia) to as 
much as 55% (Thailand) in US dollar terms. During the period from the second half o f
1997 to the first half of 1998, most of the emerging markets in the region, which have 
suffered in a great deal from the Asian financial market crashes, seemed to recover q \ 
rapidly except the Taiwanese market, which fell by 21% at the end of 1998 compared
to the year before (see Table 2.1).
The market capitalisation of the six emerging markets has risen tremendously 
over the period from 1986 to 1996. Indeed, in 1996 the trading value o f Taiwan 
(US$470 billion), Korea (US$177 billion) and Malaysia (US$173 billion) was greater 
than that of Australia (US$145 billion), New Zealand (US$9.8 billion), Singapore 
(US$42 billion) and Hong Kong (US$166 billion). Over the same period, the total 
capitalisation of the six emerging markets in the Pacific Basin increased twenty seven-
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fold from US$36.7 billion to US$991 billion. This suggests that the six emerging 
markets’ share o f world market capitalisation increased to 4.9% in 1996 from 0.8% in 
1985 whereas the developed markets’ share rather decreased in terms of percentage 
(see Figure 2.3).
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, excluding Indonesia, the five emerging markets’ 
total annual trading value of US$12 billion represented only a 0.7 percent share of 
the world’s total annual trading value of US$1,645 billion in 1985. In 1996, however, 
the six emerging markets’ share accounted for 6.8% of the world’s total trading value. 
For the period from 1985 to 1996, including Indonesia the six emerging markets’ total 
annual trading value increased seventy seven-fold from US$12 billion to US$923 
billion. Over the same period, the developed markets’ trading volume increased only 
seven-fold from US$1,600 billion to US$12,011 billion.
In Table 2.2, the degree of market concentration in 1998 of the six emerging 
and selected developed markets is presented. In some markets, a few companies 
dominate the market. It is often said that high concentration is not desirable because it 
may adversely affect the liquidity of the market. To measure the degree of market 
concentration, both the shares of market capitalisation and trading value accounted for 
by the top 5 percent of the listed companies are computed. In terms of market 
concentration measured by capitalisation, the stock markets of Korea and Indonesia 
are relatively more concentrated among the emerging markets in the Pacific Basin, 
whereas Taiwan is the least concentrated market in the region. This might be 
explained by the fact that Taiwan is a small/medium size enterprise dominated 
economy whereas the Korean stock market is dominated by the large, well-known 
industrial corporations and family-owned conglomerates, the so-called ‘Chaebol
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• • 2 • which have an important place in its economy. When market concentration is
measured in terms of trading value, however, Indonesia and Malaysia are relatively
more concentrated emerging markets in the region. The top 5 percent of listed
companies account for approximately 60% of the domestic market capitalisation and
/ s , •trading value. Among developed market, Australia and Hong Kong have very high
/
concentration.
2.4 Concluding Remark
As the emerging markets have grown rapidly, on average, a great deal of attention has 
been turned to them by investors and academia alike. Nevertheless, little is known 
about what an emerging market means. In this chapter, the various definitions of what 
constitutes an emerging stock market have been discussed and a brief review of the 
nature and recent performance of emerging markets in the Pacific Basin have been 
presented. The definition of emerging markets varies considerably across the literature 
surveyed. Nevertheless, six emerging stock markets (Korea. Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), which will be focused in Chapter 6 in this 
thesis, meet the various classifications without much argument
Emerging markets in the Pacific Basin have grown remarkable in size in recent 
years. In particular, the growth of the stock market in Korea has been dramatic As the 
end of 1996, with more than 700 listed companies, Korea ranked 11th among 55 FIBV 
member exchanges and ranked 5th among 79 functioning emerging stock markets in
2 The Chaebol, which consist of large numbers of subsidiaries, arc usually controlled by extended 
families. Tire Chaebol's, influence on the country's economy has been enormous. For example, in 1996, 
the 50 largest Chaebols, had sales accounting for as much as 97 percent of Korea’s GDP. Allhough the 
impact of the Chaebol on the country economy has been criticised and forced their reforms because 
they were widely blamed for the country 's financial crisis in late 1997. Nevertheless, the Chaebol are 
still considered to be the main driving force o f the Korean economy
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the world.3 The Korean stock market became one of the most liquid emerging markets 
in the world and ranked 3rd and 5th among emerging markets in terms of total trading 
value and market capitalisation, respectively. The speed of quantitative growth of the 
emerging markets including Korea in the Pacific Basin has been slow due to the Asian 
financial market crisis; however, their qualitative developments through liberalisation, 
deregulation, and changes in investment environment are expected to be accelerated.
3 As the end o f 1996, only 79 countries have functioning securities exchanges among 170 countries 
around world that meet definition o f emerging markets by the IFC.
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Figure 2.1 Emerging Markets’ Share o f World GNP, 1996
Developed Markets
US$23,772 billion 
(80.5%)
Six Emerging 
Markets in the 
Pacific Basin
US$1,314 billion 
(4.5%)
Other Emerging 
Markets
US$4,424 billion 
(15.0%)
Source: International Finance Corporation. Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 1998; Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book, 1998.
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Figure 2.2 Emerging Markets’ Share o f  World Population, 1996
Developed Markets
919 million 
(16.0%)
Six Emerging 
Markets in the Pacific 
Basin
421 million 
(7.3%)
Other Emerging 
Markets
4,413 million 
(76.7%)
Source: International Finance Corporation. Emerging Stock Markets Factbook. 1998; Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book. 1998.
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Figure 2.3 Emerging Markets’ Share o f  World Market Capitalisation in 1985 and
1996
O th e r  
E m erg  in g 
M a r k e t s
M a r k e t s  in th e 
P a c i f i c  B a s i n
U S $ 3 6 . 7  b i l l i o n
(0.8%) I
( 2 . 9 % )
D e v e l o  p e d  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 4 , 4 9 6 . 5
1 9 8 5
( 9 6 . 3 % )
Si x  E m e r g i n g  
M a r k e t s  in t he  
P a c i f i c  B a s i n
U S $ 9 9 1  bi l l i on
( 4 . 9 % )
D e v e l o p e d  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 1 7 , 9 5 1  1996
bi l l i on  
( 8 9 . 0 % )
Source: International Finance Corporation. Emerging Stock Markets Factbooks 1995, 1997.
Other  
E m e r g i n g  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 1 , 2 3 4  
b i l l i on
( 6.1 %)
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Figure 2.4 Emerging Markets’ Share o f  World Market Trading Value in 1985 and
1996
Five 
E m e r g i n g  
M a r k e t s  in 
t h e  P a c i f i c  
B a s i n *  
U S $ 1 2  b i l l i o n  
( 0 . 7 %  )
O th e r 
E me r g i n g  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 3 3  b i l l i o n  
( 2 .0 % )
D e v e l o p e d  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 1  , 6 0 0  
b i l l i o n  
( 9 7 . 3 %  )
1 9 8 5
* refers five emerging stock markets excluding Indonesia.
D e v e l o p e d  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 1  2 , 0 1  1 
b i l l io n 
( 8  8  . 3 %  )
S i x  E m e r g i n g  
M a r k e t s  in 
th e P a c i f i c  
B a s i n
U S $ 9 2 3 b i l l i o n  
( 6 . 8 % )
O th e r 
E m e r g i n g  
M a r k e t s
U S $ 6 6 4  b i l l i o n  
( 4  . 9 %  )
1 9 9 6
Source: International Finance Corporation. Emerging Stock Markets Factbooks 1995, 1997.
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Figure 2.5 Number of Listed Companies on the Selected World Stock Exchanges, 
1996
833Tokyo
454Thailand
382Taiwan
296S in g ap o re
Philippine
175New Z ea lan d
Kuala Lum pur
760Korea
252Jakar ta
583H ong Kong
Australian
J o h a n e s b u r g
B ru s s e ls  ppf] 269
Si 897Paris m u
2,494London
248Italy
1,971G erm a n y
Vancouver
5,556NASDAQ
2,476New York
6,0004,0002,000
Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV).
Number of listed companies includes domestic and foreign companies but excludes investment funds.
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Table 2.2 Market Concentration: Shares of Market Capitalisation and Trading Value
by the Top 5% of Listed Companies, 1998
Market Capitalisation0 Trading value^ No. of companies
Indonesia 67.4 63.5 14
Korea 67.5 50.5 37
Malaysia 54.9 59.7 36
Philippines 63.2 47.8 10
Taiwan 33.5 NA 21
Thailand 64.5 49.0 21
Australia 77.4 83.6 58
Hong Kong 81.4 76.6 33
Japan 58.1 62.0 92
New Zealand 55.8 68.4 6
Singapore 67.1 43.4 16
France 68.6 63.4 35
US* 63.8 51.4 114
UK 80.7 59.8 98
Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV). 
Figures in colum nsa an d h are reported in terms of percentage.
* refers New York Stock Exchange.
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3 An Overview of the Korean Stock Market
3.1 Introduction
Korea’s stock market has developed remarkably over the last four decades. It has 
been claimed as one of the fast-growing emerging stock markets although it had been 
one of the strictly regulated markets until the early 1990s. In this chapter, a 
comprehensive review of the different aspects is provided including historical 
development and regulatory changes in the Korean stock market. Although a period
from the mid 1950s to the late 1990s is covered, we are particularly interested in the
/  Wm
1980s and the 1990s since internationalisation and liberalisation of the stock market
A
(X  s
were concentrated in these two decades and most data analysed in this thesis is related
. | \
to the period. This chapter also examines the main features and recent developments 
of the stock market, as well as the Korean financial market crisis in 1997, 
emphasising both the stock and derivatives markets.
There have been some studies of the Korean stock market, but most of the 
studies have concentrated on comparison with other markets rather than examination 
of the Korean stock market itself, for example, Hildeburn, 1986; Rhee, Chang and 
Ageloff, 1990; Feldman and Kumar, 1994; Freris and Blake, 1994; Clemente, 1994; 
Claessens, 1995; and Demirgiic-Kunt and Levine, 1996. Very little work has been done 
on the development of the Korean stock market. For instance, Cooper (1983), Koh 
(1992) and Roc (1995) examined the Korean stock market in historic and quantitative
40
development perspectives. However, those studies did not seem to investigate the 
topic in depth, and also the recent development of the Korean stock market could not, 
of course, be covered. Therefore, this chapter aims to fill this gap by examining the 
Korean stock market in overview and also more closely from various perspectives. In 
particular, the stock market opening-up, the introduction of derivative securities 
trading, and the Korean financial market crisis in 1997 are . l^sof examined.
Rhee, Chang and Ageloff (1990) investigated eleven Pacific-Basin stock 
markets, including the Korean stock market, in terms of market size, trading volume, 
foreign ownership and other factors. In terms of restriction on foreign ownership, the
i
Korean market was categorised in 1987, along with the Taiwan market, as/severely 
restricted one. Roc (1995) examined eight emerging Asian markets including the 
Korean stock market with a historical perspective over the three decades and 
identified the major determinants of their development and the mini-boom between 
1987 and 1990. Cheung and Mak (1992) reported that the estimated percentage of the 
value traded between local and foreign investors in the Korean stock market in 1991 
is 98% for the former and 2% for the latter. They showed that the proportion of 
value traded by overseas investors was quite low compared to the figure of 93% for 
the Malaysian market and 40% for the Philippine market. With respect to the Korean 
financial crisis, Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) examined the impact of foreign investors 
on stock returns in Korea from November 1996 to December 1997 and found no 
evidence that trade by foreign investors had a destabilising effect on the Korean stock 
market.
The securities market in Korea consists of three markets: stocks, bonds and 
derivatives. Among them, the main focus will be drawq on the stock and stock index 
futures market in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) since these markets are closely
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related to our empirical analysis. This is the first study, which covers the development 
of the Korean stock market from its first opening in the mid 1950s until the latter half 
of the 1990s including the stock market opening-up and the Korean financial market 
crisis.
In section 3.2, a brief overview of Korean stock market development up until 
the end of the 1970s is presented. Section 3.3 describes the main developments of the 
market during the 1980s, emphasising its internationalisation. Section 3.4 analyses 
the opening-up of the stock market and the development of foreign investment in it 
during the 1990s, drawing particular attention to how deregulation has speeded up. In 
addition, aspects of the Korean financial market crisis associated with the stock 
market are also noted. Section 3.5 examines some particular characteristics of the 
Korean Stock Exchange. In section 3.6, recent development of the stock market is 
explained. Finally, section 3.7 provides a summary and conclusions.
3.2 The Early Stock Exchange and Quantitative Growth of the Stock 
Market in Korea: Until the Late 1970s
An organised stock market, Chosun Kuraiso, was established in 1932 according to
Chosun Securities Industry Surveillance Decree. It was renamed Chosun Stock 
Exchange in 1943 during the period of Japanese domination (1919-1945), but World 
War II forced it to close after Korea’s independence from Japan in 1946. Since its 
purpose was solely to fund Japanese companies, the real history of the stock market 
in Korea should be considered only from when the first stock exchange was 
established in the capital, Seoul, in 1956. When Taehan Stock Exchange was opened 
on 3 March 1956, the principal securities initially traded were only twelve stocks and 
three bonds (see Table 3.1). Trading was dominated by government bonds issued
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largely to finance the Korean War and the subsequent post-war restoration, farm 
reform and the government budget deficit. Therefore, the stock market played a minor 
role as a means of raising long-term industrial capital. In fact, over 80% of the trading 
conducted in the stock exchange was generated by government bonds. This situation 
prevailed for a number of years between 1956 to 1961. It remained essentially a 
market for government bonds without an institutional structure until the early 1960s, 
when the government decided to foster capital market development in order to bolster 
domestic savings. With the inception of First Five Year Economic Development Plan 
(1962-1966), the Korean Government, recognising the potential of the securities 
market, enacted the Securities and Exchange Law, which was the first comprehensive 
set of regulations overseeing the Korean securities market.
A massive collapse of stock prices in May 1962 brought about the shutdown 
of the market. This crash was due to excessive speculative trading which led a sharp 
rise of the stock prices. At the early of 1963, the Ministry o f Finance (MOF) closed 
the exchange on five occasions, with trading suspended for a total of seventy-three 
days, and instituted a series of reforms. On 3 May 1963, the stock exchange was 
reorganised into a non-profit government-owned corporation and renamed the Korea 
Stock Exchange (KSE). Unfortunately, there was relatively little financing of 
investment through the securities market. Also, relatively risk free bank deposit rates 
were an impediment to stock market growth. In these circumstances the major 
sources of corporate finance necessary to implement First Five Year Economic 
Development Plan were bank loans and, to some extent, foreign capital. This, in turn, 
resulted in the banks suffering from chronic over-extension of loans while highly 
geared business enterprises were burdened with heavy debt service charges.
Embarking on the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-
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1971), the Ministry of Finance recognised that comprehensive measures needed to be 
adopted to promote the securities market. This led to the milestone development of 
comprehensive reform legislation. In November 1968, the government enacted The 
Law on Fostering Capital Market to foster the local securities market. This legislation 
was designed to increase the number of listed companies, thereby distributing share 
ownership among all sectors of the investing body. The first investment trust, Korea 
Investment Corporation (KIC) was established in 1970 to stabilise securities prices 
and also facilitate the issuance, distribution and underwriting o f securities. Until its 
liquidation in 1977, the KIC performed various other functions such as open market 
measures to stabilise prices, analysing securities, and financing securities on the basis 
of collateral. Furthermore, a heavy capital gains tax was imposed on sales of real 
estate to reduce property speculation, while bank deposit rates were halved between 
1968 and 1972 so accelerating the flow of funds into the stock market.
On 3 August 1972, another government measure was taken in the form of a 
Presidential Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth. The main 
purpose of this was to reduce the heavy cost of corporate financing through the 
informal financial sector, or the so-called ‘curb’ market.4 The Emergency Decree 
required that all debts and credits of business enterprises created outside the organised 
financial market be reported to the government while the interest rates of bank loans 
and time deposits were lowered. In 1975, the stock market started undergoing a great 
boom, led by bullish buying of construction-related stocks. Throughout the latter half 
of the 1970s, the Korean securities market experienced an unprecedented rush of
4 Although 'curb’ market was the infonnal financial sector, it was a large and well organised system of  
credit brokers and dealers. The sources o f funds in this market were heterogeneous, but the uses were 
principally for the working capital o f large firms and small and medium-sized finns. The average 
interest rates on curb loans were much higher than those for loans in the regulated market, but most of 
these loans do not require the use of collateral, which indicated that the risk of default was accounted 
for in the interest rates charged.
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public offerings. Later in July 1979, the KSE was moved from Myung-Dong to Yoido 
where Korea’s Wall Street created. In particular, throughout the 1970s, the Korean
t~
stock market had grown rapidly. The number of listed companies, which stood at 
only 50 in 1971, jumped to 356 by the end of 1978. In terms o f trading value, it was 
34.4 billion won in 1971, but it sharply increased to 1,741.5 billion won in 1978— a 
fifty-fold increase (see Table 3.2). Overall, the period to the 1970s, it can be 
characterised as one in which the stock market emerged and played a minor role in 
the economy.
3.3 Market Internationalisation in the 1980s
Since the early 1980s, the Korean financial market has been through a process of 
gradual opening-up and liberalisation. The Korean government took a conservative 
approach, because it had been aware of both the benefits and adverse effects of 
financial market opening which other countries had experienced. At the early of th3 
1980s the authorities had sufficient confidence in the market to begin allowing 
foreign investors an indirect investment channel into the Korean market. In 1981, the 
government announced The Long-Term Plan for Internationalisation of the Capital 
Market, which was a comprehensive blueprint for the globalisation of Korean 
securities industry. The Long-Term Plan outlined the general phases for liberalisation. 
For the first stage of the plan, the Korea International Trust (KIT) and the Korea Trust 
(KT) were established to allow foreigners to invest in Korean equities. The 
establishment of these trusts was seen as a first step in instructing foreign investors 
and brokers in Korean equities since they were permitted to invest indirectly in the 
Korean market not through stocks and bonds but only in beneficial certificates (see
45
Table 3.3 for details). By the end of 1994, beneficial certificates were issued for 
forty-one occasions with a total of US$1.88 billion invested in the Korean market.
Since the capital market was opened to foreign investors in 1981 by indirect 
investment in trusts, there was increasing demand for other means of investment in 
the Korean stock market. In 1984, the listing on the New York Stock Exchange of 
Korea Fund, the first exchange-traded, closed-end country fund ever created, allowed 
indirect foreign participation in the Korean securities market for the first time. With 
US$60 million capital, it was quite popular among international investors as Korean 
equities boomed in the second half of the 1980s. Other funds, such as Korea Europe 
Fund in 1987 and Korea Asia Fund in 1990 quickly followed.
In December 1988, the MOF announced a revised form of the 1981 
internationalisation plan to further promote the liberalisation of the Korean capital 
market for foreign investors. The mid-term plan provided new opportunities for non­
residents to invest in Korean securities during 1989 and 1990. This was arranged by
increasing the capital of overseas funds, such as Korea Fund, which was listed on the
f
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and Korea Euro Fund, which raft by Ssangyong 
Investment Company and Barings and was listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
authorised for investments in Korean securities and by relaxing the qualifications to 
issue overseas securities by Korean companies, including convertible bonds (CB), 
bonds with warrants (BW), and depository receipts (DR).
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the KOSPI began to pick up from 1986. It stood at 
271.61 points at the end of 1986, and climbed to 907.21 points by the end of 1988. 
On 1 April 1989, the KOSPI hit 1,007.77 points which was an increase of 720% 
compared to 139.53 points in 1985. Breaking the 1,000 barrier for the first time was 
attributed to a higher rate of economic growth and the current account surplus. In
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particular, stock market capitalisation grew approximately 1,450% from 6,570.4 
Korean billion won in 1985 to 95,476.8 billion won in 1989 (see Table 3.2).
3.4 Liberalisation in the 1990s
The remarkable quantitative growth in the Korean stock market throughout the late 
1980s and the middle of the 1990s is also highlighted in Table 3.2. This was fuelled 
by the stable and strong performance of the economy. Korea took steps to improve 
the quality o f the market by implementing comprehensive capital market 
liberalisation. One of these steps was opening of the stock market to foreigners. As 
described in section 3.3, this had its beginnings in the 1980s when foreign investors 
were permitted to invest on Korean stocks indirectly through convertible bonds 
and/or country funds and trusts that invested in the Korean stock market. Although 
the Korean economy itself began a liberalisation program as early as 1985, with direct 
foreign investment in some industries, opening the stock market was only a rumour
up until the late of 1988, and even that was to occur with severe restrictions onF /  /
foreign investors. Liberalisation of the stock market in the early 1990s heralded an era 
of gradual deregulation, although not comparable with that in the advanced markets, 
and it was regarded as a new departure in Korea’s previously closed markets. The 
pace of stock market opening was thereafter accelerated. In 1991, prior to the stock 
market opening to foreign investors, the KSE opened its membership to foreign 
securities companies, and Korean securities companies also were permitted to 
establish overseas branch offices. Finally on 3 January 1992, the Korean stock 
market first opened to direct foreign investment. Subsequently, there has been 
escalation in the number of foreign investors, as well as growth in the volume of their
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market participation. Although their market share was still insignificant by 
comparison with that of domestic institutions, foreign investors began to play an 
important part in the domestic securities market.
3.4.1 The Stock Market Stabilisation Fund
After peaking for four years in the late of 1980s, the Korean stock market fell into a 
long slumber from 1990 to 1993. This occurred for a variety o f reasons, including 
excess supply on the stock market, higher interest rates and economic slow-down. In 
spite of other government policies to stabilise the stock market, for example the 
Policy for Adjustment of Demand and Supply on the Issue Market and the Policy for 
Stock Market Stabilisation at the end of 1989, the stock market did not show signs of 
recovery. In order to boost and stabilise the deeply depressed stock market, the Stock 
Market Stabilising Fund was established for the first time on 4 May 1990 but it was 
abolished on 3 May 1996 in line with its six-year legal validity. The Stock Market 
Stabilising Fund was initially organised with 4.85 trillion Korean won by 32 
securities companies, 22 commercial banks, 19 insurance companies, 28 investment 
companies and 536 listed companies on the KSE. Over the period of its six-year legal 
validity, the fund intervened six times by means of direct stock trading. Additionally, 
when the stock market was depressed it also intervened several times in an indirect 
way by lending funds at relatively low interest rates to institutional investors. The 
scope of investment by the fund was limited to stocks issued by listed companies on 
the KSE. At the time, the fund was criticised because it ignored the free market 
principle by distorting the price mechanism. In spite of high hopes for boosting the 
stock market, the positive effects of market intervention by the Stabilisation Fund 
were only short term.
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3.4.2 The Real-Name Financial Transaction System
On 12 August 1993, the Real-Name Financial Transaction System was introduced 
by an emergency order, to eliminate the so-called ‘dark link5 between politics and 
business. Under this system, Koreans were required to use only their own names in 
financial transactions. Those who formerly traded under false names to evade taxes, 
to conceal sources of income or to avoid regulators were required to switch to their 
real names by 12 October 1993. This emergency order required banks’ customers to 
produce identification documents to prove ownership of accounts. Banks also had to 
report to the authorities the names of all clients who withdraw more than 30 million 
Korean won during the period before 12 October 1993 and the names of people 
whose financial assets newly registered in real names exceed 50 million won. The tax 
collector could then investigate their sources of income. The announcement came as a 
massive shock to the financial markets and the banking system. The KOSPI declined 
8% in the two days after the announcement, falling to 666. However, because 
investors expected a government support scheme, the market rebounded, although 
remained edgy.5
The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) announced deregulation of 
the stock market, the so-called Korean version of a ‘Big Bang,5 on 12 July 1996. This 
system implied that the government would move to lift its tight control in an effort to 
enhance the transparency of market regulations and to promote the working of market 
forces. The government released its grip on the supply volume of new stocks enabling 
private corporations to make initial public offerings or issue new stocks freely for
5 In fact, nobody seemed to have much idea of what proportion of Korean financial assets was 
registered in false or borrowed names. Some economists reckoned it could amount to as much as 20 
billion Korean won, which was a fifth of Korea’s money supply.
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cash payment. The government also announced it would not take steps to boost or 
cool down the stock market, and the daily price limits would be gradually expanded. 
The government also liberalised the margin requirement system. In the long run, 
stock brokerage houses would be given full autonomy in setting brokerage 
commissions. So far as investors concerned, they would be able to submit orders to 
brokerage firms and confirm transactions through their own computers.
On 11 October 1996 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the Paris-based club of industrialised nations, officially 
invited Korea to join as its 29th member country. Korea became the second Asian 
member of the OECD after Japan. OECD membership was expected to have a large 
influence on the capital market. Before joining, Korea’s original timetable for fully 
liberalising its financial markets was set for year-end 2000. The government initially 
planed to open domestic banking and securities markets fully to foreigners, allowing 
them to set-up wholly owned subsidiaries in Korea by December 1998. It was 
expected that, from the beginning of 1997, the government would eliminate a 10% 
limit on a foreign corporation’s ownership of existing local securities firms, 
investment trust companies and investment firms. A ceiling on foreign ownership of 
local stock would also be raised to 23% in 1997, 26% in 1998, 29% in 1999 and 
finally 100% in 2000. However, with the sudden onset of the financial crisis, the 
process of liberalisation and opening-up of the market accelerated with the 
subsequent adoption of the IMF bailout program in December 1997.
3.4.3 Stock Market Opening-Up
The changes in foreign investors’ ownership ceilings on the KSE are presented in 
Table 3.4. When the Korean stock market first opened to direct foreign investments
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on 3 January 1992 foreign investors were allowed to buy up to 10% of a Korean 
company’s outstanding securities, with a maximum holding of a 3% for each investor. 
The aggregate foreign investment ceiling was increased to 12 % in December 1994, 
and then gradually increased at fairly regular intervals to 26% in November 1997 to 
meet foreign investors’ increasing demand for Korean stocks. The aggregate ceiling 
on foreign ownership for public utilities such as Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) and Pohang Iron & Steel Company (POSCO) was raised several times from 
8% to 21% in November 1997. In fact, it took only five years to double the foreign 
ownership ceiling to 20%. The ownership ceiling for each individual foreign investor 
was gradually increased from 3% to 7% until November 1997 for general companies 
but the ceiling for public utilities was-remained at 1%. The aggregate ownership 
ceiling on foreign investors increased to 50% in 1997 and then increased again to 
55% at the end of the year. This became 100% on 25 May 1998. Similarly, the 
ownership ceiling for each individual foreign investor jumped from 7% to 50% on 11 
December and finally to 100% in 25 May 1998. By then, investment ceilings on all 
equity products were eliminated. Compared to the original schedule for expanding a 
ceiling on foreign ownership which is described in section 3.4.2, these rapid
c r> . . »increasing were almost entirely in response to the Korean financial market crisis and i 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout program. Subsequently, foreign investors 
have been free to invest in stocks, bonds, derivatives and money market instruments, 
including repurchase agreements, certificate of deposits (CD) and commercial papers 
(CP). In addition, on 1 July 1998, foreign investment limits in stock index futures and 
options market were also fully liberalised. For example, foreign investment limits for 
the stock index futures market were set at 100% of the average daily open interest for 
previous three months on the aggregate basis, and 5% for the individual ceiling.
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3.4.4 Korean Financial Market Crisis in 1997
Up until 1997, Korea’s economic performance was rather impressive. In 1995, GNP 
per capita surpassed US$ 10,000 for the first time and became the eleventh largest 
economy in the world in a short period of time. During the earlier boom period of 
1994-1995, the GDP growth rate was over 8%, the rate of inflation was around 5% 
and the domestic savings rate was approximately 35%. On the stock market side, its 
quantitative growth had been remarkable. From 1980 to 1995, market capitalisation 
increased over 5,500% and the stock market index, KOSPI rose almost 1,000% (see 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1). However, the outbreak of the Korean financial crisis in the 
last quarter of 1997 was preceded by a foreign currency market crash and followed by 
meltdown of the stock market. According to many economists, the Korean financial 
crisis emanated from both internal and external factors. The former includes structural 
weakness of the Korean economy and the latter is characterised by a contagion effect 
of the Southeast Asia financial market crisis in 1997.6 On 3 December 1997, the 
Korean government and the IMF reached an agreement on a bailout loan package 
totalling US$58.35 billion, including loans worth US$21 billion from the IMF, US$14 
billion from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and US$23.35 billion from G7 and other countries. 
In response to the bailout program, the Korean government agreed with the IMF that 
it would pursue macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform in the financial 
sector, the corporate sector, and the labour market, and accelerate trade and 
liberalisation of the capital account.
6 Many other factors such as over investment and liigh costs also contributed to the Korean financial 
market crisis. The structural weakness o f the Korean economy came from two sources, external and 
internal vulnerabilities. The former is characterised by the heavily short-term oriented external 
financing and the latter is characterised by highly leveraged corporate financial structure.
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In particular, with regard to capital market liberalisation, the previous 
government schedule was accelerated. Other conditions of the IMF package involved 
restructuring of the troubled financial system, and further opening-up of Korean 
financial markets to foreign investors, including foreign stakes in banks. The newly 
introduced market-opening measures included the partial or complete removal of 
investment ceilings and restrictions on foreign investment in the stock, bond markets, 
short-term money market instruments and deregulation on mergers and acquisitions 
by foreign investors. The government also permitted foreign investors to buy shares 
in the stock market without limits for the purpose of friendly mergers and acquisitions 
(M & A).
Mainly due to the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997, most exchanges in 
this region experienced meltdown of their stock markets over 1997 and 1998. 
Although various reasons can be regarded as origins of the Asian financial market 
crisis, one of the major for the crisis was Thailand’s financial market crash on 
Wednesday 2 July 1997 (henceforth Black Wednesday). During the second half of 
1997, in particular, equity and currency markets in the most affected countries in the 
region recorded a great degree of drops, which ranges from 20 to 75 percent. The 
KSE was no exception. With the string of bankruptcies of listed firms and the lack of 
market liquidity, total market capitalisation of the KSE at the end of 1997 plummeted 
to 70.9 trillion won, which was equivalent to US$41.8 billion, less than one-third of 
what it was in 1996 in US dollar terms. During the year 1997, the KOSPI plunged 
42.2% to 376.31 compared to 651.22 in the beginning of that year. In terms of the 
dollar-denominated International Finance Corporation Index (IFCI) Korea Index, it 
suffered a 68.9% drop in US dollar terms for the year. Also, the contraction in values 
precipitated a 39.5% decline in the market capitalisation o f securities listed on the
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KSE. In early 1998, however, the stock market regained liquidity, pushing the market 
capitalisation of all listed companies above 137.8 trillion won. Trading value of the 
KSE also had been decreased from US$177 billion in 1996 to US$145 billion in 
1998. In particular, although the KOSPI rebounded sharply one year after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, it dropped by 42% in 1997 compared to the end of 
1998 that was the third worst figure among the Southeast Asian stock exchanges 
during the period (see Table 2.1 of Chapter 2). In particular, the stock market in Korea 
began its downward spiral from mid-1997 when the Southeast Asian financial turmoil 
started. In October 1997, the KOSPI plunged to 350.68 points by the end of 1997 
from 645.15 points in early October and a low of 280.00 was recorded in June 1998. 
Since then, the stock market recovered rapidly due to positive developments in the 
economy, a sizeable trade surplus and stabilised currency, and liberalised investment 
status. At end of 1998, the KOSPI closed at 562, a 49% increase on a year-end basis, 
and the traded value of listed stocks increased by 19%.
3.4.5 Growth of Foreign Investment on the Stock Market
Table 3.5 provides data on the flow of stock investment in Korea. Over the period 
from when stock market was opened up in 1992 to the end of 1998, the total net 
inflow of foreign capital amounted to US$21 billion. Except for the second half of 
1997, the inflow of foreign capital has dominated the outflow. By the end of 1998, 
Foreign investors brought in US$12.8 billion and remitted US$8.8 billion, resulting in 
a net inflow of US$3.9 billion.
Since the Korean stock market opened up, foreign investors have been net 
purchasers. As presented in Table 3.6, when the stock market was in the midst of a 
long recession in 1997, in terms of trading value, foreign investors bought only 424
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billion won, the lowest since the market opening. However, in 1998, foreign 
investment increased dramatically and foreign investors made a net purchase of 5.7 
trillion won, the largest recorded since the stock market opening. One of the reasons 
for the large inflow of foreign investment during 1998 was Korea’s decisive measures 
of abolishing various restrictions in the stock market. Furthermore, active overseas
r '
investment attraction by the private sector and government, recovery in the economy 
during the second half of 1998 and the boost in sovereign credit rating also helped the 
inflow of foreign investment. Overall, by the end of 1998, foreign investors had 
purchased a total of 60.9 trillion won and sold 43.6 trillion won, resulting in a 
cumulative net purchase of 17.3 trillion won. In terms of trading volume, foreign 
investors have remained as net purchasers except the Korean financial period. In 
addition, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, the proportion of total market value of stocks 
owned by foreign investors has been increased rapidly from 2.7% in 1992 to 16.4% in 
1998. In terms of number of listed shares, the rate has been increased almost four 
times from 2.1% in 1992 to 8.1% in 1998.
Table 3.7 and 3.8 report data on foreign investors from 1992 to 1998. When 
the stock market first opened to foreign investors only 1,572 investors from 37 
countries registered for trading. Since then, the number of foreign investors had been 
increased continuously and over 8,000 foreign investors from 66 countries registered 
as of 1998. A breakdown by nationality is illustrated in Figure 3.3 and the reported 
figures are calculated by the average over the period from 1992 to 1998. The majority 
was from US (35.8%), UK (15.1%), Taiwan (10.7%) and Japan (8.2%).
The number of listed companies was only 50 in 1971. The figure reached to 
352 by the end of 1980, 669 in 1990 and 748 in 1998. In terms of the number of listed 
companies, the KSE ranked 16th among 35 member stock exchanges of the
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International Stock Exchange Federation (FIBV: Federation Internationale des 
Bourses de Valeurs) in 1985. It ranked 11th among 51 member stock exchanges in 
1998 (see Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2). The trading value for listed stocks on the KSE 
amounted to 34.4 billion won in 1971 and then it was increased to 1.13 trillion won 
in 1980. In 1998, it reached 192.8 trillion won, which was almost one hundred and 
seventy-fold increase over two decades.
Although the stock market has grown continuously with the expansion in the 
Korean economy, the stock market expanded rapidly in the period following the first 
trade surplus in late 1986. Qualitative growth of the KSE accelerated further after its 
opening to foreign investors in 1992. By 1998, total market value had increased 
twenty-fold, and the KSE-listed capital stock increased ten-fold, over 1985.
Table 3.9 shows the foreign investors’ share ownership since 1981. In the 
period before the stock market opening-up in 1992 the percentage of foreign 
shareholders among total investors varied only over a range of 0.01% to 0.06%. 
However, the rate increased to 0.18% in 1993 and 0.28% 1995. Incidentally, the 
percentage of shares owned by foreign investors increased sharply compared to 
2.49% in 1991 to 4.13% in 1992. Furthermore, the rate doubled to 8.74% in 1993 
although the speed of increase slowed down to 9.1% in 1994 and 10.1% in 1995, an 
increase of more than 250% since 1992. In 1998, foreign investors’ shareholding 
reached 1.2 billion shares or the value of 25.6 trillion won, which accounted for 
10.5% of the total outstanding shares and 18,6 % of the total market value, 
respectively.
As presented in Table 3.10, at the end of 1998, the total number of 
shareholders reached to 1.9 million, accounting for approximately 4.2% of the Korean 
population. The number of shares held by individual and institutional investors
56
accounted for 39.8% and 21.7% of all listed shares, respectively. Foreign investors’ 
shareholdings have shown a slight decrease from 11.6% in 1996 to 9.1% in 1997 
although the figure increased to 10.4% in 1998 (see Figure 3.4).
3.4.6 The Stock Exchange Versus the Over-the-Counter Market
In July 1996, the Korea Securities Dealers Association set up the Korea Securities 
Dealers Association Quotation Stock Market (KOSDAQ), in which listing 
requirements are less strict than those for the KSE. It was born as a development of 
the existing over-the-counter market and one of the its main roles is primarily to 
provide a method of raising public investment for promising small and medium-sized 
enterprises and venture businesses. The KOSDAQ has grown rapidly. Indeed, in two 
years since its foundation, trading value and volume have been increased by three­
fold and six-fold, respectively. By the end of 1998, there were 331 listed companies 
on the KOSDAQ, which is equivalent to 44% of companies listed on the KSE, and 
the KOSDAQ’s market capitalisation was 7.9 trillion won, which is 5.7% of the 
KSE’s level.
3.5 Characteristics of the Korea Stock Exchange
The KSE is a privately incorporated association composed of member securities 
companies. Until the early part of 1988, the government owned 68% of the KSE’s 
shares, with the remainder in the hands of the 25 member firms. In March 1988, the 
government sold its shareholding to these member firms and the KSE has since 
operated as a non-profit organisation. In 1991, the KSE opened its membership to all 
qualified foreign securities companies and in 1998 had 41 members including 10
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foreign securities companies and two affiliates, the Korea Securities Depository 
(KSD) and the Korea Securities Computer Corporation (KOSCOM).
The KSE has become one of the most modern exchanges in Asia with a high 
degree of computerisation and a central depository system. KSE membership is 
granted only to securities companies licensed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MOFE) to engage in the securities business to act as a dealer, broker or 
underwriter. Thus the major sources of income of the securities companies comprise 
capital gains plus dividends, brokerage commission and underwriting fees. Securities 
companies are also permitted to operate other appending activities such as security 
savings business and trading of bonds.
3.5.1 Trading Scheme
The open outcry trading method was used from March 1956 to late 1974. KSE 
officials clapped wood chips to signal the beginning of bid for each stock and the end 
of trade for each stock. When a certain bid price and volume for a particular stock 
matched the ask price and volume for that stock, the chips were clapped.
For the period from January 1971 to August 1997, post trading was used. The 
main purpose of this method was to handle an increasing number of listed stocks, 
because call trading was incapable of handling a large number of shares. The KSE 
installed a trading place for each listed stock. This was, in effect, a post where buyers 
and sellers submitted their bid and ask prices and volumes to KSE officials. They 
then listed bid and ask prices and volumes in order of receipts, then matched them in 
the order.
In March 1988, the KSE partially introduced a computerised trading system, 
called SMATS (Stock Market Automated Trading System). On 1 September 1997, the
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KSE fully automated its securities reading and runs two electronic systems, an order 
routing system and KATS (KSE Automated Trading System), to facilitate securities 
trading.
The KSE operates a continuous double auction system in which the 
computerised system replaces an auctioneer and determines the price by matching the 
best bids and offers. Through the trading session, customer orders are continuously 
matched at a price satisfactory to both parties according to price and time priority. At 
the time o f market opening and closing, however, customer orders are pooled over a 
certain period of time and matched at a single price that minimise any imbalance 
between buying and selling parties.
The stock market in Korea is divided into two sections: first section and 
second section markets. To be listed on the first section, there are several major 
requirements. Among them, the number of minority shareholders must be at least 
1,000, paid-in capital must be at least 5 billion Korean won, and the ratio of net profit 
to the capital stock must have been at least 10% for the last three business years. 
Also, the number of shares owned by one controlling shareholder must not be more 
than 51% of the total outstanding shares, excluding preferred (non-voting) shares. 
Companies, which do not satisfy these criteria, are traded on the second section.
3.5.2 Stock Indices
a) Korea Composite Stock Price Index
The KSE initially introduced the Korea Stock Price Index (KSPI) in 1972 and it was a 
price-weighted index of selected stocks representative of the market as a whole. Its 
base date was 4th January 1972, with a base index of 100. The original index was 
composed of 35 stocks, but the number of stocks had increased to 153 by 4 January
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1979, and the base date was then adjusted to 4 January 1975.
From 1 January 1983 the KSE adopted a new method o f calculating the index 
called the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), which is a comprehensive 
top-down and market capitalisation weighted index. It is based on aggregate market 
value and has a base value o f 100 on the base date of 4th January 1980. The index is 
composed of all listed shares on the KSE to reflect the whole stock market. The KSE 
also publishes 40 supplementary indices categorised by section, industry and capital 
size. As the end of 1998, the KOSPI and its supplemental indices are published every 
thirty seconds of each trading session. The computation formula for the KOSPI is as 
follows:
K O S P I = 100 (3.1)
i = l  7=1
where PojQoj and P CiQCi which are the market capitalisation of an individual stock, is 
derived by multiplying common stock price by the number o f the outstanding shares 
in the base year and in current time, respectively. The aggregate market capitalisation 
is the sum of market capitalisation of all constituent stocks. In calculating the KOSPI, 
the number of preferred stocks is added to the number of common stocks and then 
multiplied by common stock price, not by preferred stock price.
b) Korea Stock Price Index 200 (KOSPI 200)
The KOSPI 200 is an underlying index for stock index futures and options contracts, 
which were introduced in 1996 and 1997, respectively. It has been published since 15 
June 1994. The KOSPI 200 is a sampled constituent and market capitalisation 
weighted index. It is composed of 200 leading companies’ stocks listed on the KSE 
that make up approximately 70% to 80% of total market capitalisation. The selection
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of the constituent stocks is based on the individual stock’s liquidity and position in its 
industry. In principle, changes to constituents are made in two ways. One is through 
periodic changes every June and the other is the occasional changes when existing 
constituents are de-listed or merged between the periodic changes.
The KOSPI 200 is announced every thirty seconds on a real time basis. 
Basically, the methodology of the KOSPI 200 calculation is identical to the KOSPI 
calculation shown in equation (3.1) except for the fact that KOSPI 200 is a sampled 
constituent index and its base is 100 as of 3rd January 1990.
3.5.3 Trading Hours
The KSE operates as a continuous auction market where an auctioneer matches best 
bids and offers, which is similar to the trading mechanism found in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Since 8 December 1997 the KSE closed its market on Saturdays and 
trading hours changed. From Monday through Friday, the morning session begins at 
09:00 and finishes at 12:00 and the afternoon session begins at 13:00 and ends at 
15:00. Besides the regular trading sessions, the KSE operates an after-hours session in 
which investors can trade securities at the closing prices for 30 minutes from 15:10 to 
15:40, In addition, the opening auction prices of the morning and afternoon sessions 
are determined by an opening auction where the price is determined by referring to all 
bid and ask prices in the first five minutes of the trading session. Transmissions are 
handled in two ways, either regular-way or cash transactions, depending on the 
settlement period. The former is settled on the second business day following the 
contract date (T + 2) while the latter is due on the day of the transaction.
3.5.4 Price Limits System
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Price limits have been in force in the KSE since May 1964. The price limits refer to a 
range within which the price of a stock is permitted to rise or fall in a particular day 
from the pervious trading day’s closing quote. All securities listed on the KSE are 
subject to daily price limits designed to protect investors from sharp falls in price, 
which may be caused by speculative trading on the part of few large investors.
Before April 1995, the price limits were expressed as absolute changes for 
specified ranges of base prices. Under this system of absolute changes, as the average 
equity price has increased over time, the set of ranges of base prices has increased. 
From the beginning of April 1995, price limits have been expressed as a fixed  
percentage rate. Under this system, for a given period, the price limits are the same 
percentage change of the base price, whatever that base price. Initially, the daily 
limits were price changes of ±6%, these were relaxed to ±8% from 25 November 
1996 and again to ±12% from 2 March 1998. From 7 December 1998 the limits were 
widened to ±15% of the base price and circuit breakers were also introduced. The 
system of price limits is fully described in section 7.3 of Chapter 7.
3.5.5 Taxation and Transaction Costs
There is no capital gains tax on income from securities investment for residents. In 
principle, non-residents are taxed according to tax treaties. When an investor is from 
a country with which Korea has a taxation treaty, the tax is levied according to the 
rate range in the treaty. Non-residents without a permanent establishment in Korea are 
subject to 25% of final withholding tax on dividend and interest.
Investors incur two types of out-of-pocket transaction costs in the Korean 
stock market: Securities Transaction Tax and brokerage commissions. The Securities 
Transaction Tax is levied on the seller at a basic rate of 0.3% of sales value. Flowever,
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there is no tax levied on stocks sold below par value or the public offering price 
during the first year of listing on the KSE, or sales of securities by investment trusts. 
Brokerage commissions are charged to both the seller and the buyer, and individual 
securities companies freely determine the rates.
3.5.6 Margin Transactions
A margin transaction is a purchase or sale of securities with only part of the money or 
securities supplied by the purchaser or seller, the balance being borrowed from 
securities companies. That is, securities companies extend credit to customers, 
thereby enabling them to settle their trading. There are two categories in a margin 
transaction: margin buying and short sale. Securities companies may extend credit to 
their customers by using their own money or stocks, or by borrowing from the Korea 
Securities Finance Corporation, which acts solely for the financing securities, market 
in various ways. With the exception of securities issued by securities companies, all 
stocks are eligible for margin trading. The initial margin requirement is a rate of 49% 
of the trading value. The regulations limit margin buying and short sale to 20% of the 
total shares of a listed company. A securities company may extend credit up to 150% 
of its shareholders’ equity for margin buying and 50% for short sale, respectively. 
Foreign investors are not allowed to trade on margin or overdraw their cash accounts.
3.5.7 Regulatory Structure
The regulatory structure of the Korean stock market consists of three main types of 
regulator: the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), the Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSS), and self-regulatory bodies. The MOFE, controls and directs the stock 
market by setting overall policies, is primarily responsible for the interpretation of the
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securities laws, and the authorisation or revocation of licences for financial 
institutions. The FSS is responsible for the supervision and surveillance of securities 
and futures markets as well as securities institutions. In addition, self-regulatory 
bodies such as the KSE and the Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA) also 
play an important role in the Korean market. The KSE monitors all trading activities 
as well as price movements and market events. For example, if Stock Watch 
Department of the KSE detects unusual trading through a computerised system, 
Stock Watch Alert System (SWAS), on real-time basis, it analyses trading activities, 
rumours and news of the relevant stock and further analysis is referred to Market 
Surveillance Department for in-depth investigation. Subsequently, the suspicious 
trading is either referred to the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) or subject to 
disciplinary measures by the KSE. The KSDA promotes discipline and fair practice 
among its members as well as on the securities industry. It also recommends policies 
to the government to help develop regulations and laws to protect all market 
participants.
3.6 Recent Development
3.6.1 The Introduction of Derivative Securities Trading
Among the most important events in the 1990s was the introduction of derivative 
securities trading on the KSE. This was expected to add a new dimension to the 
Korean securities market. As a first step, stock index futures trading was introduced 
on 3 May 1996. Following the successful introduction and operation of KOSPI 200 
futures market, the launch of the KOSPI 200 options followed on 7 July 1997. These 
new instruments provide risk management opportunities for investors.
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S tock  In d e x  F u tu res
There are four delivery months: March, June, September and December, For the life 
of a contract, the longest maturity of one year is the same as the length of institutional 
investors’ fiscal year. The last trading day of a contract is the second Thursday of the 
delivery month. A futures contract size is 500,000 won times the futures price and the 
minimum price change is 0.05 point (25,000 won).
Trading hours of the morning session are similar to the stock market. Trading 
hours in afternoon sessions are extended by 15 minutes for the purpose of giving 
investors time to adjust their futures position after the stock market has closed. The 
futures market is closed ten minutes earlier than the stock market on the last trading 
day of a contract. The KSE uses a computerised individual auction method for trading 
futures contracts, as in the cash market.
The size of daily price limits, ±10% of a base price, is determined to be 
similar to that of the cash market. If a futures price changes more than 10% of a base 
and if at the same time the magnitude of market basis is larger than 1%, then the 
futures trading will be halted for a while. The market basis is the percentage 
difference between market and theoretical prices. The introduction o f a circuit breaker 
system is considered necessary to minimise the adverse effects of sudden fluctuations 
in the futures market on the underlying cash market and to provide investors with a 
‘cooling o ff period.
Table 3.11 reports data on KOSPI 200 futures trading. The growth of stock 
index futures trading in Korea has been remarkable. In 1997, average daily trading 
volume and trading value increased 203% and 125%, respectively, compared to the 
first year of its introduction in 1996. By the end of 1998, average daily trading
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volume amounted to 61,279 contracts, which is an almost six-fold increase compared 
to 1997 and has become the second largest in the world, after the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME). In terms of total contract value, it recorded 405 trillion won. As 
shown in Table 3.12, in terms of trading value and volume, the average range of 
foreign investment were around 2 to 4%. The trading systems and development of 
the KOSPI 200 futures market are fully described in section 8.3 of Chapter 8.
S to ck  In d e x  O ptions
There are four options contract months: March, June, September and December. The 
first or last trading is the same as futures contracts with unit in points. An option 
contract is 100,000 won times the option price. The minimum price change is 0.05 
points for price quotations greater than or equal to 3.00 points, and 0.01 point for less 
than 3.00 points. Although there are no price limits in the options market the price 
quotation must be within the theoretical option price range if the KOSPI 200 should 
rise or fall by 15%. The ceiling on foreign investment in KOSPI 200 futures and 
options was completely lifted in May 1998.
The options market has grown rapidly despite of its short period of 
experience. During the first trading year of 1997, the average daily trading volume 
was 31,000 contracts. In 1998, it reached 110,000 contracts, and thus the KOSPI 200 
options market became the fourth largest market in the world. Among investors, 
individuals were most actively traded investors and constituted approximately 77% 
of the total trading volume, whereas securities companies and foreign investors made 
up only 5.4% and 0.8%, respectively.
3.6.2 New Dimension: On-Line Stock Trading
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The advent of cyber on-line stock trading through the internet or commercial 
networks has revolutionised the global stock marketplace from the largest of 
brokerage houses to the smallest of dealers. The growth of on-line trading has been 
remarkable. Compared to conventional transactions, on-line stock trading has some 
advantages such as promptness and accuracy. Above all, the chief merit of on-line 
stock trading is significantly reduced commission fees for stock investors. The 
Korean stock market is no exception. In January 1997, with the amendment of the 
Securities and Exchange Act, securities companies was allowed to receive customers’ 
order through electronic communications such as the internet, mobile phones, etc. 
The innovative on-line trading method has become very popular because of the fast 
and wide spread of the internet. Initially, it started with text-based on-line trading 
services and modified into graphic-based internet trading in June 1998 when 
domestic brokerage houses launched their Home Trading Systems (HTS). With 
popular use of personal computers and internet, on-line stock trading has increased 
remarkably. As the end of April 1998 cyber trading amounted to 2.8% of all orders 
executed on the KSE. By December 1998 the ratio jumped to 6,4% and the trading 
value via on-line systems reached to 22.5 trillion won including 11.4 trillion won in 
stocks, 10.9 trillion won in stock index futures and 136 billion won in stock index 
options. In terms of trading value, on-line trading was remarkably increased by over 
8,500% from 1999 to 2000, which is the fastest growth rate among the securities 
markets in the world. As the end of December 2000, the trading value by on-line 
stock trading system accounted for 51.2% in the KSE market.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
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In this chapter, the development of the Korean stock market and its particular 
characteristics have been examined in order to provide some background 
understanding of (i) changes in the trading system; (ii) relevant regulation system;
(iii) the internationalisation and liberalisation programme in a historical context; and
(iv) particular features, for instance, Stock Market Stabilisation Fund, price limits 
system, and introduction of derivative securities trading.
The period since the opening of the stock market in the mid 1950s up until 
the late 1970s can be characterised as one in which stock market emerged and played 
a minor role in the economy. In particular, the Korean stock market has grown rapidly 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the early 1980s, the Korean financial market has been 
through a process of gradual opening-up and liberalisation. Although 
internationalisation of the market began in the early 1980s, its qualitative 
development has started in the 1990s when stock market liberalisation accelerated 
allowing direct investment by foreign investors, and derivative securities trading and 
a cyber stock trading system were introduced. Since 1992, Korea has been one of the 
emerging stock markets that is relatively open and easily accessible to foreign 
investors. The sudden outset of the Korean financial market crisis, which was 
partially triggered by the Southeast Asian financial market crisis in the last quarter of 
1997, led meltdown of the Korean stock market—but it recovered rapidly due to 
positive developments in the economy and liberalised investment status.
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Table 3.1 Principal Securities Traded on Taehan Stock Exchange at the Outset
Stocks Bonds
Taehan Stock Exchange financed stock Gunkuk Government Bond Ma-Ho
Korea United Stock Gunkuk Government Bond Ba-Ho
Chohung Bank Gunkuk Government Bond Sa-Ho
Saving Bank
Korea Commercial Bank
Hungyop Bank
Kyungsung Textile
Kyungsung Electric
Namsun Electric
Chosun Transports
Taehan Haeun Public Co.
Taehan Chosun Public Co.
Source: Korea Stock Exchange, Stock Market in Korea , 1991.
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Table 3.2 Key Statistics o f  Listed Stocks on KSE
End of 
period
No. of 
listed
CO.
No. of 
listed 
is su e s
M arket
capitalisation
{billion won)
Capital stock 
listed
(billion won)
Trading
volum e
(million
shares)
Trading
va lue
(billion
won)
G DP
nom inal
(billion
won)
‘ Market 
capitalisation / 
GDP nominal
{%)
1971 50 62 108.7 141.4 50.5 34.4 3,423 3.2
1972 66 97 246.0 174.3 84.7 71.1 4 ,212 5.8
1973 104 200 426 ,2 251.6 130.1 160.6 5,421 7.9
1974 128 221 532.8 381.3 157.1 179.4 7 ,664 7.0
1975 189 356 916.1 643.4 310.5 333 .9 10,296 8.9
1976 274 516 1,436.1 1,153.3 591.8 628 .7 14,088 10.2
1977 323 540 2,350.8 1,492.4 1,271.5 1,375.3 18,063 13.0
1978 356 594 2,892.5 1,913.5 1,368.5 1,741.5 24 ,388 11.9
1979 355 495 2,609 .4 2,202.3 1,560.6 1,372.8 31 ,393 8.3
1980 352 437 2,526.6 2 ,421 .4 1,645.3 1,134.0 38 ,148 6.6
1981 343 451 2,959.1 2 ,410 .2 3,074.6 2 ,534 .2 47 ,657 6.2
1982 334 416 3,300.5 2,811.3 2,872.4 1,973.5 54,721 5.5
1983 328 422 3,489.7 3,238.9 2,750.7 1,752.6 64 ,197 5.4
1984 336 455 5,148.5 4,336.2 4,350.3 3,118.2 73 ,605 7.0
1985 342 414 6,570.4 4,665.4 5,563.8 6 ,320 .6 82 ,062 8.0
1986 355 485 11,994.2 5,649.7 9,272.5 9,598.1 95 ,736 12.5
1987 389 603 26,172.1 7,591.4 5,943.0 20 ,493 .9 112,130 23.3
1988 502 970 64,543 .7 12,560.4 3,037.0 58 ,120 .6 133,134 48.5
1989 626 1284 95,476.8 21,211.5 3,397.6 81,199 .6 149,165 64.0
1990 669 1115 79,019 .7 23,981.6 3,162.1 53,454 .5 179,539 44.0
1991 686 1013 73,117.8 25,509 .6 4,094.4 62 ,564 .9 215 ,734 33.9
1992 688 1014 84,712.0 27,064.7 7,064.2 90 ,624 .4 240 ,392 35.2
1993 693 1045 112,665.3 28,800.7 10,398.4 169,918,1 2 67 ,146 42.2
1994 699 1089 151,217.2 34,402.6 10,911.2 229 ,772 .0 305 ,970 49.4
1995 721 1122 141,151.4 38,047.0 7,648.4 142,914.1 351 ,975 40.1
1996 760 1143 117,370.0 42,991 .9 7,785.4 142,642.2 389,813 30.1
1997 776 958 70,988.9 45,153 .7 12,125.3 162,281.5 420 ,987 16.9
1998 748 925 137,798.5 54,865.6 28,533.1 192,845.2 398 ,313 34.6 ...
Sources: Korea Stock Exchange. Stocks, various issues: Bank o f Korea, Monthly Economic Statistics, 
various issues.
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Table 3.3 Investment Vehicles for Foreign Investors from 1981 to 1990
Fund
establishment
date
Amount
Beneficial certificates 
for foreign investors
o f  money 
(US$
Investment principle o f the fund 
(Domestic investment only) Issuing area
million)
Korea International Trust (KTT) Nov. 1981 25 Listed stocks on the KSE
(Investment over 90% of the net 
asset value)
Korea Trust (KT) Nov. 1981 25 Listed stocks on the KSE
(Investment over 90% of the net 
asset value)
Korea Growth Trust (KGT) Mar. 1985 30 Listed stocks on the KSE and bonds
(Investment over 80% of the net 
asset value)
Europe, Asia, 
Australia
Seoul International Trust (SIT) Apr. 1985 30 Listed stocks on the KSE and bonds
(Investment over 80% of the net 
asset value)
Europe, US, 
Asia
Seoul Trust (ST) Apr. 1985 30 Listed stocks on the KSE and bonds
(Investment over 80% of the net 
asset value)
Europe, US, 
Asia
Korea Small Company Trust Dec. 1985 6 Listed and unlisted stocks on the 
KSE
U K , Japan
(KSCT) (Investment over 60% of the net
asset value)
Korea Emerging Company Tmst Mar. 1986 6.2 Listed and unlisted stocks on the 
KSE
UK, Japan
(KECT) (investment over 60% of the net 
asset value)
Korea 1990 Trust (KNT) Apr. 1990 50 (Investment over 90% of the net US
asset value)
Korea Equity Trust (KET) May 1990 50 (Investment over 90% of the net 
asset value)
Asia, etc.
Daehan Korea Trust (DKT) May 1990 50 (Investment over 90% of the net Europe, etc.
asset value)
Daehan Asia Trust (DAT) Jun. 1990 100 Domestic stock investment: 70%,
Overseas stock investment: 30% 
of the net asset value
Domestic:
40%
Overseas:
60%
Seoul Asia Index Tmst (SAIT) Jun. 1990 100 Domestic stock investment: 60%,
Overseas stock investment: 40% 
of tire net asset value
Domestic:
40%
Overseas:
60%
Korea Pacific Tmst (KPT) Jun. 1990 100 Domestic stock investment: 70%,
Overseas stock investment: 30% 
of die net asset value
Domestic:
40%
Overseas:
60%
Sources: Korea Stock Exchange, Stock Market in Korea, 1991; Dongseo Economic Institute, Securities 
Investment, 1995,
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Table 3.4 Changes in Foreign Investors’ Ownership Ceilings on KSE
Starting date
Ceiling on the 
aggregate foreign 
ownership of a 
general company 
listed on the KSE
Ceiling 
on each 
foreign 
investor
Ceiling on the 
aggregate foreign 
ownership for a 
public utility* 
listed on the KSE
Ceiling 
on each 
foreign 
investor
Initial 3 Jan. 1992 10% (3%) 8% d%)
1st expansion 1 Dec. 1994 12% (3%) 8% (1%)
2nd expansion 1 Jul. 1995 15% (3%) 10% (1%)
3rd expansion 1 Apr. 1996 18% (4%) 12% (1%)
4th expansion 1 Oct. 1996 20% (5%) 15% (1%)
5th expansion 2 May 1997 23% (6%) 18% (1%)
6th expansion 3 Nov. 1997 26% (7%) 21% d%)
7th expansion 11 Dec. 1997 50% (50%) 25% d%)
8th expansion 30 Dec. 1997 55% (50%) 25% (1%)
9th expansion 25 May 1998 100% (100%) 30% (3%)
Sources: The Korea Economic Daily, Seoul, various issues; Dong-A Daily Newspaper, Seoul, various 
issues.
Note: * Public utilities include POSCO (Poliang Iron & Steel Company) and KEPCO (Korea Electric 
Power Corporation).
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Table 3.5 Flow of Stock Investment in Korea
End
of
period
Stock investment (US$ million)
Inflow
(I)
Monthly
average
Outflow
(O)
Monthly Net flow 
average (I -  O)
Monthly
average
1991 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
1992 2,716.1 (226) 681.5 (57) 2,034.6 (170)
1993 7,639.3 (636) 1,942.8 (162) 5,696.5 (475)
1994 8,559.8 (713) 6,599.5 (550) 1,960.3 (163)
1995 9,990.7 (833) 7,786.9 (649) 2,203.8 (184)
1996 12,422.4 (1,035) 8,049.4 (671) 4,373.0 (364)
1997 12,525.7 (1,044) 11,748.3 (979) 777.4 (65)
First half 7,009 (1,168) 4,835 (806) 2,174 (362)
Second half 5,517 (920) 6,9 13 (1,152) -1,396 (-233)
1998 12,810.3 (1,075) 8,822.2 (729) 3,988.1 (347)
Source: The Bank of Korea, Balance o f Payments, various issues.
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Table 3.6 Stock Trading Value and Volume by Foreign Investors
End
of
year
Stock trading value 
(billion won)
Purchases Sales Balance
Stock trading volume 
(million shares)
Purchases Sales Balance
1992 2,385 (2.6%) 877 (1.0%) 1,508 129 (1.8%) 52 (0.7%) 77
1993 6,419 (3.8%) 2,089 (1.2%) 4,329 383 (3.7%) 126 (1.2%) 257
1994 6,101 (2.7%) 5,172 (2.3%) 929 335 (3.1%) 285 (2.6%) 50
1995 7,602 (5.3%) 6,284 (4.4%) 1.318 434 (5.7%) 371 (4.%9) 62
1996 10,123 (7.1%) 7,050 (4.9%) 3,074 537 (6.9%) 405 (5.2%) 132
1997 11,061 (6.8%) 10,637 (6.6%) 424 641 (5.3%) 864 (7.1%) -222
1998 17,270 (9.0%) 11,546 (6.0%) 5,723 1,087 (3.8%) 990 (3.5%) 97
Source: Korea Stock Exchange, Stock, various issues. 
Balance is calculated as Purchases -  Sales.
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Figure 3.2 Share Ownership by Foreign Investors
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□  Total Market Value
□  No. of Listed Shares
Table 3.7 Foreign Investors Registered in Korean Stock Market by Nationality
(Cumulative)
End
of
year
Number of investors Total no. 
of
nationalitiesUS UK Japan Taiwan Canada Malaysia Ireland Others Total
1992 502 314 110 266 24 8 14 334 1,572 37
1993 983 478 237 353 71 38 33 552 2,745 44
1994 1,228 565 293 400 111 55 76 699 3,427 49
1995 1,553 682 365 442 155 92 119 878 4,286 55
1996 1,939 719 451 492 197 183 155 1.158 5,294 61
1997 2,369 806 528 504 246 310 178 1,573 6,514 66
1998 3,225 859 677 514 308 360 251 2,286 8,480 66
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and Korea Stock Exchange.
Table 3.8 Investment Registration by Types of Foreign Investors
End
of
year
Number of 
Individual 
investors
Number of institutional investors
Total
Investment
companies
„ , Securities Funds companies Banks Insurance Others Subtotal
1992 677 584 102 73 62 23 51 895 1,572
1993 1,092 1,080 240 88 101 48 96 1,653 2,745
1994 1,316 1,392 282 119 141 59 118 2,111 3,427
1995 1,520 1,895 351 138 165 76 141 2,766 4,286
1996 1,782 2,412 432 191 205 112 160 3,512 5,294
1997 1,995 3,198 476 250 243 144 208 4,519 6,514
1998 3,151 3,763 522 285 282 159 318 5,329 8,480
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
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Figure 3.3 Breakdown by Nationality o f  Foreign Investors
Others 22.2%
Ireland 2.2% 
Malaysia 2.6% 
Canada 3.2%
Japan 8.2%
Taiwan 10.7%
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and Korea Stock Exchange.
Note: Reported Figures are the averages, which are calculated over the period from 1992 to 1998.
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Table 3.9 Foreign Investors’ Share Ownership
End of Foreign shareholders Shares held by foreign investors
year Total number (%) Total number (%)
1981 98 (0,02) 83,154,829 (1.96)
1982 87 (0.01) 96,891,208 (2.04)
1983 84 (0,01) 125,574,375 (2.24)
1984 106 (0,01) 163,581.612 (2.20)
1985 122 (0.01) 211,396,615 (2.63)
1986 154 (0,01) 288,747,732 (3.01)
1987 1,822 (0.06) 51,018.169 (3.31)
1988 3,444 (0.04) 67,525,104 (2.69)
1989 7,075 (0.04) 92,851.339 (2.13)
1990 607 (0.03) 81,897.483 (1.69)
1991 413 (0.02) 123,670,426 (2.49)
1992 1,572 (0.05) 220,633,805 (4.13)
1993 2,745 (0.18) 500,082.828 (8.74)
1994 3,427 (0.20) 634,857,767 (9.11)
1995 4,286 (0,28) 762,310,986 (10.12)
1996 5,294 (0.36) 989,201.238 (11.58)
1997 4,432 (0.33) 816,107.450 (9.11)
1998 8,320 (0.43) 1.181,311.142 (10.39)
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
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Table 3.10 Breakdown o f  Share Ownership by Type o f  Investors
1990 1998
Type
o f
investors
N o . o f  shareholders
N o . o f  shares 
(million shares)
N o . o f  
shareholders
N o . o f  shares 
(million shares)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
G overnm ent &  
public bod ies
4 (0.00) 495 (10.25) 10 (0.00) 1,969 (17.32)
Banks 30 (0.00) 355 (7.34) 79 (0.00) 408 (3.58)
Securities
com panies
25 (0.00) 229 (4.74) 55 (0.00) 148 (1.30)
Investm ent trust 
com panies
8 (0.00) 394 (8.15) 24 (0.00) 226 (1.99)
Insurance
com panies
48 (0.00) 265 (5.48) 42 (0.00) 411 (3.62)
Other financial 
com panies
275 (0.01) 37 (0.76) 220 (0.01) 84 (0.74)
Other juridical 
persons
4,235 (0.18) 754 (15.06) 3,819 (0.20) 2,531 (22.26)
Individuals 2,413,097 (99.78) 2,223 (45.99) 1,902,779 (99.34) 4,410 (38.79)
Foreigners 607 (0.03) 82 (1.69) 8,320 (0.43) 1,181 (10.39)
Total 2,418,329 (100) 4,834 (100) 1,915,348 (100) 11,368 (100)
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
Other financial companies include investment companies, finance companies, and mutual savings and 
finance companies.
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Figure 3.4 Number o f  Foreign Shareholders and Shares Held by Foreign Investors
End of year
□  No. o f  foreign shareholders
□  N o. o f  shares hold by foreigners
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   i
Source: Korea Stock Exchange
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Table 3.11 Trading o f  KOSPI 200 Futures
End of year
Trading volume 
(contract)
Trading value 
(million won)
Total Daily average Total Daily average
1996 715,624 3,670 30,698,920 157,384
1997 3,252,060 11,137 103,606,790 354,818
1998 17,893,592 61,279 405,903,406 1,390,080
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
Table 3.12 Foreign Investment in KOSPI 200 Futures Market
End of year
Trading volume Trading value
No. of contracts (%) million won (%)
1996 43,152 (3.02) 1,765,032 (2.88)
1997 263,093 (4.05) 8,064,704 (3.89)
1998 812,388 (2.27) 18,008,767 (2.22)
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
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Appendix 3.1 Overview of the Historical Changes in the Korean Stock Market
0 3 / M a r . / 1 9 5 6  T aehan  S tock E xchange (TSE) opened.
1 5 / J a n .  / 1 9 6 2  Securities and  E xchange Law enacted .
o i / A p r . / 1 9 6 2  T SE  reo rgan ised  into a joint stock  corporation.
0 3 / M a y  / 1 9 6 3  T SE  renam ed  as  Korea Stock E xchange (KSE).
o s / M a y  / 1 9 6 3  KSE r e o r g a n i s e d  in to  a  g o v e r n m e n t - r u n ,  n o n -p ro f i t  o r g a n i s a t i o n
2 2 /N o v . /1 9 6 8  Law on Fostering th e  Capital Market enacted .
o i / F e b .  / 1 9 6 9  F o r w a r d  t r a n s a c t i o n s  r e p l a c e d  with  r e g u l a r - w a y  t r a n s a c t i o n s
0 3 / J a n .  / 1 9 7 1  Margin trading started.
0 1 / J a n .  / 1 9 7 2  K orea C om posite S tock Price Index (KOSPI) published.
0 5 / J a n .  / 1 9 7 3  Public C orporation Inducem ent Law enacted .
02/ N o v .  / 1 9 7 3  Book-entry clearing system  introduced.
0 8 / A u g .  / 1 9 7 4  K orea Investm ent Trust Co. established.
0 6 / D e c .  / 1 9 7 4  K orea Securities Settlem en t Co. (KKSC) estab lished .
0 4 / J a n .  / 1 9 7 5  C o n t i n u o u s  t r a d in g  s y s t e m  r e p l a c e d  call  t r a d in g  s y s t e m .
1 9 / F e b . / 1 9 7 7  SE C  and  Securities Supervisory Board established.
2 0 / S e p . / 1 9 7 7  K o r e a  S e c u r i t i e s  C o m p u t e r  i n c o r p o ra t e d .
0 2 / J u l . /1 9 7 9  KSE m oved to  the  p resen t trading floor in Yoido.
2 4 / S e p . / 1 9 7 9  KSE joined th e  FIBV (International Federation of S tock E xchanges).
1 4 / J a n .  / 1 9  8 1  Internationalisation plan of the  capital m arket announced .
1 9 / N o v .  / 1 9 8 1  International investm ent trusts(KIT and KT) launched,
0 4 / J a n . / 1 9 8 3  New KOSPI launched ,(4 /Jan /1980=100)
o i / F e b .  / 1 9 8 3  C om puterised  order-routing system  launched.
0 1 / M a r .  / 1 9 8 8  KSE privatised and incorporated into a m em bersh ip  organisation .
0 3 / M a r .  / 1 9 8 8  S tock  M arket A utom ated Trading System  (SMATS) launched.
0 2 / D e c .  / 1 9 8 8  G radual internationalisation of th e  capital m arket announced .
0 4 / M a y  / 1 9 9 0  Stock  M arket Stabilisation Fund established.
1 5 / M a r ,  / 1 9 9 1  Foreign Securities, firms allowed to establish branched .
1 4 / J u n .  / 1 9 9 1  KSE m em bersh ip  opened  to foreign securities com pan ies.
0 3 / J a n .  / 1 9  92  D irect investm ent by foreign investors allowed.
1 2 / A u g .  / 1 9 9 3  R eal-N am e Financial T ransaction  System  introduced.
1 5 / J u n . / 1 9 9 4  K O SPI200 published,
o i / J u l . / 1 9 9 4  Bond m arket opened  to foreign investors.
" D om estic individual investors allowed to invest in foreign securities.
1 4 / O c t . / 1 9 9 4  P O SC O  listed its stocks on th e  NYSE.
2 7 / O c t . / 1 9 9 4  K EPCO  l i s ted  its s t o c k s  o n  t h e  NYSE.
o i / D e c . / 1 9 9 4  Foreign investm ent ceiling extended from 10% to 12%.
2 2 / D e c . / 1 9 9 4  KSE changed  trading hours to 09:30-11:30, 13:00-15:00.
0 4 / J a n .  / 1 9 9 5  C om prehensive  Surveillance and information System  launched.
2 7 / F e b .  / 1 9 9 5  Ja rd in e  Fleming b ecam e  the  first foreign m em ber of th e  KSE.
o i / M a r .  / 1 9 9 5  Daily price limits ex tended from an average  ±4.6% to  a  flat ±6%.
03 / A p r . / 1 9 9 5  KSE opera ted  m ock trading of KOSPI futures.
O l / J u l . / 1 9 9 5 Foreign investm ent ceiling extended  from 12% to  15%.
1 2 / A u g . / 1 9 95 Mutual entry of securities com pan ies and investm ent tru s t com pan ies
perm itted.
0 2 / O c t . / 1 9 9 5 T ransactions of th e  sm all-lot public bonds centralised  on th e  KSE.
l l / O c t . / 1 9 9 5 P lan s to allow foreign com pan ies to issue  stocks in Korea announced .
0 1 / A p r . / 1 9 9 6 Foreign investm ent ceiling extended  from 15% to  18%.
0 3 / M a y  / 1 9 9 6 Stock  Index F u tures M arket opened.
O l / O c f c . / 1 9 9 6 Foreign investm ent ceiling ex tended from 18% to  20% .
1 1 / O c t . / 1 9 9 6 K orea’s adm ission into th e  OECD.
2 5 / N o v . / 1 9 9 6 Daily price limits ex tended  from a flat ±6% to a flat ±8%.
0 1 / A p r . / 1 9 9 7 H om e trading introduced.
0 7 / J u l . / 1 9 9 7 S tock  index options m arket opened .
3 0 / A u g . / 1 9 9 7 Trading system  fully com puterised .
2 1 / N o v , / 1 9 9 7 IMF bailout fund requested .
3 1 / D e c , / 1 9 9 7 F ore igners’ investm ent ceiling in th e  stock m arket ra ised  to 55%,
2 5 / M a y  / 1 9 9 8 F oreigners’ investm ent ceiling com pletely eliminated.
0 7 / D e c . / 1 9 9 8 KSE started  to  c lose its m arket on S atu rdays and trading hours changed .
H Circuit B reakers system  introduced in the  stock m arket.
tt Daily price limits expanded  from ±12%  to ±15%  and  for fu tures m arket from
7%  to 10%.
Sources: Korea Stock Exchange, Stock Market in Korea, 1991; Korea Stock Exchange, Korean Stock 
Market, 1996; The Korea Economic Daily, Seoul, various issues; Maeil Business Newspaper, Seoul, 
various issues; Joong-Ang Daily Newspaper, Seoul, various issues.
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4 Time Varying Stock Returns
4.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the presence of heteroscedasticity in financial time series 
has been widely researched. Since the early research of Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama 
(1965) there had been numerous studies on the characteristics of stock returns.7 
However, these early studies tended to focus on the first moment of returns of 
financial time series. The introduction of techniques for modelling the second 
moment is a more-recent event.
The general regularities of stock returns, which have been found by many 
researchers, are typically characterised as follows. First, the distributions of asset 
returns tend to be fat tailed and peaked, i.e., leptokurtic. There is evidence that the 
empirical distributions of changes in stock prices and indices yield a higher 
frequency o f observations near the mean and fatter tails than that would be expected 
for a normal distribution (see Fama, 1965; Westerfield, 1977; and Kon, 1984). 
Secondly, there have also been investigations about volatility clustering. As noted by 
Mandelbrot (1963), “large changes tend to be followed by large changes - of either 
sign - and small changes tend to be followed by small changes.”8 Thirdly, the so-
7 Mandelbrot (1963) and Faina (1965) showed departures from normality in the distributions of 
returns: the tendency o f extreme tails as well as higher frequency distributions o f the central bells than 
those o f a normal distribution.
8 See also Fama (1965).
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called “ leverage effect” first noted by Black (1976) refers to the tendency for stock 
prices to be negatively correlated with changes in stock volatility. Black (1976) and 
Christie (1982) suggested that a decline in stock prices (in relation to bond prices) 
increases leverage, increases the expected return on the stock in the future, and 
increases the variance of the stock return in the current period. A firm with debt and 
equity outstanding is typically more-highly leveraged when the value of the firm falls. 
This raises the equity return volatility. Finally, variance of stock returns for a certain 
period will be different if there exists non-trading periods. For instance, this has been 
captured by the day-of-the week or weekend effects in empirical work (see French 
and Roll, 1986).
In this context, a family of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH) models seems to be extremely useful in modelling financial time series. 
Conditional volatility models have the important implication7 for finance that 
investors can predict risk. These models successfully characterise the fact that stock 
prices tend to go through long periods of high volatility and long periods of low 
volatility. In reality, it does matter when an investor has forecasted invested asset 
prices to be very volatile since the investor should either exit the market or require a 
larger premium as compensation for bearing an unusually high degree of risk. 
Consequently, market participants’ volatility predictions have important implications.
In fact, much of the literature on stock market volatility has focused on 
developed markets. There has been relatively little literature examining the volatility 
of the Korean stock market. Lee and Ohk (1991) examined the conditional 
heteroscedasticity of stock returns and their predicted volatility in six countries 
including Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the US and find that there are strong 
ARCH effects in all six countries. The results showed that participants in their stock
86
markets are compensated with higher returns for bearing higher levels o f risk. Corhay 
and Rad (1993) examine the stock price behaviour of seven Pacific-Basin countries; 
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and Korea. The 
empirical results suggest that the behaviour of daily stock returns of these countries 
exhibits heteroscedasticity. Among various models, integrated generalised ARCH 
(IGARCH) fits the data best for Hong Kong and Thailand and generalised ARCH 
(GARCH) for rest of the countries. Huang, Liu and Yang (1995) investigated the 
weekend effects of stock markets in the US, the UK and six Pacific Basin countries: 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The results show 
that the returns of these stock markets are not normally distributed and suffer from 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems. However, with an ARCH-related 
model, these problems are much reduced. Poon and Taylor (1992) examined the 
relationship between the stock returns and market volatility in the UK stock market. 
Two types of volatility measures, and an ARIMA model are used. Expected returns 
are shown to have had a positive, though not statistically significant, relationship with 
expected volatility. The unexpected components of the returns and volatility series 
have a negative relationship but only when volatility expectations are represented by 
standard deviations.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the empirical distribution of Korean 
stock returns of Korea and to find the best-fit model among a family of ARCH-type 
models. This is the first study to apply various ARCH-type models to the Korean 
stock market. Since very few studies have compared these methods empirically it is 
of interest to apply each of the various techniques to our data, with the aim of 
investigating the different implications each might have for the predictability of
|Ui
volatility. Investigating the volatility of/K orean stock market is particularly
£
87
interesting for several reasons. First, the Korean stock market represents a typical 
emerging market. Although it is relatively small compared to major markets the 
market itself has been growing fast in terms of market capitalisation, trading volume 
and listed companies on the stock exchange since the mid 1980s. Secondly, the 
Korean stock market used to be one of the most restricted and controlled markets 
among emerging markets until liberalisation of the market took place in January 
1992. Subsequently, it could be conjectured how the market liberalisation has affected 
the behaviour of the Korean stock market volatility by examining two subperiods, the
pre-opening and the post-opening periods. Although some studies analysed ^eforathe
i IvX'T'-
stock market liberalisation, for example, Ng, Chang and Chou (1991), and Kim and
l\ . A
/ .M  .Rogers (1995), there exists no study investigated the impact of the stock market 
opening-up in 1992 on the stock market volatility in Korea. Therefore, one could 
expect this to have had some implication for volatility estimates in recent years.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 introduces 
the family of ARCH and GARCH models and shows how these models are derived. 
Section 4.3 describes data sources and presents the sample properties of those data. In 
section 4.4 the results are presented. In section 4.5 and 4.6 the methodology for 
discriminating between alternative ARCH models and forecasting ability is discussed, 
and the interpretations of obtained results are offered. Section 4.7 provides a brief 
conclusion.
4.2 Various Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Models
4.2.1 Linear ARCH/GARCH
The pioneer ARCH model by Engle (1982) and the generalised ARCH (GARCH)
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process in Bollerslev (1986) are particularly important because they can capture the 
temporal dependence of stock returns. Engle (1982) shows that it is possible to derive 
a model, which simultaneously has the mean and variance of a series. Bollerslev 
(1986) develops a technique that allows the conditional variance to be an ARM A 
process. These processes allow for volatility clustering, which has long been 
recognised as an important feature of the behaviour of stock returns.
In the linear ARCH(^) model, the time varying conditional variance is 
postulated to be a linear function of the past q squared innovations. It can be
I o <~
interpreted as the conditional variance of the error term is serially correlated with the 
past squared values of the error term in the ARCH model
or] = co + y a ,s]_i = (o + a (L )e ]  (4.1)
i= I
where L is the lag operator. A sufficient condition for the conditional variance to be 
positive is that the parameters of the model satisfy the following constraints; co> 0
and a t>0, a 2> 0, •— a q> 0.
Defining u , = s ] -  a]  then the ARCH(g) process can be re-written as
s] = co + a(L)e]_x + u t (4.2)
(Notice that a] -  E{e]\s]_^s]_2,...... ))
since £ f_,(i>,) = 0, the model corresponds to an AR(<y) model for the squared 
innovations, s ] . The process is covariance stationary, if and only if, the sum of the 
positive autoregressive parameters is less than one, in which case the unconditional 
variance equals
Var(st ) = c o / ( l - a l - a 2  a q) (4.3)
Although the disturbance terms, e t s are serially uncorrelated they are clearly not
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independent through time. In accordance with the stylised facts for asset returns 
discussed above, there is a tendency for large (small) absolute values of unpredictable 
sign.
Building on the basic ARCH model, Bollerslev (1986) subsequently 
introduces a new, more-general class of process, the generalised GARCH (GARCH) 
model. This model is more flexible in its lag structure and allows the conditional 
variance function to include past conditional variances as well as past squared 
disturbances. One of the main advantages of the GARCH process is that it allows a 
more parsimonious description in most time series, for which an accurate statistical fit 
could be obtained without having to estimate a large number of parameters. The 
conditional variance equation of GARCM(p,q) model can be written as:
°h2 + -  co + cl(L)e] (4.4)
1=1 i=i
where p  > 0, q > 0, co> 0, a f >0, /?, > 0, and L is the lag operator.
A sufficient condition for the conditional variance in the GARCH(/?,<7) model to be 
well-defined is that all the coefficients in the infinite order linear AR representation 
must be nonnegative, where it is assumed that a(L) and p(Z) have no common roots 
and that the roots o f the polynomial in (1 - (3(/.)) = 0 lie outside unit circle. This 
positive constraint is satisfied, if and only if, the coefficients of the infinite power 
series expansion for a (L) I (1 - $(L)) are nonnegative.
s] = co + (a (L)  + p{L))s]_x -  (5{L)vt_x + v t (4.5)
which defines as ARMA(max(p,i7 ),jy) model for s ] . By standard arguments, the 
model is covariance stationary, if and only if, all the roots of (1 - a (L) - |3(£)) 
outside the unit circle.
The GARCH model implies that the variance today depends upon three
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factors: a constant, yesterday’s news about volatility, which is taken to be the squared 
residual from yesterday (the ARCH term) and yesterday’s forecast variance (the 
GARCH term). This specification makes sense in financial settings where an agent or 
investor predicts today’s variance by forming a weighted average of a long -term 
average o f constant variance, the forecast from yesterday, and what was learned 
yesterday. If the asset return was large in either the upward or the downward 
direction, then the trader will increase the estimate of the variance for the next day.
4.2.2 Asymmetric GARCH
Following the introduction of the ARCH and GARCH models, there have been 
numerous variations, refinements and applications of this approach to modelling 
conditional volatility. Even if GARCH models successftilly capture thick tailed 
returns and volatility clustering, they tend not to capture the ‘leverage effect’ since 
the conditional variance is only linked to past conditional variances and squared 
innovations, and hence the sign of returns plays no role in affecting volatility. Nelson 
(1991) tests this leverage effect using exponential ARCH (EGARCH) with lagged 
standardised returns included in the conditional variance equation. The results show a 
significant leverage effect in the US for the period from 1962 to 1987. The 
EGARCH(/?,<y) is defined as
In o f + In cf_,. + Y ja i[(p{st_l / o f : ) + / cr,' 2 |) “ (^ )1 :] (4.6)
i=i i=i
The advantage in using an exponential form for the conditional variance function 
ln<j] is that the variance will be positive for all possible choices of the parameters 
co, p ., y and cp so that no restrictions need to be placed on these coefficients except 
|/?( | < 1 in order to guarantee that the process is stationary. In other words, by
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modelling the logarithm of the variance it is not necessary to restrict parameter values 
to avoid negative variance as in the ARCH and GARCH models. Because of the use 
of both |£ f_f and (e,_f erf will also be non-symmetric in s t_,. And for
negative 8, erf will exhibit higher volatility for large negative s t_t .
For other asymmetric GARCH specifications, Glosten, Jaganathan, and 
Runkle (1993) also capture the leverage effect with the threshold GARCH (TARCH) 
model. The conditional variance function is
o f  =<o + 2 > ls,-,(1 + Yd ,-,) + Z / ?,°7-, (4T)
j=l /=!
where d t_t is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 when e t_t < 0 and value of 
0 when s t_. > 0.
Good news has an impact of a .  while bad news has an impact of a , + a y .  If a y  
is significantly different from zero, then the leverage effect exists. When a y  > 0, 
negative shocks will have a larger impact on erf than positive shocks. For instance, 
the variance equation for TARCH(1,1) model is
• + Asf_vd,_\ (4-8)
4.2.3 ARCH-in-Mean
Many theories in finance assume some kind of relationship between the mean of a 
return and its variance. One way to take this into account is to explicitly write the 
returns as a function of the conditional variance or, in other words, to include the 
conditional variance as another regressor. ARCH in mean or GARCH in mean models 
are included in this category.
The ARCH in mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by Engle, Lilien and
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Robins (1987) extend the ARCH model to allow the conditional variance to affect the 
mean. In this way changing conditional variances directly affect/the expected return 
on a portfolio. Most of the time this conditional variance term will have the 
interpretation of a time-varying risk premium. For instance, a simple version of the 
ARCH-M model can be written as
y t — if/a^ + s { (4.9)
where s t = vfcr(, v( ~ 77(0,1)
a ]  =  c o + j ^ a ^ l f .  (4 .1 0 )
i=1
The estimation o f GARCH-in-mean type of models is numerically unstable9 and 
many applications have used ARCH-M type models, which are easier to estimate. 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) argue that many theories in finance involve an 
explicit trade-off between the risk and the expected return. The ARCH-M model is 
ideally suited to handling such questions in a time series context where the 
conditional variance may be time-varying.
4.2.4 Integrated GARCH
Engle and Bollerslev (1986) extend GARCH to the class of integrated GARCH 
(IGARCH) models that have the restriction ^  ^  /?, = 1. The basic GARCH
model has been extended to allow the conditional variance to have a unit root. If this 
sum equals one, the IGARCH is said to be exhibited, implying that shocks to the 
conditional variance persist over future horizons. However, Sharma, Mougoue and
9 For instance, Chyi (1997) investigated daily returns of five stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange by 
adopting a GARCH-M model for the period of 1976-1993. The results showed that the GARCH-M 
process cannot precisely model the distribution o f daily returns even though the model does remove 
some o f the serial dependence and reduce the observed leptokurtosis fairly for certain cases.
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Kamath (1996) argued that with IGARCH class of models, second and fourth 
unconditional moments are non-existent even though the conditional distributions are 
well defined.
4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 The Data and Their Properties
The basic sample consists of daily closing price data for the KOSPI over the period 
starting on 1 January 1980 and ending on 17 June 1997 (4,556 observations). A 
further 30 observations to 17 July 1997 are used for examining the forecasting ability 
of the ARCH class models. The sources are Datastream10 and Korea Stock Exchange 
Data Base.11 Unlike all previous studies of the Korean stock market data for 
Saturday trading is included to avoid omitting observations. The path of the daily 
stock returns over this period is plotted as Figure 4.1. The daily stock returns, Rt is 
calculated as the first differences of the logs of the stock prices 
f  KOSPI, ^R, = In
KOSPI ^  j
Descriptive statistics for the daily returns are reported in Figure 4.2. The 
results confirm the well-known fact that daily stock returns are not normally 
distributed, but are leptokurtic and skewed to the left. Although Figure 4.2 confirms 
that the distribution is highly peaked, the distribution of returns does not seem to be 
thick tailed. One possible explanation can be that there have been daily price limits
10 Datastream provides data only from Monday to Friday uniformly.
11 Until the end o f 1997 Korea Stock Exchange operated on Saturday from 9:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m..
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over the sample period.12 Due to price limits system, some extreme movement of
stock prices is censored thus not recorded with their true variations. Consequently, the
($y '
generated returns jtre  not possibly capture highly volatile values hence the lower 
volatility. Under the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed, the 
result o f the Jarque-Bera test confirms rejection of the normality assumption since the 
probability value of the computed ^-statistic is sufficiently low, i.e., zero.
4.3.2 Testing for ARCH Presence
Before estimating a GARCH process, it is important to examine whether there exist 
ARCH effects in the residuals of estimating models. Subsequently we should not 
estimate the conditional volatility of series in means of GARCH when there are no 
signs of ARCH effects.
Since the variance o f a time series depends on past squared residuals of the 
process in an ARCH process, the appropriateness of an ARCH model can be tested by 
means of a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggested by Engle (1982). The 
methodology involves the following two steps:
Under the null hypothesis it is assumed the model is estimated by an 
appropriate ARQy) model
y ( = 0 O + 0 jTr-i + 0 2 ) ’t-2 + • ■' ' + 0 py t-p + e i (4.11)
where s t is a Gaussian white noise process, s l \I,_] ~A /’( 0 ,a : ) where I t is the 
information set.
12 Before April 1995, price limits were expressed as absolute changes for specified ranges of base 
prices. The price limits have been expressed as a fixed  percentage rate from the beginning of April 
1995. Under this system, for a given period, the price limits are the same percentage change of the base 
price, whatever that base price. Initially, the daily limits were price changes of x6%, these were relaxed 
to ±8% from 25 November 1996 and again to ±12% from 2 March 1998. See section 7.3 of Chapter 7 
for further details.
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The test for an ARCH(^) effect simply consists on regressing 
e 2 = a 0 + a l s 2_1 + a 2s 2_2 + ...........+  a qs 2_q + t t f . (4.12)
Under the null hypothesis of no ARCH process, that is, a , = a 2 = ...... = a q -  0, the
test statistic TR1 where T is the number of observation and R 2 is obtained from 
(4.12) is asymptotically distributed • With a sample of T residuals, under the null
hypothesis of no ARCH errors, the test statistic TR2 converges to a %\ distribution. 
The LM test has been applied to our data up to AR(5). The values, which are
I - f c'
' ^based on the regression of squared residuals on lagged up to 10 a.nd squared residuals 
for the TR2 and F-statistics are reported in Table 4.1. The /^-statistic tests the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged squared residuals are all zeros, that is, 
no ARCH. The results show that the TR1 and the F-statistics are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the pre-opening, the post-opening and the whole 
period. This indicates that there exist ARCH effects in the period of 1980-1997. 
Therefore, use of ARCH class models might be appropriate to describe our data.
4.3.3 Structural Breaks and ARCH Effects
Diebold (1986) shows that breaks in the variance might appear as ARCH effects 
when the whole sample is used. In other words, for a subperiod, it could be the case 
that the unconditional variance changes from a 2 to a \  and then back to the previous 
level. In this case modelling the conditional variance as an ARCH model would be 
inappropriate. Consequently, it is recommended to divide the sample and test for 
ARCH effects for the subperiods. If no ARCH effects are found for any of the 
subperiods but are found for the whole sample period then that is a clear indication of 
a break in the unconditional variance and not of ARCH effects. Table 4.1 confirms
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that there is no structural break in the volatility since the ARCH effects are found not 
only in the two subperiods, the pre-opening and the post-opening but also in the 
whole period.
4.3.4 Determining the Order of GARCH Models
Some prior studies such as Chou (1988) and Baillie and DeGennaro (1990) have 
shown that GARCH(1,1) class models are the most appropriate types for daily stock 
return data. Poon and Taylor (1992) also argue that GARCH(p,q) models with p  + q 
> 3 are very unstable and very much influenced by the starting values. The benefit of 
including additional parameters beyond p  + q = 2 is very small. It is claimed that, in
n
most cases, (increase in the log-likelihood value is less than one. Consequently, our 
focus is drawn on p  + q< 2 order formulations for GARCH class models.
4.4 Empirical Results
In this section, results of estimating various ARCH class models are presented in 
order to give an idea of the possible usefulness of the models for the behaviour of 
Korean stock market volatility. Table 4.2 reports the results of ARCH class model 
estimations of the KOSPI daily returns for the entire sample period. The value of 
maximum log likelihood (LL), the values of Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz criterion (SC) are also presented in order to compare models and to choose 
an appropriate model for the Korean stock market for the sample period. A post­
opening dummy variable, d  is created taking value of 1 in the post-opening subperiod 
afterwards 1992 and 0 elsewhere. The dummy variable is included in both the mean 
and the variance equations to examine the possibility of a structural break in the
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volatility which might be caused by the Korean stock market opening up in January 
1992. The estimated GARCH(1,1) model with the dummy variable is
Rt = (x0 + d 0POD + s t (4.13)
CT j = co + cc i + ft \ <y + dx POD (4.14)
where Rt is the KOSPI return, a]  is the conditional variance and POD is the post­
opening dummy variable.
An interesting finding is that all the parameters of the variance equations, 
regardless \classes of the model^are statistically significant at the 5% level. However, 
some coefficients of the mean equations for several models are not statistically 
significant at the 5% level: the POD dummy variable of the ARCH(l)-dummy, the 
constant of the GARCH(1,1), the constant of the GARCH(1,1) -MA(1), and the 
constant and the POD dummy of the TARCH(l,l)-dummy model, Another interesting 
finding is that the mean equations of all the simple models such as ARCH(l), 
GARCH(1,1), EGARCH(1,1) and TARCH(1,1), each of which includes the post­
opening dummy (POD) variable as a regressor, are not significantly different from 
zero. Although the dummy variable, which is included in the variance equations of 
these models, is statistically significant at the 5% level this seems to be fairly small 
and nearly zero. This implies that the opening stock market, i.e. the liberalisation of 
the Korean stock market has caused no structure change in market volatility.
For the EGARCH class models, the signs of all the coefficients on elAlalA term
(8) are negative, confirming the leverage effect. Subsequently, it suggests that a]  
exhibits higher volatility for large negative s t . Whereas the TARCH class models, 
have significant coefficients (df,) for the s)^dt_x terms. Since is significantly 
different from zero it also confirms the existence of the leverage effect.
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Aside, in order to test the IGARCH(1,1) model, the value of a ,  +/?, among 
the GARCH class of models is calculated. They are in the range o f 0.1298 to 0.9804. 
This shows that the IGARCH(1,1) model, where should be « :,+ /? , = 1, does not fit 
our data set for the period 1980 to 1997 and confirms no persistence in volatility. Our 
results are similar to that in Corhay and Rad (1993) which the value of a ,  + /?, is 
0.9195 for the Korean stock market daily returns in Korean stock market for the 
period 1980 to 1990.
There are a number of approaches, which can be used to compare fitted 
models in Table 4.2. One of these approaches is to compare the maximised values of 
the log likelihood functions (LL). Another approach is to compare the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz criterion (SC), which is an alternative 
method of the AIC. In terms o f the LL, the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1)-M turns out to be 
the best-fit model. In contrast to this, in terms of the AIC, the ARCH(1)-AR(1)-M 
shows the lowest AIC value that implies the best-fit model. By the way, the value of 
SC, which is similar to the AIC, confirms that the best-fit model is the ARCH(l)- 
AR(1)-M. In general, the GARCH type models show higher values of the log 
likelihood functions than the ARCH or the EGARCH class models.
4.5 Discriminating Between Alternative GARCH Models
Although it is possible to compare the estimated ARCH models using the criteria 
reported in Table 4.2, it is not straight forward to determine the best fit model for our 
data because the differences in the values of these criteria are negligibly small. 
Therefore, it is necessary to use a method for comparing the estimated ARCH 
models. There are several ways of discriminating between alternative GARCH class
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models. One of the ways is suggested by Pagan and Schwert (1990). They use an 
auxiliary regression as a mean of choosing between different GARCH models
s ]  = a  +  Pcr2t + . (4.15)
Equation (4.15) regresses the squared residuals on the fitted variance of the 
alternative GARCH models. If the chosen GARCH model is appropriate to explain 
the conditional volatility of the series under scrutiny, it should be expected that a  = 0,
P = 1 and the fit ( R 2) is good. The joint null hypothesis, a  — 0 and P = 1 is tested 
against the alternative hypothesis, a  *  0 and p & 1. The restrictions on these 
coefficients are tested by applying the Wald test.
As a second step, the models that are not rejected on the basis of goodness of 
fit will be compared. Similar to Pagan and Schwert (1990), equation (4.15) is 
regressed in logarithms in order to account for scale effects and then the goodness of 
fit of this alternative auxiliary regression is compared to the regression by the model 
in (4.15)
In £ 2 ~ a  + p  In a?  + . (4.16)
The R 2 statistics for the model in (4.16) are motivated by the idea of a proportional 
loss function, rather than the quadratic loss function implied in (4.15). Mistakes in 
predicting small variances are given more weight in (4.16) than in (4.15).
Table 4.3 contains the results of comparison between alternative ARCH class 
models. We tested for all models in Table 4.2 by using the model in (4.15) and (4.16). 
However, we report some models among the presented models in Table 4.2. The first 
and the second columns present the coefficients of the model in (4.15). The fifth 
column, Q(10) is the heteroscedasticity-corrected Box-Pierce (1970) statistic for ten 
lags of the residual autocorrelations. Similarly, the sixth column, BG(10) is the serial 
correlation LM test statistic where uses the Breusch-Godfrey large sample test for
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autocorrelated disturbances for ten lags disturbances. The values of F-statistics are 
reported in this column. These two columns report tests of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation tests against the alternative hypothesis o f autocorrelation. The last 
column, InR2 is the R 2 statistics from the regression of the model in (4.16) where R2 
is the usual coefficient of determination. A good model is expected to have a  = 0, (3 
= 1. In this context, we can eliminate models for which there is no * in the first 
column. Although the GARCH-AR, the GARCH-AR-M without a constant in the 
mean equation, the GARCH-AR-M, the GARCH-MA, the GARCH-MA-M without a 
constant in the mean equation, and the GARCH-MA-M model show statistically non­
significant from zero coefficients for a  they have all different ps. According to the 
model in (4.15), this coefficient should be unity for the best-fit model. It clearly 
shows that the GARCH-AR and the GARCH-MA model have good values of the (3 
coefficient, 0.9554 and 0.9484, respectively than other models. In terms of 
autocorrelation, Models 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 show no signs o f autocorrelations 
in their residuals. The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM statistics, reported in 
the sixth column, also reveal that there is no autocorrelation. An interesting finding is 
that all the R 2 statistics for logs (InR2) are larger than the R 2 ’s for the raw data.
It is useful to carry out the Wald coefficient test for the models * marketed in | 
Table 4.3, which can be said as ‘potentially good models.5 The F-statistics are 
reported in Table 4.4. The joint null hypothesis of a  = 0, p = 1 is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis of a  & 0, p =£ 1. Since all the p-values exceed 0.01, the null 
hypothesis is accepted at the 1% critical value.
4.6 Forecasting Ability
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Alternative way of comparing and discriminating the ARCH class models is to 
examine whether an estimated model adequately forecast the volatility. ARCH 
models allow us to forecast the conditional variance of a series, therefore a criteria 
which may enable us to choose different models is to choose that one that forecasts 
best. Akgiray (1989) argues the usefulness of forecasting the future volatility. First, 
good forecasts of volatility can be used to investigate any relationship between 
current prices and expected risk. Since risk is inherently related to volatility, expected 
future volatility is a major factor in the pricing of securities. Second, the predictive 
capabilities of ARCH and GARCH models constitute further evidence as to their 
relative merits as such. Notice that we calculate one-step ahead forecasts, i. e. we 
use the estimated models to forecast for /+1 while the models are forecasted for 
twenty-two year observations.
Root Mean Square Error = - & ] ) '  IT )  (4.17)
T
Mean Absolute Error = (4.18)
/=i
T
Mean Absolute Percent Error = ( ^ | ( £ f  -  o'2,)  / 0 7  |/7’)x 100 (4.19)
f=i
Table 4.5 reports the forecasts of the conditional variance for the period of 1 January 
1980 to 17 June 1997, where the model parameters were estimated using data from 
this period. The forecasts of the conditional variances on the Korean stock market 
daily returns are evaluated and compared through a number of statistics: root mean 
square error (RMSE), mean absolute error (MAE), and mean absolute percent error 
(MAPE). We only consider the six GARCH class models: GARCH(1,1)-AR(1), 
GARCH( 1,1)-AR( 1 )-M (no constant), GARCH(1,1)-AR(1)-M, GARCH(1,1)-MA(1), 
GARCH(1,1)-MA(1)-M (no constant) and GARCH(1,1)-MA(1)-M. All the forecasts
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for these models appear to be reliable since the values of the RMSE and the MAE for 
these models are in the range of 0.008139 to 0.012130. It implies that a forecast is 
more accurate if the value of a parameter is smaller. In this context, the 
GARCH(1,1) - MA(1) model is the best forecasting performance model among the 
six models since this shows the smallest value of the RMSE, the MAE, and the 
second largest value of the MAPE. However, the differences between the RMSE and 
the MAE values of the GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) and those of the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) are 
negligibly small (each of these are 0.000001). Moreover, the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) 
shows larger MAPE value, which is desirable to be 100%, than the value of the 
GARCH(1,1)-MA(1). Since most of the forecasts are reasonably desirable i.e., the 
smallest MAPE is 98.35% of the GARCH-MA and the largest MAPE is 123.72% of 
the GARCH-AR-M it is useful to perform more forecasts in means of several 
subsample period models.
Table 4.6 contains forecasts of the conditional variance for three subsample 
periods i.e. pre-opening (1 Jan. 1986-31 Dec. 1991), post-opening (1 Jan. 1992-17 
Jun. 1997), and post-sample (18 Jun. 1997-23 Jul. 1997), where the model 
parameters were estimated using three data sets for the periods of 1 Jan. 1980-31 
Dec. 1985, 1 Jan. 1980-31 Dec. 1991, and 1 Jan. 1980-17 Jun. 1997, respectively. For 
the pre-opening period, although all the values of the RMSE, the MAE are reasonably 
small for a good forecasting model it does not seem to exist the best forecasting 
model among the six GARCH class models since there is no agreement on the best 
model. By the way, for the period of post-opening, the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) obviously 
turns out to be the best model for forecasting. The RMSE and the MAE values of this 
model which are 0.005676 and 0.004186, respectively, are smaller than the values of 
the any other models. The MAPE value of this model, 101.6611 is also near to 100
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which is desirable value for an accurate forecasting model. For the post-sample
period, however, the GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) appears as the best forecasting model. The
smallest RMSE (0.004783) and MAE value (0.003705) and the nearest MAPE value
to 100(103.7624) among the six models confirm this fact.
In addition, the forecasts of variance for the three subsample periods are
shown in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.3, for the pre-opening
period, the variances for the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) and the GARCH( 1,1 )-MA( 1)
appears to be falling sharply and then steady whereas those of the GARCH(1,1)-
AR( 1 )-M (no constant), the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1)-M, the GARCH( 1,1 )-MA( 1 )-M (no
constant) and the GARCH(1,1)-MA(1)-M appear to be rising sharply and then steady
r>. .over the forecast horizon. However, all the variance shown in Figure 4.4 for the 
period of post-opening appear to be rising sharply and then steady over the forecast 
horizon. In Figure 4.5, all the variance forecasts for post-sample period seem to be 
monotonically rising. Since this period contains only 30 daily observations, we might 
observe a different pattern if forecasts covered a longer period or had other starting 
dates.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the behaviour of Korean stock market volatility for the 
period from 1980 to 1997 using a set of models belonging to the class of 
ARCH/GARCH. The results of descriptive statistics confirm that the daily stock 
market returns are skewed to the left and leptokurtosis. Consequently, ARCH 
/GARCH class models are used to capture successfully these aspects of the abnormal
, ft ^ '
distribution of our data. Prior to model estimation, we carry out a test for the ARCH
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effect presence. The results show that there are the ARCH effects in daily stock 
market returns of Korea. One interesting finding is that there is no structure change in 
volatility even after the stock market opening to foreign investors in 1992.
The results from using the EGARCH and the TARCH class models confirm 
the leverage effect whereas the IGARCH model does not fit our daily returns series. 
The estimated ARCH models are generally consistent with the behaviour of the stock 
market volatility. Overall, the class of GARCH models is found to be a better fit than 
the class of ARCH, EGARCH and TARCH models in terms of several criteria 
including the LL, the AIC and the SC. Among the GARCH class models 
GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) and GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) seem to be the best fit models. The 
test results to distinguish forecasting ability among the estimated models confirm 
that GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) is the most accurate forecasting model among the six 
different GARCH class models for the historical forecast for 1980-1997. However, 
since there exist negligibly small differences between these two models we also 
estimate forecasts for three subsample periods: pre-opening, the post-opening, and the 
post-sample. The results confirm that GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) and GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) 
are the best forecasting model for the post-opening and the post-sampling period, 
respectively.
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Figure 4.1 Daily Returns o f  KOSPI, 1980-1997
0.04  
0.02 
0.00 
- 0.02 
-0 .04  
-0 .06  
-0 .08
50 0  1000 1500  2 0 0 0  2500  3 0 0 0  3 5 0 0  4 0 0 0  4 5 0 0
r r i T r r r n  r n ' i  11 m  i i n  n  | i t  r T ' p n r iT p ' i r i j v r r r p  i i t  111 i t  111 i 111 i n  111 111 i m - p n T r p  n  11 i i 11
106
Figure 4.2 Descriptive Statistics o f  Daily Return Series
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Jarque-Bem 4847.47
p  - value 0.00
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Table 4.1 Lagrange Multiplier Tests
Pre-opening period 
(1980-1991)
Post-opening period 
(1992-1997)
Entire period 
(1980-1997)
Lags TR2 F-statistic Tr 2 F-statistic TR2 F-statistic
ARCH(l) 341.56(0.00)*
37.34
(0.00)*
753.94
(0.00)*
131.46
(0.00)*
1368.13
(0.00)*
184.53
(0.00)*
ARCH(2) 330.23(0.00)*
36.35
(0.00)*
735.40
(0.00)*
125.89
(0.00)*
1335.99
(0.00)*
178.73
(0.00)*
ARCH(3) 330.19(0.00)*
36.35
(0.00)*
744.70
(0,00)*
128.66
(0.00)*
1345.80
(0.00)*
180.51
(0.00)*
ARCH(4) 327.37(0.00)*
36.01
(0.00)*
736.67
(0.00)*
126.27
(0.00)*
1341.07
(0.00)*
179.67
(0.00)*
ARCH(5) 326.96(0.00)*
35.96
(0.00)*
757.11
(0.00)*
126.40
(0.00)*
1339.40
(0,00)*
179.38
(0.00)*
/^-values are presented in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4.3 Comparison Between Alternative ARCH M odels
a p R 2 Q(10) BG(10) InR2
3. ARCH - M 
no constant
0.0001
(0.00)
0.3368
(0.00) 0,007
95.117
(0.00)
8.031
(0.00) 0.041
4. ARCH - AR 0.00008(0.00)
0.4548
(0.00) 0.012
79.101
(0.00)
6.793
(0.00) 0.041
8. ARCH - MA
no constant
0.00008
(0.00)
0.4543
(0.00) 0.012
80.288
(0.00)
6.89
(0.00) 0.034
*12. GARCH - AR -1.6E-06(0.91)
0.9554
(0.00) 0.02
18.068
(0.05)
1.83
(0.05) 0.06
*14. GARCH - AR -M 
no constant
9.6E-06
(0.51)
0.8854
(0.00) 0.019
17.025
(0.07)
1.76
(0.06) 0.067
*15. GARCH - AR -M 0.00001(0.24)
0.8612
(0.00) 0.02
17.255
(0.07)
1.85
(0,05) 0.085
*16. GARCH-MA
-3.5E-07
(0.98)
0.9484
(0.00) 0.02
18.194
(0.052)
1.853
(0.05) 0.059
*17. GARCH-M A -M 
no constant
9.6E-06
(0.51)
0.8852
(0.00) 0.019
16.934
(0.08)
1.755
(0.06) 0.066
*18. GARCH -MA -M
0.00001
(0.24)
0.8605
(0.00) 0.02
17.291
(0.07)
1.86
(0.05) 0.084
19. EGARCH 0.0001(0.00)
0.0936
(0.00) 0.001
143.63
(0,00)
14.621
(0.00) 0.047
21. EGARCH-AR 0.0001(0.00)
0.1133
(0.00) 0.003
135.66
(0.00)
13.904
(0.00) 0.05
23. EGARCH - MA 
no constant
0.0001
(0.00)
0.0824
(0.00) 0.003
142.64
(0.00)
14.37
(0.00) 0.058
24. EGARCH - M
no constant
0.0001
(0.00)
0.1306
(0.00) 0.002
138.89
(0.00)
14.402
(0.00) 0.053
28. TARCII - AR 
no constant
0.00004
(0.00)
0.6857
(0.00) 0.016
21.813
(0.016)
3.742
(0.00) 0.059
29. TARCH - MA 
no constant
0.00004
(0.00)
0.685
(0.00) 0.016
21.667
(0.017)
3.721
(0.00) 0.037
30, TARCH -M 
no constant
0.00005
(0.00)
0.0628
(0.00) 0.015
16.742
(0.08)
2.951
(0.00) 0.063
All the ARCH, GARCH, EGARCH, and TARCH type models refer ARCH(1),GARCH(1,1), 
EGARCH(1,1), and TARCH(1,1), respectively, AR and MA also refer AR(1) and MA(1), 
respectively.
p-values are shown in parentheses.
f-statistics non-significant at the 5% level are underlined.
* indicates model with tire statistically non-significant coefficient a  and significant coefficient (3 that 
implies a good GARCH type model. 
r 2 is the coefficient o f determination.
Q(10) is the heteroscedasticity-corrected Box-Pierce (1970) statistic for ten lags of tire residual 
autocorrelations. BG(10) is tire serial correlation LM test statistic where uses tire Breuscli-Godffey 
large sample test for autocorrelated disturbances for ten lags disturbances. The values o f F-statistic are 
reported.
The last column, InR2 shows the R2 statistic from the regression of tire model in (4.14).
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Table 4.4 Wald Coefficient Tests
F-statistic p -value
GARCH-AR 0.864 (0.42)
*GARCH-AR-M 1.623 (0.20)
GARCH-AR-M 1.821 (0.16)
GARCH-MA 0.88 (0.42)
* GARCH-MA-M 1.626 (0.20)
GARCH-MA-M 1.835 (0.16)
p-values are shown in parentheses,
* refers a model without a constant term in its mean equation.
Table 4.5 Forecasts of the Conditional Variance of Daily Stock Returns: 1980-1997
Root Mean Square 
Error Mean Absolute Error
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error
GARCH- AR 0.012107 0.008140 98.35838**
GARCH - AR -M 
no constant 0.012109 0.008172 106.8638
GARCH - AR -M 0.012130 0.008245 123.7206
GARCH -MA 0.012106* 0.008139* 98.35189
GARCH - MA -M 
no constant 0.012108 0.008171 106.8412
GARCH -MA -M 0.012128 0.008240 122.8929
* indicates the smallest value among the six GARCH models.
** indicates the nearest value to 100.00 which is the desirable value for an accurate forecast.
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Table 4.6 Out-of-Sample Forecasts for the Conditional Variance of Stock Returns
Statistic GARCH 
- AR
GARCH 
- A R -M  
no 
constant
GARCH 
-A R  -M
GARCH
-MA
GARCH
- M A - M
no
constant
GARCH
-M A -M
Pre-opening
(1 Jan . 1986- 
31 Dec. 1991)
RMSE
MAE
MAPE
0.006205
0.004443
98.98997
0.006189
0.004444
103.0687
0.006191
0.004439
98.48241
0.006205
0.004443
98.81296
0.006189
0.004444
103.0393
0.006191
0.004439
98.95627
Post-opening
(1 J a n .1992- 
17 Jun . 1997)
RMSE
MAE
MAPE
0.005676
0.004186
101.6611
0.005679
0.004197
108.8840
0.005680
0.004199
109.9056
0.005683
0.004207
114.8117
0.005679
0.004197
108.8442
0.005680
0.004198
109.5344
Post-sample
(18 Jun. 1997- 
23 Jul. 1 9 9 7 )
RMSE
MAE
MAPE
0.004783
0.003706
103.8068
0.004812
0.003748
106.3459
0.004805
0.003741
105.8596
0.004783
0.003705
103.7624
0.004812
0.003747
106.3271
0.004804
0.003739
105.7794
RMSE, MAE and MAPE refer root mean squared error and mean absolute error, and mean absolute 
percent error, respectively. Underlined values for the RMSE and the MAE are the smallest value, 
which implies the best forecasting model among the six GARCH class models in each subsample 
period. Underlined values for the MAPE are the nearest value to 100, which is desirable one for an 
accurate forecasting model.
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Figure 4.3 Variance Forecasts for Pre-Opening Period from 1986 to 1991
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Figure 4.4 Forecasts o f  the Conditional Variance for Post-Opening Period
from 1992 to 1997
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Figure 4.5 Forecasts o f  the Conditional Variance for Post-Sample Period from
18 June 1997 to 23 July 1997
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5 Macroeconomic Variables and Stock Returns
5.1 Introduction
A series of stock market and foreign exchange market crashes in East and Southeast 
Asia in the second half of 1997 bring us to the question of the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and stock market performance. Empirical evidence 
suggests that some macroeconomic variables contain important information for stock 
market participants and can play an important role in determining stock market 
performance.
Basically, stock prices are determined by people’s expectations about firms’ 
future profitability. Future profitability, in turn, depends on the state of the economy. 
Hence, stock prices are determined by expectations about the future state of the 
economy. But those expectations turn out to be wrong almost as often as they turn out 
to be right. Thus, stock prices are not entirely reliable predictors of the state of the 
economy and vice versa. In general, stock prices are dependent on both 
macroeconomic variables and micro-market variables. However, it is not easy to 
outline the major determinants of stock prices because a stock market is affected by a 
variety of economic and political factors. In other words, movement of a stock price 
is related to a company’s specific profitability so that the macroeconomic variables 
can provide an external environment for the performance of companies as a whole. In 
this context, it is interesting to investigate whether macroeconomic variables are
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useful in forecasting stock market variability.
While empirical studies on advanced markets abound (see for example, 
Rogalski and Vinso, 1977; Geske and Roll, 1983; Bulmash and Trivoli, 1991; Smith, 
1992; Belden, 1995; and Mookergee and Yu, 1997) few studies have examined the 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and stock prices in emerging markets. 
As the Korean stock market is representative of a typical emerging market and has 
experienced fast changes since opening-up in January 1992, a closer examination of 
this market might also help to understand particular aspects of some other emerging 
stock markets in the Pacific Basin.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore whether changes in 
macroeconomic variables contain important information for stock market participants 
in Korea. The chapter analyses the effects of changes in major macroeconomic 
variables on stock market returns in Korea within a multivariate vector autoregression 
(VAR) framework using the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). In 
particular, our macroeconomic variables including the current account balance, 
money supply, interest rates and exchange rates, and stock price series are analysed 
dividing into two subperiods, pre-opening (from January 1987 until the end of 1991) 
and post-opening (from the early of 1992). While most economic variables included 
in the analysis have been used in different forms in stock price analysis, the effects of 
changes in macroeconomic variables on stock returns before and after stock market 
opening-up in Korea has not been analysed empirically. This chapter also aims to 
evaluate the usefulness of the relationships between macroeconomic variables and 
stock returns as a forecasting tool in the implementation of investment strategies.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews 
related literature and describes the theoretical foundation. Section 5.3 describes the
119
empirical methodology employed. Section 5.4 discusses the data and their properties. 
In section 5.5 the results are presented. The final section summarises this chapter.
5.2 Macroeconomic Variables and Stock Prices
One of the most important macroeconomic variables that has been identified as a 
major determinant of stock prices is the money supply but there are, of course, others; 
exchange rates and interest rates are typical macro variables that have been 
researched widely.
5.2.1 Money Supply
The money supply-stock market nexus has been widely tested and documented. The 
existing findings show conflicting results. Among many others, Homa and Jaffee 
(1971) have shown that past increases in money growth lead to increases in equity 
prices. On the other hand, money supply growth can also affect stock prices through a 
different channel. For example, Tatom (1985) argued that increased volatility in 
money growth increases uncertainty about the direction of monetary policy, causing 
erratic movements in interest rates. As interest rates move erratically investment in
(V V'P-
financial assets such as stocks becomes riskier and uncertain. Investors will tend to 
shift away from financial assets to holding money. Thus, money growth and stock 
prices could be negatively associated. On the other hand, Rogalski and Vinso (1977) 
found bi-directional causality between money supply and stock returns in the US over 
the period 1963-1974.
5.2.2 Interest Rates
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Interest rates can affect the profitability of firms in various ways. If  interest rates 
increase then firms incur higher costs of borrowing money and decreases. Thus stock / 
prices decrease. In the short term, they can be influenced by substitution among 
financial assets. If interest rates decline then investors turn to the stock market which 
can provide higher profitability than somewhat less riskier but less profitable assets 
such as bonds and bank deposits. The opposite would occur with rising rates, as 
higher interest rates increase the attractiveness of alternative investments (see for 
example, Geske and Roll, 1983; Solnik, 1983; and Bulmesh and Trivoli, 1991).
5.2.3 Exchange Rates
Economic theory suggests that, for an export dominant economy, exchange rate 
appreciation reduces international competitiveness of export markets. Subsequently it 
affects the domestic stock market negatively. On the other hand, if the economy is 
import dominant then the domestic stock market reacts favourably to the expected 
currency appreciation since exchange appreciation lowers input costs and generates a 
positive impact on the stock market. An appreciation usually occurs when positive net 
exports increase so that it helps the trade balance surplus that, in turn, has a positive 
effect on the current balance surplus. Therefore, an appreciation o f own currency 
(decrease in exchange rates) might be positively related to stock prices in the 
economy. In particular, the number of foreign investors on the Korean Stock 
Exchange has increased since stock market opening in 1992. Thus stock prices can be 
affected by net purchases by foreign investors, that is, sales minus purchases by 
foreign investors, whose investment on the stock market is easily influenced by 
exchange rate movements. For example, although foreign investors expect a decrease 
in stock prices they might purchase stocks if the expected decrease in exchange rates
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exceeds the expected decrease in stock prices. On the contrary, although they expect 
an increase in stock prices they might not purchase stocks if the expected increase in 
exchange rates exceeds the expected increase in stock prices. Consequently, an 
appreciation of own currency (decrease in exchange rates) would induce an inflow of 
foreign capitals' and, in turn, the demand for stocks might increase. Thus stock prices / 
will be positively affected.
There is conflicting evidence on the relationship between exchange rates and 
stock prices. Some studies have shown that exchange rates have a significant impact 
on stock prices. For example, Ma and Kao (1990) demonstrated two possible impacts 
of changes in a country’s currency values on stock price movements. One is the 
financial effect of exchange rate changes and the other is the economic effect from 
exchange rate changes. The former suggests that if the investment is denominated in a 
strong currency, foreign investors expect to receive an ultimately higher rate of return 
after the payoff is converted into their own currency. Consequently, appreciation of 
currency generates a favourable transaction exposure and creates excess demands for 
domestic stocks. However, the economic effect from exchange rate changes suggests, 
for an export dominant country, the currency appreciation reduces the 
competitiveness of export markets and has a negative effect on the domestic stock 
market and vice versa for an import dominant country. However, empirical evidences 
suggest mixed results. Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) reported a feedback 
effect from stock prices to exchange rates in the U.S. context. Using data form the 
UK, as well as the US and Germany, Smith (1992) also found that equity values have 
a significant impact on the UK pound- US dollar exchange rate over the period 
1979Q2-1988Q3, On the contrary, Mookerjee and Yu (1997) found no causal 
ordering between exchange rate changes and stock price changes in Singapore. Using
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Kearney and Daly (1998) also found no statistically significant relationship between 
the conditional volatility o f the foreign exchange market and the conditional volatility 
of the stock market in Australia.
As previously mentioned, most studies on the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and stock prices have focused on developed markets with 
relatively few investigating emerging markets. For example, Kwok (1994) 
investigated relations between stock returns and inflation variables, and between 
stock returns and future real activity in Korea over the period 1975-1990. The results 
show a highly significant negative relationship between stock returns and expected 
and unexpected inflation whereas an insignificant relationship between stock returns 
and real output is detected. Habibullah and Bahaaimshah (1996) examined whether 
money supply and output are important in predicting stock prices in Malaysia for the 
period from 1978 to 1992. Using cointegration methodology, they found no long-run 
equilibrium between stock price indices and money supply, which suggests that 
Malaysia’s stock market is informationally efficient with respect to money supply. 
Abdalla and Murinde (1997) investigated interrelations between exchange rates and 
stock prices in the emerging financial markets of Korea, India, Pakistan and the 
Philippines for the period 1985-1994. Using bivariate VARs, they found that 
exchange rates Granger cause stock prices in Korea, Pakistan and India, whereas 
stock prices Granger cause exchange rates in the Philippines. That is, there exists 
unidirectional causality from exchange rates to stock prices in all the sample 
countries, except the Philippines.
5.3 Methodology
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where u xt and ti t are uncorrelated white noise disturbances.
This system can be rewritten as:
^ f - O 0 + O 1X,_,+»f (5.3)
where
A =
Premultiplication by A '1 allows us to obtain the VAR model in standard form:
X t = B 0 + B lX t_l + et (5.4)
where B0 = 5, = / 4 ^ 0 , , s t = A~xut .
In the VAR, it is important to determine the appropriate lag length. If the lag 
length, p  is too small, the model is misspecified but if p  is too large, degrees of 
freedom are wasted. One way of determining appropriate lag length is the 
multivariate generalisation of the Akaike information criterion (AIC). This is defined 
as
AIC = TTog |Z| + 2N  (5.5)
where |E| is determinant of the variance covariance matrix of residuals, N  is the total 
parameters estimated in all equations. Thus, if there are n variables and have n 
equations and each variable has p  lags and an intercept, N =  n(np +1) ;  each of the n 
equations has np lagged regressors and an intercept. Adding additional regressors will 
reduce log |Z| at the expense of increasing N. By choosing a model that has the lowest 
AIC value we can select an appropriate lag length for VAR model.
Now, consider a matrix form of equation (5.4):
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If we iterate backwards, it is possible to form:
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By defining the (2 x 2) matrix Tf with elements y/Jk (?) such that
1 -c in >11 (0 Wn (O’
*21 1 W 21 (0 W22 (0 .
and jj -  [ //v ju ] ', it can be
rewritten as:
(5.8)
(=0
The four sets of coefficients of (/) and ^ 22(/) are called the impulse
response functions. Plotting the impulse response functions is a practical way to 
visually represent the behaviour of the {x,} and {yt } series in response to the various
shocks. An impulse function describes the effect on current and future values of the 
endogenous variable of a one standard deviation shock to one of the innovations.
While an impulse response function traces out the response o f an endogenous 
variable to a one standard deviation shock to one of the innovations, the forecast error 
variance decomposition of a VAR gives information about the relative importance of 
the random innovations. In other words, it illustrates the proportion o f the movements 
in a sequence due to its own shocks versus shocks to the other variable. If we use 
equation (5.8) to conditionally forecast «-step ahead then the w-step ahead forecast 
error X l+n - E tX t+n becomes
1
(5.9)
1=0
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If we focus solely on the {xf} sequence, the ??-step ahead forecast error is 
- E , = V \i + Vxi (!)«,,*,,-i + ’• • + V \\(» “
(5.10)
+ Vn (0)H„„, + Wn + ■ ■ ■ + Vn (n ~ l)“ ^ +i
If we denote the variance of the «~step ahead forecast error of xl+n as o\.(/?)2, then it 
is possible to decompose a x(n)2 due to shocks in the {uxl} and {uyt} sequences are
°~»[yn(°)2 + y fn ( 1)2 + ---+ y ,n ( » - i ) 2]
, vlVWni®)2 + F 12(1)2 + - "  +  ^ p . ( » - 1 ) 2]and ~ —.......  — ----------------------  (5.11)
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By construction, as in equation (5.1) and (5.2), the innovations u xt and u vl are
serially uncorrelated white noise disturbances. In reality, however, the innovations are 
never totally uncorrelated and they might be correlated contemporaneously. When the 
innovations are correlated they have a common component which cannot be 
identified with any specific variable. To quantify the cumulative response of an 
element of a single equation in VAR to an innovation, it is necessary that u xt and
b. orthogc.l. o f f  « .  m„« w id.l, „«d  o d b o g o l i - i . , ,  p r .^ u , , .  i, « »
S '
Choleski decomposition, which is based on decomposing the original VAR 
innovations ( u xt and u vt) into a set of uncorrelated components.13
5.4 Data
Monthly data on the stock price index, money supply, interest rate, exchange rates, 
balance of trade and flow of stock' investment are used for the period starting in
For a full technical discussion of these issues, see Hamilton (1994), pp. 318-323.
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January 1987 and ending in June 1997 (126 monthly observations). The first and last 
observations were dictated by both the availability o f the yields of corporate bond 
with 3-year maturity and the exclusion of the Asian financial market crisis in 1997. 
The data on trade balance were collected from Monthly Bulletin o f  Statistics.14 The 
data on money supply, interest rate, foreign exchange rates and flow of stock 
investment were obtained from The Bank o f Korea Database. The Korea Stock Price 
Composite Index (KOSPI) were obtained from Korea Stock Exchange Database with 
the index of 4 April 1980 as the base, i.e., it equals 100.
Since Korea is an export-lead economy, the exports/imports ratio (EXPIMP), 
which is computed as exports divided by imports, is used as a proxy variable for 
balance of trade in goods. For a money supply variable, we use the broad (M2) 
money supply measure. For an interest rate series, the yields o f corporate bond with 
3-year maturity (CB3Y) is chosen because this rate has been regarded as the most 
sensitive and representative money market rate in Korea. The selected exchange rates 
series are the Korean won-US dollar (KOUS), and the Korean won-100 Japanese yen 
(KOJP) exchange rates. As foreign investors have traded actively in the Korean stock 
market since the market opened-up in 1992, we also consider net stock investment by 
foreign investors (NETSTOCK), which is computed as the difference between an 
inflow and an outflow of stock investment fund, and net stock trading value 
(NETPURCH), which is generated as purchase minus sale by foreign investors.
The data on exports, imports and M2, were seasonally unadjusted; seasonally 
adjusted series were generated using an additive m ethod15 First, a centred moving 
average of the series, which covers a whole year centred around the current
14 Monthly Bulletin o f  Statistics is published by the Bank of Korea.
15 Our raw data are seasonally adjusted using an additive method described in the EVIEWS manual.
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observation, is computed. Second, the difference from the moving average is 
obtained. Third, we average the ratio over the years in the sample, for each month 
separately. These averages are seasonal factors. Fourth, the seasonally adjusted series 
are generated by subtracting it from the seasonal factors.
Initially the series KOSPI, M2, KOUS and KOJP are transformed using 
logarithmic first differences. The transformed series are designated as DLKOSPI for 
Korean stock market returns; DLM2 for M2 money growth; DEXPIMP for changes 
in the exports/imports ratio, a proxy variable for the balance of trade in goods; 
DLKOUS for the Korean won-US dollar exchange rate growth, DLKOJP for the 100 
Korean won-Japanese yen exchange rate growth; DCB3Y for changes in yield rates 
of 3-year corporate bond; DNETSTOCK for changes in net stock investment by 
foreign investors; and DNETPURCH for changes in net stock purchase by foreign 
investors. In order to examine the consequence of stock market opening-up, two sub 
periods are used: Pre-opening period from January 1987 to December 1991 and Post­
opening period from January 1992 to June 1997.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Cross-Correlation Analysis
Table 5.1 reports the cross-correlation coefficients computed between KOSPI returns 
and changes in trade balance variables. If  stock returns and trade balance are 
independent, then the estimated cross-correlation coefficients are expected to be zero 
for all lags/leads. As shown in Table 5.1, this is clearly not the case. The estimated 
cross-correlation coefficients between stock market returns (DLKOSPI) and changes 
in balance of trade (DEXPIMP) are not significantly different from zero in the pre­
129
opening period whereas the coefficients at lags one and eight in the entire period, and 
the coefficients at lags two and eight in the post-opening period are significant at the 
5% level. In the post-opening period, in particular, the coefficients at lag two and 
eight exhibit significant a positive relationship and the computed O-statistics also 
confirm that the set of cross-correlation coefficients at lags is not zero for the post­
opening period. The results suggest that unidirectional feedback generally exists in 
the post-opening period because some of the estimated cross-correlation coefficients 
are significant for lags. Thus, these results suggest that the change in the balance of 
trade variable is positively related to KOSPI returns in the post-opening period.
The estimated cross-correlation coefficients between stock market returns and 
changes in net purchases, and stock investment by foreign investors in the post­
opening period are presented in Table 5.2. As shown in panel A, the concurrent 
coefficient, 0.342 and the coefficient at lag nine, 0.227 are positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. In panel B, the estimated cross-correlations 
between stock market returns and net stock investment reported. The results indicate 
that, only the estimated concurrent coefficient 0.403 is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. The results imply that, no significant relationship 
between stock market returns and net purchases/net stock investment by foreign 
investors only exhibits in the long term.
Table 5.3 reports cross-correlation function computed between money growth 
and stock returns series. In the entire period, the estimated coefficients between 
KOSPI returns and the growth rates of money supply are significant and positive at 
lead eight. In the pre-opening period, the coefficients at lag three and leads seven, 
eight and nine are significantly different from zero. These results suggest a bi­
directional theory of causality. The computed O-statistics also indicate that all of the
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cross-correlation coefficients at leads are not zero. This might suggest that causality 
goes from money supply to stock market returns in the entire and pre-opening 
periods. However, no significant correlation between KOSPI returns and money 
growth is found in the post-opening period.
The yield rates of a 3-year corporate bond in Korea, which is a representative 
market rate, were around 10 to 13%, which implies approximately 7% of real interest 
rate, given the 4 to 5% inflation rate. Under this circumstance, it is clear that, for 
foreign investors, Korea is an attractive market that has not yet been sufficiently 
explored. It is well known that official interest rates in Korea were maintained at 
levels far below the market rate by severe government controls until the first half of 
the 1980s. The gap between the official rates and the curb loan market rates 
substantially narrowed as a result of the continuous financial market deregulation 
since the second half of 1980s.
Figure 5.1 shows that when the mid-term interest rate was high during the 
early period of stock market opening in 1992 and 1993, the stock price index 
(KOSPI) was relatively low. Subsequently, when the KOSPI increased in 1994 and 
1995, the mid-term interest rate followed a declining trend. A negative relationship 
between the stock price index and the interest rate was evident the period 1995-96.
Table 5.4, reports results of cross-correlations between stock returns and 
changes in interest rates. Over the entire period, the concurrent coefficient is -0.357 
and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Its negative sign is consistent 
with the conclusions of Bulmash and Trivoli (1991) that stock prices appear to react 
negatively to rising interest rates and vice versa for falling interest rates as higher
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interest rates increase the attractiveness o f alternative investments.16 It is also 
consistent with Geske and Roll (1983), who found a negative relationship between 
stock prices and interest rates.17 The results for the subperiods are interesting. The 
concurrent coefficient is -0.369 in the pre-opening period and becomes -0.397 in the 
post-opening period. This suggests that the negative relationship between the stock 
market returns and changes in interest rate has strengthened slightly since stock 
market opening.
In Table 5.5, the cross-correlation between the stock market returns and the 
growth rates of the Korean won-US dollar exchange rate are reported. Irrespective of 
sample period, all o f the significant cross-correlation coefficients are negatively 
associated. In the entire period, the coefficients at lag two and zero and the 
coefficients at lead one, six and seven are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level and negatively associated. In pre-opening period, the results are similar to those 
in the entire period except that the coefficient at longer lead eleven and lag eight is 
significant, whereas -0.265 the concurrent coefficient and -0.336 the coefficient at 
lead seven are significantly different from zero at the 5% level in the post-opening 
period.
These negatively associated coefficients can be explained by two aspects. 
First, the depreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar could negatively 
affect stock market prices. This can be explained the fact that although the Korean 
economy is export-oriented, most of the essential materials for export goods, for 
instance crude oil, are imported from abroad. Thus, currency depreciation can
16 Bulmash and Trivoli (1991) use monthly data of the US 3-montli Treasury bill auction average 
yield and the US Composite Treasury bond issues over 10 years maturity as the interest rates variables 
for the period of 1961-1987. They use the monthly Standard & Poor’s Composite Stock Market 
Average as the stock prices variable for the same period.
17 Geske and Roll (1983) use Treasury bill rates as a proxy for expected inflation.
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negatively affect export industries if they rely heavily on imported materials. Thus, 
the stock market as a whole can also react badly to currency depreciation. Second, 
although foreign investors expect an increase in stock prices they may reduce their 
portfolio balance by selling stocks if an increase in exchange rates exceeds an 
increase in stock prices. Consequently, a depreciation of own currency (increase in 
exchange rates) could result in selling stocks held by foreign investors since they tend 
to remit their invested amount to their own countries until the environment of the 
local financial market improves. Thus, an outflow of foreign capital due to a decrease 
in demand for stocks by foreign investors could also affect the demand for stocks by 
domestic investors. Consequently stock prices and the exchange rate are expected to 
be negatively associated.
The results of cross-correlation estimation between stock returns and growth 
rates of the Korean won-Japanese yen exchange rate are interesting. As shown in 
Panel B, the estimated coefficients between stock returns (DLKOSPI) and the growth 
rate of the Korean won-Japanese yen exchange rate (DLKOJP) are smaller, and 
longer lead coefficients are significant than those with DLKOUS. In the pre-opening 
period, although the significant coefficients at lead one and six are negatively 
associated, the lead coefficient at nine exhibit positive sign. In the post-opening 
period, the significant coefficient at lead four is positive whereas the coefficient at 
lead twelve is negative. Consequently the overall effect seems to be negative in both 
the pre- and post-opening periods. However, the positive correlation might be 
explained by the exogenous compared to other variables in the system.
Figure 5.2 plots the impulse responses of DLKOSPI to a one standard 
deviation shock to the innovations in four equations in the pre-opening period. As 
mentioned in section 5.3, the VAR errors are orthogonalised using a Choleski
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decomposition that eliminates any contemporaneous correlation between the 
innovation in DLKOSPI equation and the other four innovations, which precede it in 
the chosen ordering. When the innovation in the DLM2 equation changes by a value 
of one standard deviation, stock market returns (DLKOSPI) decrease at 2-month 
horizon then DLKOSPI increases in the following month. In general, a shock to the 
money supply seems to have a small impact on DLKOSPI at longer horizon. When 
there is a one standard deviation shock on the growth rates in the Korean won-US
i ?
dollar exchange rate, stock market returns respond negatively to the shock up /month ^ 
three then DLKOSPI increases for the following one month. The responses to 
exports/imports ratio show that stock market returns increase up to month four after 
decreasing slightly in the first period. However, stock market returns seem to respond 
negatively to the shock on changes in interest rate after increasing slightly in the first 
period.
In Table 5.7, the estimated forecast error variance decompositions of stock 
returns are presented. The results indicate that approximately 80.1% of the first month 
variation of stock returns is attributable to its own innovations. However, the 
contributions of own innovations decrease to 34.8% and 32.9% at 12 and 24 months 
horizon respectively as the shock evolves over time and system approaches a stable 
equilibrium. In particular, among the remaining model variables, the strongest 
influence on stock price movements is exerted by changes in the balance of trade. For 
example, DEXPIMP accounts for 19.3% and 20.7% of the variance in DLKOSPI at 
12- and 24-months horizon, respectively. The decrease in the explanatory 
contributions of DLKOSPI due to its own innovations is incrementally picked up by 
the remaining model variables over the 24 months forecast horizon of which gets the 
larger share. The contribution of money growth innovations on the variance of stock
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returns is also considerable. DLM2 accounts for 15.3% and 18.2% of the variance in 
DLKOSPI at 6- and 24-months horizon, respectively. The contribution of the 
remaining variables, DLKOUS and DCB3Y in the model in explaining the variance 
of stock returns are approximately the same, which is approximately 14%, at 12- and 
24-months horizon.
At 3-month horizon, the variance of stock returns is decomposed of the 
innovations of stock returns (52.1%), growth rates of the Korean won-US dollar 
exchange rate (20.6%), money supply growth (13.2%), changes in interest rate 
(12.6%) and changes in balance of trade (1.5%). At 24-month horizon, although the 
contributions of the innovations of stock returns (33%) have decreased, the 
attributions of changes in balance of trade (20.7%), money supply growth (18.2%), 
growth in the Korean won-US dollar exchange rate (14.6%) and changes in interest 
rate (13.5%) have increased.
Table 5.8 reports a multivariate VAR(6) in the post-opening period. Although 
the computed AIC suggests the order of six for a VAR, the VAR specification does 
not seem be fit very well in the post-opening period since only one of the coefficients 
in the RKOSPI equation is significant. Our results indicate that DEXPIMP(-3) is 
positive and significant in the RKOSPI equation.
The responses of RKOSPI to one standard deviation shocks in the post­
opening period are presented in Figure 5.3. When the innovation in the DLM2 
equation changes by a value of one standard deviation, DLKOSPI responses to the 
money supply shock by decreasing slightly in the first following month then 
DLKOSPI increases up to month four in the future. The results of the response of 
DLKOSPI to DLKOUS innovation show that stock DLKOSPI do not seem to 
respond to the shock in the Korea won-US dollar exchange rate shock in the first
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following two months. However, DLKOSPI decrease after increasing slightly for a 
month. The results of the response of stock market returns to exports/imports ratio 
indicates that DLKOSPI increases up to month three then it decreases for the 
following two months. Although the pattern of the response o f DLKOSPI to interest 
rate changes exhibit the repeat of a decrease and an increase, DLKOSPI seems to 
decrease in the first following month.
The results of variance decomposition of DLKOSPI in the post-opening 
period are shown in Table 5.9. Irrespective of forecast horizon, the forecast error 
variance of DLKOSPI is mainly due to its own innovations and partially due to the 
innovations of DCB3Y and DEXPIMP. One of the interesting findings in the post­
opening period is that the forecast error variance of stock returns explained by 
changes in interest rate is approximately 9.2% in the first month but the remaining 
variables in the model do not seem to attribute to the forecast error variance of 
DLKOSPI. Unlike our findings in the pre-opening period, the innovations of the 
Korean won-US dollar exchange rate growth hardly attribute to the decomposition of 
forecast error variance of stock returns.
Our results suggest that DCB3Y accounts for 12.5% of the variance of 
DKLOSPI and that DLKOSPI accounts for 12.3% of the variance of DCB3Y 
indicate the existence of co-movement between these two variables rather than one 
causing the other in the Granger (1969) sense. A strong co-movement between two 
variables x and y  may simply indicate that x causes y, and in the process y  moves 
closely with it. This aspect of the relationship between DCB3 Y and DLKOSPI can be 
examined following the procedure implemented in Abdulah (1994). To determine ifx  
causes y  in the Granger sense one computes the forecast error variances by running a 
pair of decompositions, first with x and y  placed next to each other from the last
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position, and reversing only their positions in the second running. The variable, which 
accounts for a larger proportion of the variance when placed last in the ordering of the 
decomposition scheme, is considered as causal in their co-movements. Our 
implementation of this procedure at a 12-month horizon finds that DLKOSPI 
accounts for 12% of the variance of DCB3Y when DLKOSPI is placed last in the 
ordering whereas DCB3Y accounts for 4.6% of the variance of DLKOSPI when 
DCB3Y is placed in the last ordering. This suggests that stock returns exert a larger 
influence on changes in interest rate in their co-movements in the post-opening 
period.
To sum up, changes in exports/imports ratio and money supply growth are 
important determinants of stock price movement in the pre-opening period whereas 
changes in interest rate and balance of trade seem to play an important role in 
forecasting the variance of stock returns in the post-opening period.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated the nexus between Korean stock market returns 
and macroeconomic variables for the period from January 1987 to June 1997. Since 
the Korean stock market has been affected by different economic and political 
environment following its opening in 1992 the series has been divided into two 
subperiods: Pre-opening period from January 1987 to December 1991 and Post - 
opening period from January 1992 to June 1997.
Cross-correlation analysis and a five variable VAR framework are used 
together with innovation accounting procedures to assess the economic implications 
of the model. The results of cross-correlation analysis reveal that (i) the balance of
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trade variable is positively related to the stock returns in the post-opening period; (ii) 
strong negative relationship between stock returns and changes in interest rate at lag 
zero is found and has strengthened since the stock market opening; (iii) the Korean 
won-US dollar exchange rate is negatively related to stock market returns in all 
sample periods.
Our findings using forecast error variance decompositions are interesting. The 
results show that a substantial proportion of the variance of stock returns is 
attributable to its own innovations in the pre- and post-opening periods. The evidence 
suggests that changes in the exports/imports ratio is an important determinant of the 
variance of stock returns in both the pre-and post-opening periods. In the pre-opening 
period, changes in money growth together with the exports/imports ratio jointly 
account for over one third of the variance of stock returns, and a considerable 
proportion of the variance of stock returns are also attributed to changes in the Korean 
won-US dollar exchange rate and interest rate. In the post-opening period, however, 
the results show that changes in the interest rate and the exports/imports ratio have 
relatively more significant influence on stock returns variability than those due to 
money growth and exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, the findings suggest that 
changes in the balance of trade is one of the important determinants in forecasting the 
variance of stock returns in the Korean export-oriented economy.
138
Figure 5.1 KOSPI and Mid-Term Interest Rates
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Table 5.1 Estimated Cross-Correlation Coefficients Between KOSPI Returns and 
Balance o f Trade
DLKOSPI & DEXPIMP(0
i Entire period Pre-opening period Post-opening period
12 0.014 -0.026 0.087
11 0.036 0.089 -0.018
10 0.003 0.037 -0.040
9 -0.052 -0.110 0.030
8 -0.098 -0.079 -0.128
7 0.120 0.147 0.037
6 0.008 0.175 -0.162
5 -0.051 -0.131 0.065
4 0.050 0.069 0.067
3 -0.101 -0.105 -0.081
2 -0.003 0.017 -0.054
1 0.067 0.053 0.056
0 -0.078 -0.077 -0.076
-1 -0.157 * -0.188 -0.156
-2 0.154 0.070 0,361 *
-3 0.050 0.120 -0.071
-4 0.067 0.135 0.000
-5 -0.091 -0.208 0.068
-6 0.046 0.070 0.128
-7 -0.103 -0.048 -0.224
-8 0.180 * 0.060 0.306 *
-9 -0.124 -0.078 -0.079
-10 0.058 0.055 -0.123
-11 -0.130 -0.130 -0.032
-12 0.060 0.013 0.039
O-statistic O-statistic O-statistic
H0: all A*. (+0 = 0 6.448 8.109 5.726
H0: all Avy ( 0  = 0 19.889 10.325 25.697 *
Note: For a proxy variable for balance of trade, Exports/Imports ratio (EXP/IMP) variable is computed 
as exports divided by imports.
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5.2 Estimated Cross-Correlation Coefficients Between DLKOSPI and Flow of 
Stock Investment
A. DLKOSPI & B. DLKOSPI &/ DNETPURCH(/) DNETSTOCK(/)
12 -0.029 -0.024
11 -0.126 -0.183
10 0.048 0.086
9 0.038 0.073
8 -0.060 -0.093
7 0.074 0.065
6 0.063 0.093
5 -0.149 -0.133
4 -0.026 -0.045
3 0.010 -0.026
2 -0.141 -0.196
1 -0.124 -0.103
0 0.342 * 0.403 *
-1 0.001 0.032
-2 -0.091 -0.088
-3 0.228 0.190
-4 -0.143 -0.118
-5 -0.072 -0.089
-6 -0.078 -0.078
-7 0.119 0.112
-8 -0.205 -0.203
-9 0.227 * 0.196
-10 0.004 0.011
-11 -0.082 -0.062
-12 0.026 0.047
O-statistic O-statistic
Ho: a llp J5,(+/) = 0 6.798 10.327
H0: all A* (“ 0  = 0 15.611 12.919
Note: NETPURCH is computed as tlie value of purchase minus the value of sale by foreign investors 
in tire Korea Stock Exchange. NETSTOCK is calculated as an inflow o f stock investment minus an 
outflow o f stock investment fund.
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5.3 Estimated Cross-Correlation Coefficients Between KOSPI Returns and
Money Supply
i
DLKOSPI & DLM2(/)
Entire period Pre-opening period Post-opening period
12 0.106 0.187 -0.039
11 -0.113 -0.207 0.059
10 0.109 0.163 -0.016
9 -0.165 -0.343 * 0.111
8 0.174 * 0.339 * -0.079
7 -0.220 -0.281 * -0.128
6 -0.018 -0.027 -0.081
5 0.077 0.008 0.194
4 0.062 0.083 -0.013
3 0.092 0.089 0.072
2 -0.001 -0.051 0.079
1 0.015 0.061 -0.046
0 -0.057 -0.049 -0.081
-1 -0.165 -0.212 -0.135
-2 0.119 0.220 0.003
-3 -0.132 -0.265 * 0.041
-4 0.102 0.169 0.013
-5 -0.001 -0.076 0.123
-6 -0.016 0.109 -0.179
-7 -0.050 -0.030 -0.053
-8 0.051 0.054 -0.009
-9 0.078 0.090 0.142
-10 0.020 0.024 -0.097
-11 -0.018 -0.073 0.062
-12 0.042 0.014 0.012
(7-statistic O-statistic O-statistic
Ho: all ^ ( + 0  = 0 21.998 * 31.738 * 7.358
H0: all Pxv(- i)  = 0 10.934 14.967 7.801
^denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5.4 Estimated Cross-Correlation Coefficients Between KOSPI Returns and
Interest Rates
7
DLKOSPI & DCB3Y(/)
Entire period Pre-opening period Post-opening period
12 -0.016 0.011 0.015
11 0.042 0.090 -0.054
10 0.039 -0.164 0.156
9 -0.061 -0.068 -0.053
8 0.195 * -0.044 0.348 *
7 0.105 -0.059 0.174
6 -0.073 0.080 -0.157
5 0.102 0.117 0.030
4 0.047 0.004 0.079
3 0.052 0.022 0.068
2 0.046 0.021 0.026
1 0.130 0.037 0.172
0 -0.357 * -0,369 * -0.397 *
-1 -0.035 0.107 -0.183
-2 0.006 -0.101 0.095
-3 -0.046 -0.003 -0.091
-4 0.037 -0.040 0.071
-5 0.126 0.154 0.108
-6 0.014 0.105 -0.029
-7 0.011 0.007 -0.037
-8 0.071 0.059 0.106
-9 -0.146 - 0 . 1 1 1 -0.166
-10 -0.001 0.009 -0.022
-11 -0.031 -0.021 -0.039
-12 -0.075 -0.104 -0.022
O-statistic O-statistic O-statistic
H0: all p xy(+i) = 0 12.845 4.013 17.221
H0: all p xy(- i)  = 0 8.464 5.626 9.146
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5.5 Estimated Cross-Correlation Coefficients Between KOSPI Returns and 
Exchange Rates
A. DLKOSPI & DLKOUS(i)
/ Entire period Pre-opening period Post-opening period
12 -0.136 -0.113 -0.076
11 -0.120 -0.227 * 0.051
10 -0.107 -0.092 -0.103
9 -0.102 -0.209 -0.042
8 -0.007 -0.156 0.084
7 -0.313 * -0.248 * -0.336 *
6 -0.178 * -0.233 -0.172
5 -0.068 -0.006 -0.026
4 -0.160 -0.254 * 0.030
3 -0.113 -0.183 0.011
2 -0.091 -0.221 0.058
1 -0.215 * -0.298 * -0.110
0 -0.246 * -0.225 -0.265 *
-1 -0.170 -0.382 * 0.049
-2 -0.197 * -0.314 * -0.078
-3 -0.115 -0.201 -0.029
-4 -0.072 -0.089 -0.033
-5 -0.070 -0.080 -0.013
-6 -0.121 -0.097 -0.160
-7 0.023 -0.164 0.219
-8 -0.078 -0.297 * 0.179
-9 -0.103 -0.164 -0.023
-10 -0.076 -0.155 -0,025
-11 -0.077 -0.100 -0.035
-12 0.063 0.009 0.094
(9-statistic O-statistic (9-statistic
H0: all p xy(+i) = 0 37.958 * 33.720 * 14.210
H0: all p ^ ( - / )  = 0 18.371 31.377 * 9.729
B. DLKOSPI & DLKOJP(/)
/ Entire period Pre-opening period Post-opening period
12 -0.263 * -0.170 -0.334 *
11 -0.118 -0.132 -0.126
10 -0.019 -0.029 -0.066
9 0.157 0.234 * 0.062
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8 0.007
7 -0.062
6 -0.120
5 0.068
4 0.051
3 -0.111
2 -0.033
1 -0.149
0 -0.002
-1 0.048
-2 0.023
-3 0.057
-4 0.007
-5 0.131
-6 0.010
-7 -0.066
-8 -0.111
-9 0.032
-10 0.091
-11 0.059
-12 0.127
O-statistic
H0: all p xy(+/) = 0 23.288 *
Hp: all P y  (-/’) = Q_______ 9.451
* denotes significance at the 5% level
-0.064 0.111
-0.100 0.050
-0.253 * 0.088
0.083 0.097
-0.087 0.262 *
-0.198 -0.004
-0,020 -0.072
-0.248 * -0.005
0.017 -0.024
0.150 -0.127
-0.004 0.096
0,001 0.136
-0.027 0.053
0.187 0.119
-0.015 0.070
-0.175 0.150
-0.130 -0.055
0.030 0.065
0.145 0.027
0.060 0.008
0.110 0.079
►-statistic O-statistic
20.454 18.953
10.054 7.539
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Table 5.6 VAR Estimations in the Pre-Opening Period: Jan. 1987 -  Dec. 1991
DLKOSPI DLM 2SAA DLKOUS DEXPIMP DCB3Y
DLKOSPI(-l) -0.594 0.053 -0.006 0.086 1.433
(-2.95) * (0.80) (-0.24) (0.31) (0.61)
DLKOSPI(-2) -0.237 -0.066 0.012 -0.032 -1.639
(-1.20) (-1.03) (0.46) (-0.12) (-0.71)
DLKOSPI(-3) -0.110 0.035 0.002 0.078 -2.794
(-0.56) (0.54) (0.07) (0.29) (-1.22)
DLKOSPI(-4) -0.016 0.062 0.006 0.087 -1.863
(-0.08) (1.01) (0.26) (0.33) (-0.84)
DLKOSPI(-5) 0.514 -0.009 -0.006 -0.145 -3.734
(2.88) * (-0.15) (-0.25) (-0.59) (-1.80)
DLKOSPI(-6) 0.241 0.002 -0.014 0,177 -1.931
(1.41) (0.03) (-0.64) (0.75) (-0.97)
DLM2(-1) -1.555 -0.226 0.087 -0.580 3.930
(-2.28) * (-1.01) (1.00) (-0.61) (0.49)
DLM2(-2) -1.744 0.121 0.214 -0.897 5.120
(-2.40) * (0.51) (2.29) * (-0.89) (0.60)
DLM2(-3) -1.840 -0.184 -0.002 -0.139 0.634
(-2.55) * (-0.78) (-0.02) (-0.14) (0.08)
DLM2(-4) -0.390 -0.057 0.058 0.449 -4.865
(-0.57) (-0.25) (0.66) (0.47) (-0.61)
DLM2(-5) 0.694 -0.300 0.109 -0.908 -9.581
(1.06) (-1.40) (1.30) (-1.00) (-1.25)
DLM2(-6) 0.937 0.008 0.028 -0.506 -19.113
(1.46) (0.04) (0.34) (-0.57) (-2.56) *
DLKO US(-l) -1.553 0.103 0.505 1.151 8.111
(-0.90) (0.18) (2.29) * (0.48) (0-41)
DLKOUS (-2) -3.939 0.133 -0.061 1.923 27.382
(-2.28) * (0.24) (-0.28) (0.80) (1.36)
DLKOUS(-3) -1.810 -0.038 0.206 1.137 -20.291
(-0.97) (-0.06) (0.86) (0.44) (-0.94)
DLKOUS (-4) 2.436 -0.553 -0.224 -1.007 -32.376
(1.35) (-0.94) (-0.97) (-0.40) (-1.55)
DLKOUS(-5) 0.517 0.401 0.388 -1.094 -17.009
(0.27) (0.64) (1.56) (-0.41) (-0.76)
DLKOUS(-6) 1.084 0.278 -0.021 -0.396 -1.275
(0.68) (0.54) (-0.10) (-0.18) (-0.07)
DEXPIM P(-l) -0.264 0.100 0.004 -0.465 0.241
(-1.60) (1.86) (0.19) (-2.04) * (0.13)
DEXPIMP(-2) -0.272 0.065 -0.019 -0.179 2.354
(-1.42) (1.04) (-0.79) (-0.68) (1.05)
DEXPIMP(-3) 0.126 -0.086 -0.021 -0.075 1.261
(0.68) (-1.41) (-0.89) (-0.29) (0.58)
DEXPIMP(-4) 0.313 0.037 -0.028 0.038 -1.549
(1.76) (0.64) (-1.23) (0.15) (-0.74)
DEXPIMP(-5) 0.165 0,019 -0.008 0.019 0.218
(0.92) (0.32) (-0.35) (0.08) (0.10)
DEXPIMP(-6) 0,194 -0.003 -0.036 0,158 -0.815
(1.16) (-0.06) (-1.67) (0.68) (-0.42)
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DCB3Y(-1) 0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.023 -0.058
(1.09) (0.52) (0.12) (-0.95) (-0.28)
DCB3Y(-2) 0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.011 -0.244
(0.40) (0.33) (0.22) (-0.43) (-1.16)
DCB3Y(-3) -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.036 0.078
(-0.27) (1.11) (-0.44) (1.51) (0.39)
DCB3Y(-4) 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.036 -0.180
(0.19) (-0.31) (-0.66) (1.46) (-0.86)
DCB3Y(-5) 0.066 -0.003 -0.003 -0.019 -0.518
(3.49) * (-0.54) (-1.42) (-0.72) (-2.37) *
DCB3Y(-6) 0.033 0.001 0.003 0.013 -0.279
(1.42) (0.14) (0.95) (0.39) (-1.03)
C 0.043 0.024 -0.007 0.024 0.646
(1.20) (2.02) * (-1.54) (0.48) (1.54)
^-statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions for KOSPI Returns and Macro Variables
in the Pre-Opening Period
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Table 5.7 Variance Decom positions in the Pre-Opening Period
A. Variance Decomposition of DEXPIMP:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.051 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.060 91.207 1.539 2.476 3.393 1.385
6 0.067 75.540 3.186 2.776 12.466 6.032
12 0.071 70.826 6.033 3.122 13.483 6.535
24 0.074 69.531 6.606 3.230 14.171 6.463
B. Variance Decomposition of DLM2:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.012 3.259 96.741 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.014 16.562 75.822 0.224 0.739 6.654
6 0.017 29.785 59.146 2.221 1.158 7.689
12 0.018 28.753 55.793 2.832 3.705 8.918
24 0.018 29.247 54.984 2.911 4.217 8.641
C. Variance Decomposition of DLKOUS:
Period Std, Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.005 17.465 1.155 81.379 0.000 0.000
3 0,006 17.050 24.627 57.309 0.092 0.922
6 0.008 22.512 28.354 45.981 2.045 1.107
12 0.008 24.599 27.316 43.018 2.979 2.088
24 0.009 26.178 28.068 40.781 2.903 2.070
D. Variance Decomposition of DCB3Y:
Period Std Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.431 0.152 3.630 5.249 90.970 0.000
3 0.479 1.945 6.278 12.164 75.882 3.731
6 0.542 5.384 6.131 12.625 68.219 7.641
12 0.612 9.346 14.849 12.669 56.639 6.496
24 0.633 10.072 16.248 12.287 54.789 6.603
E. Variance Decomposition of DLKOSPI:
Period Std Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.037 0.555 2.446 7.189 9.704 80,106
3 0.053 1.469 13.248 20.605 12.556 52.122
6 0.066 16.450 15.338 15.113 12.593 40.507
12 0.074 19.316 17.212 14.832 13.820 34.821
24 0.077 20.660 18.218 14.609 13.532 32.981
Ordering: DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
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Table 5.8 VAR Estimations in the Post-Opening Period: Jan. 1992 -  Jun. 1997
DLKOSPI DLM2 DLKOUS DEXPIMP DCB3Y
DLKOSPI(-l) -0.037 -0.013 -0.002 -0.027 2.148
(-0.22) (-0.38) (-0.09) (-0.21) (1.27)
DLKOSPIC-2) 0.050 0.047 -0.011 0.006 0.192
(0.29) (1.32) (-0.49) (0.04) (0.11)
DLKOSPI(-3) -0.070 -0.011 -0.003 -0.058 1.663
(-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.43) (0.94)
DLKOSPI(-4) -0.049 0.006 0.002 -0.014 -1.186
(-0.28) (0.17) (0.09) (-0.11) (-0.69)
DLKOSPI(-5) -0.056 0.043 -0.033 0.080 1.268
(-0.33) (1.25) (-1.44) (0.63) (0.75)
DLKOSPI(-6) 0.134 0.018 -0.026 -0.180 -1.763
(0.73) (0.48) (-1.07) (-1-29) (-0.96)
DLM2(-1) -0.663 -0.414 0.216 -0.003 14.313
(-0.83) (-2.54) * (2.00) * (-0.01) (1-78)
DLM2(-2) -0.558 -0.204 0.062 -0.S87 12.516
(-0.62) (-1.13) (0.52) (-1.31) (L40)
DLM2(-3) -0.090 -0.253 0.202 0.207 10.111
(-0.10) (-1.35) (L62) (0.30) (1.10)
DLM2(-4) -0.018 -0.194 0.102 -0.147 -2.178
(-0.02) (-1.01) (0.81) (-0.20) (-0.23)
DLM2(-5) -0.168 -0.038 -0.165 -0.840 5.672
(-0.19) (-0.21) (-1.38) (-1.24) (0.64)
DLM2(-6) -1.260 0.120 0.001 -0.642 9.022
(-1.48) (0.70) (0.01) (-1.00) (1.06)
DLK O US(-l) 0.003 0.088 0.119 -0.017 7.421
(0.00) (0.36) (0.74) (-0.02) (0.62)
DLKOUS(-2) -0.317 -0.016 0.132 0.439 -10.800
(-0.27) (-0.07) (0.85) (0.50) (-0.93)
DLKOUS (-3) 0.121 0.206 -0.025 -0.516 -1.836
(0.10) (0.87) (-0.16) (-0.58) (-0.16)
DLKOUS(-4) -0.394 0.110 0.026 0.399 5.379
(-0.30) (0.42) (0.15) (0-41) (0.42)
DLKOUS(-5) -0.074 -0.127 0,000 1.883 11.834
(-0.06) (-0.52) (0.00) (2.05) * (0.98)
DLKOUS(-6) -0.931 0.305 0,185 -0.577 -17.440
(-0.75) (1.21) ( Ll l ) (-0.61) (-1.40)
DEXPIM P(-l) 0.142 -0.008 -0.034 -0.608 -3.663
(0.65) (-0.18) (-1.14) (-3.64) * (-1.66)
DEXP IMP-2) 0.489 -0.034 -0.0S8 -0.361 -5.787
(1.82) (-0.63) (-2.45) * (-1.77) (-2.15)
DEXPIMP(-3) 0.409 -0.068 -0.071 -0.011 -2.590
(1.25) * (-1.03) (-1.61) (-0.05) (-0.80)
DEXPIMP(-4) 0.257 -0.081 -0.062 0.107 -0.050
(0.76) (-1-17) (-1.36) (0.41) (-0.02)
DEXPIMP(-5) 0.241 -0.052 -0.026 -0.036 -0.487
(0.72) (-0.76) (-0.58) (-0.14) (-0-15)
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DEXPIMP(-6) 0.211 -0.056 -0.043 0.004 -0.035
(0.82) (-1.08) (-1.24) (0.02) (-0.01)
DCB3Y(-1) -0.007 -0,003 0.002 -0.008 0.010
(-0.43) (-0.87) (0.76) (-0.65) (0.06)
DCB3Y(-2) 0.007 0.004 -0.006 0.008 0.019
(0.45) (1.33) (-2.76) * (0.62) (0.12)
DCB3Y(-3) 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.005 0.229
(0.01) (-0.05) (-1.28) (0.34) (1.20)
DCB3Y(-4) 0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.010 -0.149
(0.59) (-1.06) (0.02) (0.69) (-0.76)
DCB3Y(-5) 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.136
(0.20) (0.38) (-0.76) (-0.10) (-0.76)
DCB3Y(-6) -0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.244
(-0.44) (-0.23) (0.35) (-0.48) (1-43)
C 0.044 0.024 -0.005 0.029 -0.717
(0.97) (2.66) * (-0.85) (0.84) (-1.60)
/-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 5.3 Impulse Response Functions for KOSPI Returns and Macro Variables
in the Post-Opening Period
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Table 5.9 Variance Decom positions o f  KOSPI Returns in the Post-Opening Period
A. Variance Decomposition of DEXIMSAA:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.039 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.047 92.879 4.155 0.497 2.385 0.085
6 0.052 77.524 11.751 4.745 2.429 3.551
12 0.058 64.279 10.733 6.841 7.745 10.402
24 0.059 62.581 10.802 6.929 8.438 11.249
. Variance Decomposition of DLM2:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.010 2.298 97.702 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.012 3.892 87.506 0.156 4.595 3.852
6 0,013 4.985 79.257 3.015 6.831 5.912
12 0.013 6.403 72.324 6.116 7.965 7.192
24 0.014 6.803 69.801 7.176 8.533 7.687
!. Variance Decomposition of DLKOUS:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.007 3.846 0.515 95.639 0.000 0.000
3 0.008 10.991 8.219 66.933 13.509 0.348
6 0.009 9.428 17.902 52.886 16.157 3.628
12 0.010 11.349 17.918 45.766 17.256 7.712
24 0.010 11.669 18,232 44.621 17.376 8.102
K Variance Decomposition of DCB3Y:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.511 3.394 0.407 1.018 95.181 0.000
3 0.580 12.792 7.503 2.470 74.026 3.208
6 0.625 12.038 7.713 4.011 68.372 7.866
12 0.708 9.551 10.348 7.337 60.766 11.999
24 0.728 10.141 10.758 7,440 59.329 12.332
1. Variance Decomposition of DLKOSPI:
Period Std. Error DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI
1 0.051 0.399 0.845 0.010 9.162 89.584
3 0.054 8.472 2.835 0.218 8.837 79.639
6 0.057 10.004 2.821 0.568 11.974 74.634
12 0.060 10.614 8.245 1.696 12.289 67.157
24 0.062 11.320 8.678 2.351 12.495 65.155
Ordering: DEXPIMP DLM2 DLKOUS DCB3Y DLKOSPI 
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
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6 Total Returns in Developed and Emerging 
Markets in the Pacific Basin
6.1 Introduction
There is considerable interest in relationships between national equity markets. This 
interest has been stimulated by the globalisation of financial markets, the gradual 
relaxation and abolition of controls on international capital movements, and 
international investment associated with portfolio diversification. However, the 
empirical evidence on long run relationships in the Pacific-Basin yields conflicting 
results.
Coray, Rad and Urbain (1995) investigate the long run relationship between 
the stock price indices of five developed, Pacific Basin equity markets, Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and New Zealand using monthly data for the period 
19722 - 19922. Using Johansen cointegration tests based on a VAR(6) they find a 
single cointegration vector for the five stock markets. In a vector error correction 
framework, the long-run equilibrium relationship between stock price indices enters 
the equations for Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, but not those for Australia and 
New Zealand; within the region, geographical separation plays a significant role.
Hung and Cheung (1995) use weekly data over the period from January 1981
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to December 1991 for three emerging equity markets, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan 
and two developed markets, Hong Kong and Singapore.18 Using data in local 
currency, they find no cointegrating vectors for either the full sample period or the 
two sub-periods before- and after the 1987 crash. Using VAR(3) and US$ adjusted 
series, they find three cointegrating vectors for the four-year period after the 1987 
crash, November 1987 -  December 1991. Further investigation of the five exchange
A-
rates against he US$ finds three cointegrating vectors for the same period The 
common-currency long run equilibria appear to result from common responses to the 
depreciation of the US$ in the late 1980s.
An investigation for the earlier period by Chan, Gup and Pan (1992) using 
local currency provides consistent results. They use both daily and weekly data for 
the period February 1983 -  May 1987 in a study of linkages between the stock 
markets of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and the United States. Both 
bivariate and multivariate Engle Granger cointegration tests using ADF(4) and 
ADF(6) statistics carried out. No evidence of cointegration is found.
These results contrast with those found by Kwan, Sim and Cotsomitis (1995) 
who use monthly data denominated in local currencies for the Pacific Basin markets 
of Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, together with Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. This study implements Engle-Granger tests 
for the sample period 1982i -  19912. Within the Pacific-Basin region they find 
bivariate cointegration between Hong Kong and Taiwan, Japan and Korea, Korea and 
Taiwan and Singapore and Taiwan. Mulivariate tests find no cointegration between
18 Huang and Cheung classify' all o f their markets as ‘emerging’. However, in this thesis the definition 
provided by the International Finance Corporation is used: an emerging stock market is one which 
satisfies two criteria: (i) it is located in an economy with GNP per head not exceeding the tlireshold 
adopted by the World Bank for classification as ‘high income’ (US$ 9,656 in 1997) and (ii) the 
investable market capitalisation to GDP ratio is low recent years.
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Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan but if either Japan or Germany or the UK 
or the US is additionally included then the null of no cointegration is rejected.
There is conflicting evidence between tests in local currency of Hung and 
Cheung and Kwan, Sim and Cotsomitis. These papers differ in their sample periods 
(by only one year and ten months), the frequency of the data employed, weekly and 
monthly, and the types of test implemented, Johansen and Engl e-Granger. Given the 
countries selected for these studies, there is potential for supporting results in three of 
the four bivariate tests of cointegration. This is not found. However, there is 
consistency between the lack of cointegration between Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan and between these four markets with Malaysia additional^/included. In 
multivariate tests it would seem important for developed markets also to be included.
This chapter re-examines the question of the interdependence of Pacific Basin 
equity markets. It extends the previous literature in five principal ways. First, a larger 
set of stock markets is considered: eleven Pacific Basin markets are examined. 
Second, both developed and emerging markets are included in the tests together with 
those of the UK and the US. Third, data on total returns is used; this includes 
dividends paid and reinvested, since these are what matter to international investors. 
Fourth, a common currency, the US$, is used. Previous results o f work in local 
currency and in a common currency differ. Where exchange rates change significantly 
it would seem important not to ignore currency risk by using equity prices 
denominated in local currency. Fifth, the data span the period of Asian financial 
market crises. Consequently soHmit root tests which allow for a possible crash are 
used. Also, tests of cointegration are carried out for two periods: the first period ends 
immediately before Black Wednesday on the Bangkok stock exchange, the start of the 
Asian crisis, and the entire sample ends in April 2000. In this chapter, therefore,
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preliminary results of the consequences of the Asian crisis for long-run equilibria 
between stock markets in the region are reported.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the 
model of international returns and the empirical methodology employed. Section 6.3 
describes the equity markets and their characteristics and section 6.4 discusses the 
data and their properties. In section 6.5 the results are presented. Section 6.6 provides 
a brief conclusion.
6.2 International Returns: The Model and Methodology
The extent to which stock markets are linked internationally depends upon whether 
they are integrated or segmented. With integrated markets, prices of domestically 
traded equities depend on international factors. In segmented markets, equity prices 
are determined by purely domestic considerations. To examine the extent to which 
national stock markets are segmented or integrated this chapter draws on Solnik 
(1974) in which the international asset pricing model is represented by two equations 
which relate the price of a security to domestic and world factors respectively. 
Assuming a common currency and hence a common world risk-free rate of interest, 
p, then for security // of country /'
Df'ji -  p  + aji{DVj-rw) V / and j  (6.1)
in which Dr}i is the required return on the equity market o f country /. Dry is the 
required return on country / ’s market portfolio and ay, is the domestic systematic risk 
of security ji.
For national stock market, consider
Drj= p  + j3ji(Drw- p )  + iij V j  (6.2)
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in which Dt) is the required return on the equity market of country y, Drw is the 
required return on the world market portfolio and f t  is the international systematic 
risk of country y. The term vj represents factors specific to country y. Substituting (6.2) 
into (6.1) gives
where fy, = cLpftj is the international systematic risk of security j i  and Uj = ajtVj. If vy = 
0 then Uj = 0 and equity markets are integrated since the required return on the 
domestic security corresponds to that on the world market portfolio.
A simple test of the importance of country-specific factors is provided by 
correlation coefficients. Using data on returns on a national market and world returns, 
Dt'} and D rw, a low correlation coefficient implies country-specific factors are 
important. The larger the correlation coefficient the more integrated is the national 
market with world markets. This test, however, focuses on short-run, 
contemporaneous correlations and does not capture any long-run equilibria. To 
examine the latter we use tests of cointegration.
The returns on national and world equity markets Drn and Drw< are given by
r
krit and Arwt respectively, where rj and rw are the logarithms of the respective total 
returns indices. Long run integration implies a linear relationship between the total 
returns indices. Equation (6.3) implies a long run relationship between rj and rw such
since in long-run equilibrium rjt = = rr  The parameter y x a constant scalar and s
is a random variable representing country-specific factors which may distort the long-
Dt'ji = p  + ftji{Drw-  p) + uj (6.3)
that
or = y l + y2rw+e (6.4)
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run relationship in the short run. That is, long run integration implies a linear 
relationship between the logarithms of the total returns indices. However, in the short 
run, this may be affected by factors specific to each of the two markets. Usually total 
returns indices are 1(1) therefore for equation (6.4) to be a valid long-run relationship 
s  must be 1(0) and so r, and rw must be cointegrated. Thus if a set of equity markets is
closely integrated then there should be more cointegrating vectors than if the set of 
market is segmented.
Three tests of cointegration are used. First, the Engle-Granger cointegrating 
regression augmented Dickey-Fuller (CRADF) test based on the residuals of the 
cointegrating regression (6.4) is used. However, if total returns are cointegrated then 
they are generated by error correction models (ECMs), and conversely* (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). Therefore following Bannerjee et al (1993) the second test is based 
upon the T’ statistic associated with the estimated coefficient /?4 in the simple ECM
A'-! = P\ + + PA>\ - +  / VwM + e„ . (6.5)
The third test utilises the Johansen Method is used (see Johansen, 1988). Consider a 
kih order vector autoregression model, VAR(k), for n variables each integrated of 
order one
X  t =■ jli +  /4j X f_, +  • • • +  A k X l k +  s t t  =  1, . . . ,  T  (6 .6 )
in which X t is an // x 1 vector of variables, jli is a // x 1 vector of constants, the A, are
n x // matrices of parameters and s, is an  x I vector of iid Gaussian processes.
The error correction form of this general VAR is
AX, = / i +Xr,AA',_, + ru -,_ i + £ , ( = 1 ....... (6.7)
1=1
in which T( and FI are // x n matrices of unknown parameters. The hypothesis of
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cointegration can be expressed as n  = a  • /?' in which the rank of the matrix II is z 
where z < n -  1 and the matrices a  and p  have full rank of order n x z ,  If the rank of
U is z where z <n  -  1 then there are z linearly independent cointegrating vectors. 
We use Johansen’s likelihood ratio test based on the trace of the stochastic matrix for 
the full hypothesis that there are at most z cointegrating vectors, 0 < z < n
K a « , = ~ T Y \ n { \ - X l ) z  = 0 , 1 ,2  n - 2,h-1. (6.8)
i = r + \
where the Xt are the n -  z smallest squared canonical correlations between AXt and
X t_k (adjusted for all intervening lags). With z cointegrating vectors, there are n -  z
common stochastic trends driving the system. That is, a large number of cointegrating 
vectors among a set of integrated stock markets is associated with those markets 
sharing a small number of stochastic common trends.
6.3 The Equity Markets
The eleven Pacific Basin stock markets investigated in this chapter comprise of five 
developed markets, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and six 
emerging markets, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Table 6.1 reports market capitalisation for 1988 and 1998 for these markets together 
with, comparative purposes, those of the United Kingdom and United States. 
Capitalisation varies considerably across markets and through time. It has increased 
between these two years, in US$ terms, for all of the markets except Japan. The three 
largest markets throughout the period are Japan, Australia and Hong Kong and the 
two smallest are Indonesia and the Philippines. Capitalisation, in US$ terms, has 
grown fastest in the emerging markets. At the beginning of the period, all of the
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developed markets were larger than the emerging markets. By 1998, three emerging 
markets (Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia) had larger capitalisation than the smallest 
Pacific Basin developed markets (New Zealand and Singapore). Market liquidity, 
measured by turnover ratio, also varies widely, particularly among emerging markets. 
As presented in Table 6.1, the turnover ratios of Taiwan (330% in 1988 and 323% in 
1998) and Korea (128% in 1988 and 176% in 1988) were much higher than those of 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, which indicates that those two 
markets are the most actively traded markets in the world. Of all of the markets 
reported in Table 6.1, the three most liquid are Taiwan, Korea and Thailand while 
Indonesia and Malaysia have relatively illiquid markets.
The extent to which the stock markets are regulated varies considerably and 
has changed through time. At one extreme is the Hong Kong market which is one of 
the most open in the world: there are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investment in 
the market; there is complete flexibility in the movement o f capital, repatriation of 
funds and remittance of dividends and there are no exchange control regulations. The 
developed markets of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore have also been 
largely unrestricted throughout the sample period. While the Philippines market is 
also largely unrestricted, in other emerging markets the process of liberalisation 
generally started later than in the developed markets; Indonesia (liberalised from 
December 1987), Malaysia (exchange controls liberalised in 1991) and Thailand 
(liberalised in spring 1990) have relatively few restrictions. In Malaysia, exchange 
controls were liberalised in 1991 but, following the Asian financial crisis, restrictions 
were imposed on equities. In September 1998 a twelve-month holding period for 
equities was imposed. In Febaiary 1999, this was replaced with a levy of 10-30% 
(depending on holding period) to be paid on repatriation of capital.
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In two of the historically most restricted markets, Korea and Taiwan, the 
liberalisation process has been gradual. The Korean experience is typical with 
restrictions on the individual/aggregate foreign ownership of domestic shares being 
relaxed at intervals of several months from 3%/12% in December 1994 to 6%/23% in 
May 1997 and 50%/55% after IMF intervention in December 1997. This has been
associated with gradual changes to limits in daily stock price changes. These limits
o
^re relatively fixed over a range from ±2.3% to ±5% of the previous day’s closing 
prices, the base prices, until April 1995. The system then formally expressed in 
absolute limits was modified to a fixed percentage rate system with a daily price limit 
of ±6% of base prices; this became ±8% in November 1996, ±12% in March 1998 
and ±15% the following December. The Taiwan stock market has operated a similar 
system. The ceiling on individual/aggregate foreign ownership of a listed company 
was 10%/25% in 1996 and became 15%/30% early in 1998. Foreign share ownership 
of equities on this market is low and relatively stable lying within the range from 
7.01% to 8.69% for 1990-1996, and 8.43% by the end of 1997. The limit on daily 
stock price changes was ±5% of the closing stock price on the previous business day 
for the nine years to October 1987. The limit was tightened to ±3% for the following 
year, because the market was ‘too hot’, and then gradually relaxed to ±5% on 14 
November 1988 and ±7% on 11 October 1989.
Many other countries impose maximum limits (of varying degrees) on the 
foreign ownership of domestic companies either as a general restriction on 
individual/aggregate foreign ownership on all companies (for example, Australia 
15%/40% of share capital) or on foreign ownership in specific sectors, for example, 
Malaysia (banking < 30%), Philippines (industries traditionally reserved for Filipinos; 
retail trade, mass media, rural banks, most professions) and Singapore (finance,
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newspaper and airline companies).19
6.4 The Data and Their Properties
The stock market indices used in this paper are total returns indices, which cover both 
equity prices and dividends paid and reinvested. Indices of this type are frequently 
used in measuring performance. The percentage change in a total returns index 
measures the total return in terms of the change in the capital value of the index and 
the reinvestment of gross dividend income in additional units of the index. For all of 
the Pacific Basin equity markets in the sample and the World, Datastream Total 
Market Indices (datatype RI) are used. For the UK and the US markets, total returns 
on the FTA All-share index and total returns on the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Composite Index, respectively, are used. All series are expressed in a common 
currency, the US$, for comparability. The observations are weekly and cover the 
period from 4 May 1988 until 12 April 2000 (624 observations) except the 
Philippines data for which is available form 9 November 1988 (597 observations) and 
those of Indonesia which start on 4 April 1990 (524 observations). The start of the 
sample period was determined by the availability of the total returns index for 
Taiwan. The data refer to Wednesdays to minimise any possible day-of-the-week 
effects; the source is Datastream, The series include the crash of the Bangkok Stock 
Exchange on Wednesday 2 July 1997 and subsequent crises affecting other markets in 
the region. The presence of these events in the data may affect our statistical results 
and so we allow for this possibility.
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 report correlation coefficients for the first differences of the
19 See Appendix 6.1 for further details.
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logarithms of each total returns index, which are the one-period total returns from 
investing in each market, for the period to 25 June 1997 and the entire period 
respectively. Irrespective of time period, almost all of the correlation coefficients 
involving world returns are significantly different from zero— the exception involves 
the Taiwan market. The equity markets most influenced by country-specific factors 
are Taiwan and the Philippines. All correlation coefficients involving the Taiwan 
market are insignificantly different from zero. For the Philippines, only correlations 
with world returns and, for the full period only, returns on the Japanese market are 
significant. The Philippines and Taiwanese markets are particularly affected by local, 
rather than international, news resulting in low correlations of returns with other 
markets whether developed or emerging. In general, contemporaneous correlations 
are greater between stock markets within a geographical region than they are between 
markets in different regions. The markets of Australia and New Zealand illustrate this 
regional effect with a correlation coefficient of 0.53 largely unaffected by the Asian 
stock market crises. A further regional effect involves the markets of Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. There is, however, negligible regional effect 
evident for the stock markets of Japan and Korea. This is not surprising because over 
most of the sample period the Korean market is one of the least liberalised with few 
Japanese investors trading in it. Indeed correlations involving returns on the Korean 
market are generally low but are significantly different from zero except where 
Taiwan and the Philippines are involved.
Table 6.4 reports Phillips-Perron tests for the logarithms of the US$-adjusted 
total returns indices for the entire period. In implementing these tests we test 
sequentially from the general model
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~r 7 i  
Yt =ju + p  t  + aYt_} + e t (6.9)
to the more specific models
Yt — // + (X  x (-l +  £ r (6.10)
and
(6 .11)
The standard notation follows Perron (1988). The results can be summarised 
concisely: the returns index for the Australian market is trend stationary and all of the 
other series are 1(1).
The conventional Phillips-Perron approach is widely used in tests of stochastic 
nonstationarity for financial time series. However, these conventional tests of the unit 
root hypothesis against trend stationary alternatives frequently fail to reject the null if 
the true data generating process is characterised by stationary fluctuations around a 
trend with a single shift in either its intercept or its slope or both, Perron (1989). The 
Asian financial market crises from mid-1997 could be associated with shifts in the 
intercept of the trend function— a crash. Graphs of the series suggest particularly 
marked downward shifts in the intercept for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the last half of 1997 and for Taiwan in the 
period from October 1990 through to May 1991.
Clearly, tests of the unit root hypothesis should allow for a possible crash. 
Two sets of tests/re reported. First, Perron (1989) unit root tests with an exogenous 
time break, Tb. These are based on Perron’s model A which captures a single shift in
the level o f the series. The unit root null hypothesis is characterised by a dummy 
variable which takes the value one at the time of the break
y t -  /.i+SD(Tb) { +jyM + s t , (6.12)
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in which Tb is the period when the change on the parameter occurs and D(Tb) t = 1 if 
t = Tb + 1 otherwise D(Tb)l = 0 . The trend stationary alternative hypothesis allows 
for a once-and-for-all shift in the intercept o f the trend function
y t =jut + 0 t + (Mi ~ M\ )DUt + s t , (6.13)
where DU, = 1 if t > Tb otherwise D U t = 0.
Table 6.5 provides results based on the regression model
y , = j u  + §DU, + pt + SD(Tb), + qyM + £  SAy,_, + e, (6.14)
r=l
with Tb set at 3 September 1997 for all series. For each series, the estimated 
coefficients together with t statistics for the six null hypotheses // = 0, 6 = 0 , 
J3 = 0,S = 0 ,a  = 0 and a  = 1 are reported. Under the unit root null hypothesis, in 
general // & 0, 0 -  0, p  -  0, 8  ^  0 and a  ~ 1. Under the alternative hypothesis of 
stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend function with a single shift in the 
intercept // ^  0, 6 ^  0, p  ^  0, S  = 0 and a  < 1. Critical values for the test of the null 
hypothesis that a  = 1 depend on X , the ratio of the pre-break sample size to the total 
sample size (Perron, 1989). Exact critical values are calculated using the response 
surface estimates in Carrion, Sanso and Artis (1999). The unit root hypothesis is 
rejected at the 0.01 level or better for two series, the returns indices for Hong Kong 
and Indonesia. Where the unit root hypothesis is rejected, the asymptotic distribution 
of the ^-statistics for the other coefficients is standardised normal. For both series, the 
estimated coefficients on the constant, the post-break dummy variable and the trend 
are significantly different from zero. A limitation of these tests is that the dummy 
variables associated with the time break are exogenous and so the results are 
conditional on the imposed shift in the trend function. Also, the same exogenous time
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break for all of the series is used; a complementary approach is to let the data select 
the break date.
The Perron (1997) tests select Tb endogenously by minimising the /‘-statistic 
for testing H 0\ a - l .  The results are reported in Table 6.6. The unit root null
hypothesis is rejected for three series: the returns indices for Hong Kong and 
Indonesia (confirming the findings of the previous test) and Malaysia. For these 
series, the estimated coefficients on the constant, the post-break dummy variable and 
the trend are significantly different from zero. The empirically determined time break 
is clearly associated with the 1997 crises in financial markets. The selected dates are 
3 September 1997 for Hong Kong, 17 September 1997 for Indonesia and 25 June 
1997 (one week before black Wednesday on the Bangkok Stock Exchange) for 
Malaysia.20
After allowing for a single downward shift in the trend function, these three 
series are described by stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend; that is, 
they are characterised by deterministic nonstationary. Random shocks have only a 
temporary effect because fluctuations in these total return indices are transitory 
around a relatively stable trend path. This contrasts with the other series: under the 
unit root hypothesis, random shocks have a permanent effect on the system.
6.5 Empirical Results
Tests of cointegration on the postulated long-run relationship between domestic and
20 The use o f total returns indices, rather than the inore-widely used stock price indices, is not the 
reason for the trend stationaiy. Using Datastream Total Market stock price indices, the unit root 
hypothesis is again rejected (with the same endogenous break dates) for Hong Kong, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Additionally, the series for Taiwan is trend stationary; the time break is 28 march 1990 and 
the test statistic for H 0 : a  -  1 is -5 .19  which is less than the 0.05 critical value of -4 .80 .
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world returns given by equation (6.4) for the period prior to Black Wednesday on the 
Bangkok Stock Exchange are reported in Table 6.7. For each country, four test 
statistics are reported: Engle Granger (1987) cointegrating regression ADF for 
regressions including (i) a contrast and (ii) a constant and a time trend; the error- 
correction model /-statistic and the Johansen trace statistic for the null of zero 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of at least one. The Schwarz Bayesian 
criterion was used to select the order of the CRADF statistic. For the trace statistic, 
tests are based upon the underlying VAR(£). The order of the VAR is determined by 
first estimating in levels VAR(12) and then using the Schwarz Bayesian criterion and 
an adjusted likelihood ratio test to establish the appropriate order. The equations of 
the resulting VAR were then examined and, where necessary, the VAR order was 
increased until there was no autocorrelation.
In the pre-crash period, there is compelling evidence for not rejecting the null 
of no cointegration. The only exception is the ECM /-statistic for New Zealand. 
However, this result is not supported by the other three tests. This evidence of no 
cointegration is further supported by tests for the Hill sample reported in Table 6.8: 
not one of the test statistics rejects the no cointegration hypothesis. The result is not 
affected by the Asian financial market crisis.
A set of tests of bivariate cointegration between all 1(1) country returns 
indices was also carried out. Almost all of our results, not reported here, found no 
cointegration either in the pre-crash or entire sample period. In particular, based on a 
common currency, the US$, we find no cointegration between Korea and Taiwan and 
Singapore and Taiwan. This contrasts with the work of Kwan, Sim and Cotsomitis 
(1995) who, using stock market price indices in local currency, find cointegrating 
vectors. However, some evidence of cointegration involving Japan and is found
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Korea (see Table 6.9). Since the Korean stock market was opened up in January 1992 
we also carried out the same set of four tests of bivariate cointegration between Korea 
and Japan for pre- and post-opening periods. As shown in Table 6.10, although some 
evidence of cointegration for the pre-opening period is found the results show 
noncointegration between the two markets in the post-opening period. One of the 
reasons might be the fact that since the opening up of the Korean stock market in 
1992 the trading activity by foreign investors accounts for approximately 10% in 
terms of trading value and volume. Among foreign investors registered on the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), Japanese investors including institutional investors 
and funds are accounts around 7 to 8% of the total number of foreign investors. This 
proportion is considerably small compared to those of the US and the UK, which 
account for a half of the foreign investors on the KSE, although Korea and Japan are 
adjacently located (see section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3 for further details). This finding 
implies that long-run portfolio diversification among these two markets is not 
beneficial because stock prices in the markets are not independent of each other. 
Subsequently, the so-called contagion effect might be exist, i.e. there is a danger that
j i
shocks in Japanese stock market might spill over to Korean stock market. The results 
could be interpreted as evidence contrasting the claim by Eun and Shim (1989) and 
Cheung and Mak (1992) that Japanese market is not influential even at regional level. 
Almost all o f the results, not reported here, found no cointegration either in the pre­
crash or entire sample period.
Besides, the same set of four tests of bivariate cointegration between Korea 
and Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand are 
carried out for pre- and post-opening periods. All of the results, not reported here, 
show that there is no stationary long-run relationship between the equity markets of
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Korea and each o f the markets. This means that investing for long-term on those 
markets by Korean investors could be beneficial and vice versa. Overall, except some 
evidence involving Japan and Korea, the benefits of international diversification in 
this region are valid even if after the Southeast Asian financial market crisis. This 
suggests that the consequences of the Asian crisis for long-run equilibria between 
stock markets in the region are insignificant.
In addition, mutivariate cointegration in which all seven 1(1) series are 
included together with the World total returns index is tested. The results are reported 
in Table 6.11. For the pre-crash period, evidence from trace tests suggests that there is 
at most one cointegrating vector and hence §£ven stochastic common trends driving 
the system. Including the post-period of the Asian financial crisis does change the 
results. There are now two cointegrating vectors and, therefore six common trends. 
Further we carried out two sets cointegration tests including only the developed 
markets or emerging markets along with the World total returns index for the pre­
crash and entire periods. However the results, not reported here, found no 
cointegrating vector in either set.
In summary, given the number of variables, the number of cointegrating 
vectors is small and this general result is largely unaffected by the Asian financial 
crisis. This is highlighted by focusing on the number of trends. With n number of 1(1) 
series and z number of cointegrating vectors, if z = 0 there are n trends and no shared 
trends. That is, the logarithms of the return indices are unrelated in the long-run. On 
the other hand, if 0 < z < n then there are n - z  shared trends. If 0 < z = n -  1 there 
is one shared trend and the set of stock markets is integrated in a long-run statistical 
sense. If  0 < z < n — 1 then there is more than one shared trend and the set of stock 
markets can be viewed as being partially integrated: the larger the number of shared
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trends the weaker the degree of market integration. As shown in Table 6.11, for the 
Pacific Basin as a whole, there are at least seven common stochastic trends in the pre­
crash period whereas there are at least six shared trends in the entire period including 
the Asian crisis. Finding at least one cointegrating vector either in the pre-crash or in 
the entire periods, it is shown that stock markets in this region are collectively linked 
in the long-run.
All in all, integration of the stock markets in the Pacific Basin might be
,  •accelerated (i) more and more emerging markets are matured in terms of 
capitalisation, liquidity, deregulation on foreign ownership, institutional features, (ii) 
liberalisation on financial markets including foreign exchange markets are 
accelerated; (iii) mergers and strategic alliances among stock exchanges in different 
countries happen; and (iv) cyber stock trading on the internet readily available to 
international investors because this new generation of stock trading method provide 
real time information on other stock markets and remote stock trading as long as the 
internet is connected.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates long-term equilibrium among eleven emerging and 
developed stock markets in the Pacific Basin over the period starting in March 1988 
and ending in April 2000, a period spanning the Asian financial market crises. For the 
analysis total returns indices, which included dividends paid and reinvested, are used. 
The results of unit root tests, which allow for a possible crash, find that four of our 
series, those for Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Malaysia are trend stationary 
and so random shocks only have a temporary effect on these returns. Based on a
171
common currency, the US$, no cointegration between world returns and each of the 
remaining 1(1) series is found. Further test results of pair-wise cointegration between 
all 1(1) country returns indices found no cointegration except some evidence of 
cointegration involving Japan and Korea. The results are not affected by the Asian 
financial market crisis. However, the test results of mutivariate cointegration, in 
which all 1(1) series are included together with the World total returns index, indicate 
that there are two cointegrating vectors when the Asian crisis is included in the 
sample period, whereas there is at most a single cointegrating vector in the pre-crash 
period. This implies that the total return index of one country can be predicted by 
using a linear combination of stock prices from other countries in the region.
Overall, the findings on pair-wise cointegration tests suggest that stock 
markets in the Pacific Basin are not pair-wise cointegrated even after the Southeast 
Asian financial market crisis. Therefore, international diversification of investment 
portfolios by investors from one of the countries to another single country could be 
justified and beneficial because gaining abnormal profits in these markets by 
diversifying investment portfolios is possible and country-specific risk can be 
reduced. However, the results of mutivariate cointegration tests exhibit that there is 
one cointegrating vector in the pre-crash period whereas two cointegrating vectors are 
exhibited when the Asian crisis is included. Therefore, stock markets in this region 
are collectively linked in the long-run. Further investigation on cyber stock trading 
and foreign stock investors in this region could provide a positive and practical step in 
the direction for future research.
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Table 6.2 Correlation Coefficients: Period before Bangkok SE Black Wednesday 2
July 1997
Market
AU HK ID JP KO MY NZ PH SG TW TH
HK 0.33
ID 0.16 0.33
JP 0.19 0.16 0.14
KO 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.16
MY 0.23 0.50 0.35 0.18 0.24
NZ 0.53 0.28 0.16 0.24 0.10 0.24
PH -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
SG 0.22 0.49 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.69 0.26 -0.07
TW -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04
TH 0.16 0.33 0.33 0.10 0.19 0.45 0.15 -0.03 0.44 -0.07
WD 0.38 0.38 0.26 0.81 0.25 0.38 0.39 -0.10 0.51 -0.04 0.25
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Table 6.3 Correlation Coefficients: Entire Period
Market
AU HK ID JP KO MY NZ PH SG TW TH
HK 0.38
ID 0.21 0.36
JP 0.25 0.24 0.15
KO 0.18 0.32 0.18 0.25
MY 0.21 0.42 0.42 0.19 0.21
NZ 0.56 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.24
PH -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
SG 0.30 0.56 0.41 0.29 0.27 0.57 0.31 -0.07
TW -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
TH 0.25 0.41 0.43 0.17 0.31 0.45 0.25 -0.02 0.53 -0.03
WD 0.44 0.46 0.23 0.72 0.32 0.30 0.42 -0.10 0.46 -0.03 0.32
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Table 6.7 Tests o f  Noncointegration with World Returns, May 1988 -  June 1997
Engle-Granger CRADF
  ECM t = 0
Constant Constant + Trend
Japan -1.9908 -1.1873 -1.4376 8.2201
Korea -1.4832 -1.6588 -1.4968 8.7416
New Zealand -3.0671 -3.5327 -3.3494* 20.989
Philippines -2.4947 -1.9526 -0.81939 7.8252
Singapore -0.35486 -1.2666 -1.3817 20.135
Taiwan -2.2220 -2.4149 -2.4839 14.071
Thailand 0.84735 0.07794 -0.80046 17.235
. 05 critical value -3.3475 -3.8000 -3.28 25.77
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Table 6.8 Tests o f  Noncointegration with World Returns, May 1988 -  April 2000
Engl e-Granger CRADF
ECM t G O II o
Constant Constant + Trend
Japan -1.6310 -1.4437 -1.3790 8.2036
Korea -2.1392 -2.0069 -1.7003 8.9934
New Zealand -1.0446 -1.2811 -1.1168 8,5810
Philippines -1.3993 -1.8771 -0.84124 10.758
Singapore -1.5744 -2.1258 -1.9007 14.758
Taiwan -2.5345 -2.7173 -2.8073 16.217
Thailand -1.2520 -2.2671 -1.4303 16.348
. 05 critical value -3.3475 -3.8000 -3.28 25.77
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Table 6.11 Tests o f Multivariate Cointegration Between JP, KO, NZ, PH, SG, TW, 
TH and WD
Pre-crash Entire
0trace ,95 critical values t^race .95 critical values
2 = 0 205.42 * 182.99 221.82 * 182.99
2<1 147.02 147.27 160.52 * 147.27
z <2 104.54 115.85 111.66 115.85
z  < 3 73.87 87.17 70.51 87.17
2 < 4 46.68 63.00 46.29 63.00
2 < 5 26.89 42.34 26.68 42.34
2 < 6 12.82 25.77 13.68 25.77
2 < 7 5.21 12.39 5.29 12.39
Notes: Pre-crash period starts 9 November 1988 and ends 26 June 1997 to exclude the Asian financial 
market crisis whereas entire period ends 12 April 2000.
SBC criteria for selecting the order o f the VAR model suggests lag order one.
* significant at the .05 level.
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7 Do Stock Prices Follow a Random Walk under 
Price Limits? An Empirical Analysis Using 
Multiple Variance Ratio Tests
7.1 Introduction
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 has generated a surge o f interest in the 
stability of financial markets. Although the cause of the crisis are complex,21 a 
common theme is the tremendous shocks to the region’s economies and, in particular, 
large declines in stock prices together with the meltdown of currency markets. In 
several countries, for example Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, the crises in financial 
markets resulted in intervention in their economies by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). These economies were required to accept extensive deregulation of their 
financial markets in response to the requirements of the IMF bailout programmes, 
which require a wide range of financial market liberalisation. Although most stock 
markets in the region have had market stabilisation systems, they did not seem to 
prevent a great degree of market fluctuation due to largely unanticipated events like 
the East Asian financial market crashes.22
There are several forms of market stabilisation system but one of the most
21 Among many others, for instance, Frankel (1998) argues that the main problem in East Asia was not 
macroeconomic, but structural. In particular, deep flaws afflicted die financial system that include 
excessive leverage, a banking system which was based excessively on directed lending, comiected 
lending and other collusive personal relationships.
22 Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) point out that ‘unusual suspects’ often observed as indicators of  
crisis such as low growth, high budget deficits, high inflation, low savings rates, low investment rates 
are not observed in Asia.
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widely used in emerging markets is price limits which are an important feature of 
many stock markets, including those of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand (Rhee 
and Chang, 1992). Most of the early literature on the effects of price limits tended to 
focus on futures markets, for example, Brennan (1986), Ma, Rao and Sears (1989), 
Morgan and Trevor (1997), and Berkman and Steenbeek (1998). In the context of 
stock markets, much of the research focuses on how useful price limits are in 
preventing excess volatility and thus stabilising the price mechanism. These 
hypotheses are succinctly discussed by Kim and Rhee (1997): the volatility spillover, 
delayed price discovery and trading inference hypotheses. Their empirical evidence 
supports all three hypotheses for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, implying price limits are 
ineffective. For Korean stock market, the evidence on price limits and volatility is 
inconclusive. Chung (1991) finds no evidence that price limits decrease volatility 
over the period January 1980 -  August 1980. However, Lee and Kim (1995) find that 
price limits slow down price changes and reduce stock price volatility for the period 
1980 -  1989. Lee and Chung (1996) find that price limits are an important feature 
affecting price movements and the stock market appears to be inefficient because of 
biased price movements due to price limits.
In fact, there have been contradictory views regarding the usefulness of price 
limits in a stock market. Yet, there seems to be no agreement on this issue. Those who 
insist on the positive effectiveness of price limits believe that this system could 
reduce unnecessary price fluctuations, which tend to deviate tremendously from their 
intrinsic values or equilibrium prices, i.e., a cooling-off effect. Thus, it can protect
individual investors from huge losses in trading by providing them with a period to
(a
settle up for next trading especially when stock prices fell rapidly. The system also 
appeared to be accompanied by reductions in volatility and the minimisation of
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transaction costs. In contrast, it is often argued that price limits negatively affect the 
market as means of prolonging the price discovery process. Consequently, price 
limits prevent the operation of the natural market mechanism. This, in turn, brings 
liquidity problems, which can result in potential prevention of participation of 
buyer/seller due to further anticipated price movement. In other words, the
V V .  -
information flows of the market could be inefficient.
This chapter focuses on a different aspect—although one that is related to the 
delayed price discovery hypothesis in which equity prices are prevented from 
efficiently reaching their equilibrium levels.^WeaddressThe.questionf Do price limits 
prevent stock prices from following a random walk process? The time paths of stock 
prices under price limits might not coincide with the time paths that would prevail in 
the absence of price limits. With daily price limits, the movement of stock prices is
bounded both upwards and downwards on a particular day. When a price limit^ is 1
/
reached, any trading is at the limit price and equity prices may not reach their 
equilibrium levels on that day. According to Black (1971, p. 32)
‘Randomness means that a series of small upward movements (or small 
downward movements) is very unlikely. If the price is going to move up, 
it should move up all at once, rather than in a series of small steps.5 
Consider ‘news5 which changes the equilibrium price of an equity. In an efficient 
market the price immediately adjusts to the new equilibrium value; if it did not then 
resulting, profitable arbitrage opportunity would be immediately exploited. That is, 
stock market efficiency is associated with the rapid adjustment of equity prices to 
their equilibrium values. Slow adjustment of prices results in distortions in the pricing 
of capital and risk with implications for the allocation of capital within an economy. 
Fama (1989) conjectures that price limits delay the adjustment of prices but do not
188
affect the size of the adjustment. In these circumstances, some stocks are traded at 
disequilibrium prices, price limits are inefficient and markets, which have them, will 
loose out to those that do not.
Whilst there have been numerous studies of the efficient markets hypothesis, 
none of them has investigated the consequences of price limits for weak-form 
efficiency. This ^apefr differs from previous studies in several ways. Since the price 
limits in the Korea Stock Exchange have been modified several times as the bands 
have widened, the random walk hypothesis is tested under the different regimes of 
price limits. First, the multiple variance ratio (MVR) test developed by Chow and 
Denning (1993) is used to examine whether prices of individual stocks follow a 
random walk process under price limits. Secondly, the data cover a longer time span- 
over ten years of daily observations.23 In order to avoid the problem of missing 
observations, some of which are associated with price limits, all six trading days in 
the week are included in our data. Thirdly, we consider the effects of the relaxation of 
price limits: as price limits are relaxed do some equity prices follow a random walk 
process? Finally, the impact of the Korean financial crisis on the weak-form 
efficiency o f the stock market is noted.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
discussed the empirical test methodology. Section 8.3 describes the characteristics of, 
and changes in, the system of price limits in the Korean stock market. The data and 
their properties are described in section 8.4. In section 8.5, the empirical results are 
presented. The final section provides brief conclusions and suggestions for further 
research.
23 Shiller and Perron (1985) find that a long span of data increases the power o f tests of the random 
walk hypothesis.
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7.2 Methodology: Multiple Variance Ratio Tests
A frequently used test of market efficiency is to examine whether a price follows a 
random walk. Under the random walk hypothesis
p t = p t-i + p  + su (7.1)
or Apt = p  + (7.2)
in which p ( is the natural logarithm of a stock price, p  is an arbitrary drift parameter 
and st is a random disturbance term. The st satisfy E[ff ] -  0 and E[<S( st.g ] — 0, g  & 0, 
for all t. The random walk implies uncorrelated residuals and hence uncorrelated 
returns, Apt. A number of factors can induce autocorrelation including some aspects 
of the market’s microstructure-the bid-ask spread and nonsynchronous trading. It can 
readily be shown that effective price limits also induce autocorrelation and so result in 
inefficient markets. Consider the arrival of news at time t which reduces the 
equilibrium price of the equity. The actual price decreases but suppose adjustment to 
the equilibrium is incomplete within the unit period because the price adjustment is 
constrained by the price limit. Writing the random walk hypothesis out for successive 
time periods we have
p t= p t-i + M + s h (7.3)
P t+ i  =  P t  +  P  +  £ t+ h  (7.4)
P t+ 2  = P t+ 1  + P  + S t+2, (7-5)
and so on.
The disturbance et will be negative and since p t does not immediately adjust to the 
new equilibrium, the disturbance s(+i will be negative and p t+i < pt. If adjustment is 
again constrained by the price limit then s t+2 will be negative. With the effective daily
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price limits and daily data, news has effects in a number of periods after it arrives and 
so successive disturbances are autocorrelated. If price limits result in an equity price 
departing from a random walk then we expect positive autocorrelation.
Since the pioneering work by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) variance ratio tests 
have been widely used for testing the random walk hypothesis. These tests are 
particularly usefi.il for investigating asset prices such as stock prices in which returns 
are frequently not normally distributed. If stock prices are found to follow a random 
walk processes then equity markets are weak-form efficient (Fama, 1970). In this 
case, all information contained in historical stock prices is fully reflected in current 
stock prices and so returns on shares would not be predictable. Since future returns 
cannot be predicted from past returns, trading rules based on the examination of the 
sequence of past prices are worthless. Hence the past information contains nothing 
about the magnitude of the deviation of today’s return from the expected return.
Consider a random walk with a drift process
where p t the natural logarithm of stock prices, p  is an arbitrary drift parameter and et 
is a random disturbance term. The st satisfy E[fif ] = 0 and E [^ st.g ] = 0, g  * 0, for all t, 
and rt is continuously compounded returns. With uncorrelated residuals and hence 
uncorrelated increments in p t the variance of these increments increases linearly in the 
observation interval,
p t = p  + p t-i + sh (7.6)
or rt = A p t = ju + st (7.7)
Var(pt - p t.q) = q Var(>f - p t.j) 
in which q is any positive integer. The variance ratio is given by
(7.8)
(7.9)
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in which Rt(q) is a q period continuously compounded return 
R t ( q )  -  f t  + f t - l + ... + f t -q + l  — p t "  P t-q
and under the null hypothesis VR(g) -  1.
(7.10)
Under the null hypothesis of heteroscedastic increments random walk, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988) consider a sample of size nq + 1 observations (p o ,/^ ,•••,/> ) and 
derive the test statistic
and fi is the sample mean of ( p t -  p t_x).
If the null hypothesis is true then the associated test statistic has an asymptotic 
standard normal distribution. A weakness of the Lo and MacKinlay variance ratio 
tests is that they focus on testing one variance ratio at a time for a single aggregation 
interval, q, and so they are essentially individual hypothesis tests. However, the 
random walk hypothesis requires that VR(<y) =1 and hence M (q) = VR(<y) - 1 = 0  fo r
JnqM (q)
(7.11)
where M{q)  is asymptotically equal to a weighted sum of autocorrelation coefficient
estimates,
(7.12)
(7.13)
m  -P i -1 -p?(Pt-k-Pj-k-\ - f i f
where &k = (7.14)
' L ( p , - p ,-x- p Y
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all q. The multiple variance ratio (MVR) test facilitates cases of the multiple 
comparison of a set of estimated variance ratios with unity by way o f a joint test in 
which size is controlled (Chow and Denning, 1993).
The MVR test uses Lo and MacKinlay test statistics but with critical values 
appropriate for the joint test. Consider a set of m variance ratio tests {M(#,-)|/ = 1, 2, 
... , m)  associated with the set of aggregation intervals {#, |/ = 1, 2, ... ,m}.  Under the 
random walk null hypothesis there are multiple sub-hypotheses 
Hoi: M(</,) = 0 for / = 1, 2, ... , /w
H u: M(qi) *  0 for any / = 1, 2, ... , w (7.15)
If one or more Hoi is rejected then the random walk hypothesis is rejected. Consider a 
set of Lo and MacKinlay test statistics, { Z*(q,)\i = 1, 2, ... , m). Since the random 
walk null hypothesis is rejected if any of the estimated variance ratios is significantly 
differently different from one, it is only necessary to focus on the maximum absolute 
value in the set of test statistics. Chow and Denning’s MVR test is based on the result 
PR[max(jZ(#/)|,|Z(tf2)|, ...,|Z(grm)|) < SMM(a; m\ 7)] > (1-a) (7.16)
in which SMM(a; m\ T) is the upper a  point of the Studentized Maximum Modulus 
(SMM) distribution with parameters m (number of variance ratios) and T (sample 
size) degrees of freedom. Asymptotically, when T is infinite,
SMM(a; m\ oo) = Za* /2 in which a* = 1 - (1 - d )1/m . (7.17)
The size of a MVR test is controlled by comparing the calculated values of the
standardised test statistic with the SMM critical values available in, for example, 
Miller (1981, pp. 239 and 278). For large samples, they can also be generated from 
the standard normal distribution using equation (7.17). If the maximum absolute 
value of Z*(#,) is greater than the SMM critical value at a predetermined significance 
level then the random walk hypothesis is rejected.
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7.3 Price Limits in the Korean Stock Market
There have been price limits on the Korea Stock Exchange since 1963. Following a 
massive collapse of stock prices in May 1962, they were introduced as a mechanism 
to stabilise the market by eliminating excessive volatility and limiting potential daily 
losses. The price limits have been modified several times and their structure and 
changes from 1988 are summarised in Table 7.1. The base price is defined as the 
closing price on the previous trading day. The first column of this table identifies 
ranges o f base prices and subsequent columns report the associated price limits. 
Before April 1995, these price limits were expressed as absolute changes for 
specified ranges of base prices. For example, suppose on a particular day between 2 
March and 7 June 1992 the previous trading day’s closing price for a particular 
equity was 3,000 Korean won. That day’s price limits were +200 won and -200 won- 
the maximum the share price could go up or go down. Under this system of absolute 
changes, as the average equity price has increased over time, the set of ranges of base 
prices has increased. From the beginning of April 1995, price limits have been 
expressed as a fixed  percentage rate. Under this system, for a given period, the price 
limits are the same percentage change of the base price, whatever that base price. 
Initially, the daily limits were price changes of ±6%, these were relaxed to ±8% from 
25 November 1996 and again to ±12% from 2 March 1998. From 7 December 1998 
the limits were widened to ±15% of the base price and circuit breakers were also 
introduced. With the latter, if the KOSPI falls by more than 10% from the previous 
day’s closing price for more than one minute then trading is suspended for 30 minutes 
so transactions can re-access the market before further trading. Saturday trading was
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also abolished.
7.4 The Data and Their Properties
The random walk hypothesis can be tested with either market indices or the prices of 
individual equities. However, the limits are set on the prices of individual equities and 
not the KOSPI. An aggregate index might be used to investigate the possible effects 
of price limits if most of the constituent prices frequently hit the limits. This is the ■ { 
rarely the case. It is quite possible, therefore, the KOSPI may follow a random walk- 
but not the majority o f its constituents. A sample of 55 stocks listed on the KSE is 
used. Stocks were selected across a wide range of industries (no more than six stocks 
in any one sector) that are actively traded and have a marked number of limits moves. 
The sample includes eleven of the twenty largest companies and nine of the twenty 
most actively traded stocks, both in 1996. Since the analysis focuses on the 
consequences of price limits and these depend on the closing price on the previous
trading day, it is important not to omit any trading days from the empirical analysis.
i9Therefore the data are daily and cover all six trading day/each week, beginning on 2 
March 1988 and ending on 5 December 1998 (3,159 observations).24 They enable us 
to use five subperiods associated with the first five price limit regimes identified in 
Table 8.1. They are: Period 1, They are: Period 1, 2 March 1988 -  7 June 1992 (1,245 
observations); Period 2, 8 June 1992 -  31 March 1995 (831 observations); Period 3, 1 
April 1995 -  24 November 1996 (486 observations); Period 4, 25 November 1996 -  1
24 Five series start later due to late inception of stock trading on the KSE: Isu Chemical, 28 April 
1988; POSCO, 10 June 1988; KEPCO, 10 August 1989; SK Telecom, 7 November 1989 and Shinhan 
Bank 28 November 1989. Two series finish earlier: Commercial Bank, 26 September 1998 and Korea 
Long Term Credit Bank, 4 December 1998, because they merged with other banks.
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March 1998 (366 observations); and Period 5, 2 March 1998 -  5 December 1998 
(231 observations). The sources of the data are: March 1988 -  December 1995 the 
KSE Database, January 1996 -  March 1997 the Korea Securities Computer 
Corporation (KOSCOM) and April 1997 -  December 1998 Datastream and The 
Korea Economic Daily.
Table 7.2 classifies the companies by sector and reports descriptive statistics of 
daily returns. For 45 of the 55 equities, the average daily return is negative. The 
standard deviations of returns do not appear to fluctuate much across stocks which 
may be a consequence of price limits. Not surprisingly, not one of the daily returns is 
normally distributed: twenty five are skewed to the left, thirty skewed to the right and 
all are leptokurtic, that is, more-sharply peaked about the mean than the normal 
distribution. These distributional characteristics are entirely consistent with a system 
of daily price limits. Daily returns are continuous random variables only between the 
upper and lower limits. If market forces are taking the ‘true’ daily return on a stock 
above the upper limit or below the lower limit then the actual return recorded is the 
upper or lower limit and not the ‘true’ market-determined return; both tails of the 
distribution of returns are censored. For example, the price limits regime in subperiod 
3 was ±6% of the base price. If  a stock return at a certain time exceeded the upper 
limit, i.e. r* > 6%, then the return was simply expressed as the upper limit (rt = 6%). 
Contrarily, when a true stock return is below than the lower limit, i.e. r* < 6%, the 
value was recorded at the lower limit (r, = -6 % ). In other words, although we 
observe a set of random variables for a certain period we only get continuous random 
variables for | rt \ < 6% and discrete random variables for /•= 6% or r=  -6%.
Therefore, the stock returns in the Korean market should be regarded as variables 
censored in both tails. This reconciles the fact that none of the stock returns in our
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data exhibits the normal distribution 25
As presented in Table 7.3, we also calculate the average standard deviation of 
daily returns ^as-calculated for each subperiod. This is relatively stable for the first 
three subperiods at 0.0196, 0.0224 and 0,0213 respectively. However, volatility 
increased markedly in period 4, when price limits were ±8%, with average standard 
deviation 0.0390 and, again, in period 5, when price limits were relaxed to ±12% and 
average standard deviation is 0.0475. This suggests that volatility increases as price 
limits are relaxed. This is consistent with the work of Ma (1993) and Lee and Kim 
(1995) although Wu, Naughton and Chung (1995) found that when price limits on the 
Taiwan Stock Market were tightened from 5% to 3% in 1987 volatility significantly 
increased.
Table 7.4 reports for each equity price the number o f limit moves for each 
subperiod and the full sample. Over the entire sample period, the average number of 
limit moves is 301.3 and with 3,195 observations this gives an average rate of limit 
moves of 9.4%— approximately 10% of trading days are affected by price limits. This 
ranges considerably for individual equities from 169 (5.3%) for Shinhan Bank to 587 
(18.4%) for Taekwang Industrial. The average rate also varies across subperiods and 
this is illustrated in Figure 7.1. The average number of up- and down-limit moves is 
similar in periods 1 and 2 then clearly declined, increased in period 4 and declined 
once more in period 5. It is greatest for period 2 (16.0%) and smallest for periods 3 
and 5 both of which are associated with the market as a whole declining. In period 3, 
two of our stocks have zero limit moves, LG Electronics Inc and Korea Long Term 
Credit Bank. We shall see in section 5 that the stock price of the latter follows a
One explicit method of dealing this issue is by the so-called Tobit model, which is developed by 
Tobin (1958) and frequently referred as the censored regression model. In this chapter, however, we do 
not apply the model to our data since we are mainly interested in whether the random walk hypothesis 
can be hold even under price limits.
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random walk in this period.
Table 7.5 reports the frequencies of successive days of limit-constrained price 
changes. These frequently occur in clusters of two, three, four, or more consecutive 
days in the same direction. One of the striking findings is that a few stocks hit the 
price limits over ten successive trading days in the same direction and in an extreme 
case this occurred over twenty-eight successive trading days, which is equivalent to 
over six weeks period.26 Over the full sample, all stock returns are limit-constrained. 
Successive price limits are hit more frequently when prices are rising than when they 
are falling. Also, many more stock returns are limit-constrained over a larger number 
of consecutive days when returns are positive than when they are negative. Figure 7.2 
illustrates the average number of successive days of limit-constrained price changes 
under each price limit regime. To the extent that successive limit moves indicate 
ineffectiveness of the price limits system, it is ineffective in all subperiods. There are, 
however, clear differences. The average number of successive days of limit moves 
was 39.0 in period 1, increased in period 2 then clearly declined, increased in period 4 
and declined again in period 5. When examined by sector, the results tell us that the 
returns of banks are less affected by price limits which, in turn, implies their equity 
prices fluctuate less than those in other industries, at least until the East Asian crises. 
This may be partially explained by more conservative, or risk averse, investors 
preferring the stocks of banks to those of other industries because many investors in 
the Korean stock market have perceived investing in bank stocks as much safer than 
buying those of other sectors. However, following IMF action in December 1997 and 
despite strong criticism that intervention would prevent free market capitalism, the 
Korean government injected a total of US$2 billion into two of the weakest
26 The details o f results are not reported here.
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commercial banks, First Korea Bank and Seoul Bank—both leading creditors of 
several bankrupt Chebols, in exchange for a 59% shareholding.
7.5 Empirical Results
The random walk hypothesis is tested for each of the 55 stock prices for the five 
periods associated with the five price limit regimes. The variance ratio tests are based 
upon 6 observations per week and a set of five aggregation intervals {^,|/ = 2, 6, 12, 
18, 24}, that is, spanning 2 days and 1-4 weeks inclusive. Empirical evidence finds 
that returns have variable volatility, Corhay and Rad (1993), Huang, Liu and Yang 
(1995) and Ryoo (1997). Consequently, with our MVR tests we use the Lo and 
MacKinlay heteroscedasticity-robust test statistics, Z*(#/), and compare their 
calculated values with the SMM critical values. At the .05 significance level, from 
equation (7.17) with m = 5 the corresponding critical value is 2.57. The full results of 
our tests of the heteroscedastic random walk null hypothesis are reported in Table 7.6 
through 7.11. For each stock price, we report the estimated variance ratios for the set 
of aggregation intervals {q\i = 2, 6, 12, 18, 24} together with their associated test 
statistics {Z*(#,)|/ = 2, 6, 12, 18, 24}. Since the full results are quite lengthy the 
summarised results are also reported in Tables 7.12 and 7.13.
The cross-sectional means of the variance ratios together with their standard 
deviations are reported for each period in Table 7.12. These standard deviations 
provide an indication of the cross-sectional dispersion of the variance ratios but, since 
the variance ratios are not cross-sectionally independent, these standard deviations 
cannot be used to carry out the usual significance tests. For all periods, the average
variance ratio for q = 2, VR(2),  > 1. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) show that for q -  2,
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estimates o f  the variance ratio minus one and the first-order autocorrelation
£1
coefficient are asymptotically equal, p, -  VR{2 ) -1 , Hence, on average, the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficient is positive and close to zero. Our finding of positive 
autocorrelation in individual stock returns is consistent with the effect of price limits 
and contrasts with empirical evidence for more-advanced stock markets such as the 
US where negative serial correlation is found in individual stock returns. Here, 
differences in market micro structure are important. In the US market, there are no 
price limits for stock trading and the existence of a bid-ask spread (and possibly also 
nonsynchronous trading) induces negative serial correlation in observed individual 
security returns (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997).
Although autocorrelation can arise in various reasons, one of the obvious 
causes in our analysis seems to be the existence of price limits in the Korean stock 
market. The price limits prevent equity prices from following a random walk process 
and so results in the market being inefficient. Some studies, for instance Liu and He 
(1991) and Theerathorn, Charoenwong, and Ding (1993), argue that the rejection of a 
random walk process does not necessarily mean inefficiency and accuse the 
government intervention as one of the reasons. However, these studies do not 
correctly observe the impacts of price limits. As argued in Chou (1997), if a shock
I ’i *
occurs such that a stock price his a limit then some excess demand or supply remains
I
unreflected, thus, the returns of the following trading days would absorb the residual 
shock. Therefore, if consecutive limit moves are’persisted, then the observed returns ; 
are auto correlated. This reconciles the fact that, under price limits, stock returns often 
deviate from a random walk, hence, an informationally inefficient market.
The extent to which the sets of variance ratios for individual stocks are 
significant is summarised in Table 7.13 which reports the frequency of rejection for
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each of the price limit regimes. In period 1, the hypothesis is rejected for 33 of the 55 
(60%) stock prices. When expressed in percentage terms, the ranges of price limits 
for periods 1 and 2 are very similar. It is not surprising, therefore, that our results 
show a similar number of rejections of the hypothesis, 31 out of 55 (56.4%), for the 
latter period. Of these period 2 rejections, 22 involve the same companies whose 
share prices did not follow a random walk process in period 1.
Period 3 is associated with uniform price limits of ±6% and represents a 
relaxation of the limits from the previous regime which, when expressed in 
percentage terms, range from approximately ±2% to ±6.7%. Under this regime, only 
15 of the 55 stocks (27.3%) reject the heteroscedastic random walk null hypothesis— 
half the number of rejections found in the previous period. The transition from 
period 3 to period 4 involves a relaxation of price limits from ±6% to ±8%. The 
results of our tests for period 4 are interesting in that 44 of the 55 stock returns reject 
the random walk hypothesis. This period is associated with an average price limit hit 
rate of 12.74% (the sum of lower and upper limit rates of 5.57% and 7.17%, 
respectively). One possible explanation of this relatively higher limit hit rate given 
the ±8% range for price limits is the Korean financial market crisis which was 
associated with highly volatile stock returns. In order to separate the potential effects 
of price limits from those of the financial market crisis, we excluded from period 4 
the subperiod from one month before the IMF bailout on 3 December 1997 to the end 
of the period. Eliminating in this way the observations associated with major financial 
market turbulence, we aim to pick-up the effects of the relaxed price limits. When the 
period of the Korean financial market crisis is excluded, the results are striking. Only 
12 stock prices reject the random walk hypothesis—that is, 78.2% of our sample of 
55 stocks follow a random walk process. This implies that 34 stocks, which do not
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follow a random walk process in the original subperiod 4, become informationally 
efficient. One of the reasons for this is that even before the actual IMF bail-out 
programs, large institutional and foreign investors anticipated a bearish market in the 
nearer future so that they tended to sell shares rather buying them. Subsequently, 
shortly after the outbreak of the IMF bailout programs, the overall stock market 
became more volatile thus more consecutive down limits occurred. This might 
prevent subperiod 4, in which the Korean financial market crisis period is included, to 
be informationally efficient. It reconciles the fact that there are more stocks, which 
follow a random walk process, in new subperiod 4 than in the original subperiod 4. 
For period 5, with price limits of ±12%, only 10 of the stock prices do not follow a 
random walk.
In summary: excluding the period of the Korean financial market crisis, as 
price limits on the Korean stock market are relaxed, the proportion of stock prices in 
our sample which follow a random walk increases. In the early part of our sample 
period, when price limits were expressed as absolute changes for specified ranges of 
base prices and were equivalent to a range from ±2.0% to ±6.7%, approximately 40% 
of the stock prices in our sample followed a random walk process. By the end of our 
sample period, when price limits had been relaxed to ±12%, the proportion of stock 
prices following a random walk had doubled. That is, as price limits are relaxed, the 
stock market as a whole approaches a random walk.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigated whether stock prices under price limits follow a random 
walk. The multiple variance ratio tests are implemented to examine the random walk
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hypothesis for the Korean stock market under five regimes of daily price limits from 
March 1988 to December 1998. Using a sample of 55 actively traded stocks selected 
to cover a wide range of sectors, the hypothesis is tested under each price limit 
regime.
The results show several striking findings. First, the results generally support 
the idea that price limits do impact on volatility. It is found that stock price volatility 
increased when the price limits were widened its(band^ from ±6% to ±8% and further 
to ±12%. This suggests that impose of tightened price limits can affect for reducing 
volatility although less volatile market is not necessarily to be desirable. Second, in 
general, approximately 10% of returns for the entire sample period in our data has 
been affected by the price limits. This implies that neglecting the presence of price 
limits could result in misleading empirical evidence because price limits can be a 
crucial factor affecting stock price movement. It can be quite problematic because 
the time paths o f stock prices under price limits might not coincide with the time 
paths which would prevail in the absence of price limits. Thus equity prices are 
prevented from efficiently reaching equilibrium levels. That is, having limits move 
for a particular stock price on previous trading day can distort an equilibrium level 
since unabsorbed demand/supply on the following day, which has not been fully 
reflected into today’s price due to price limits, might affect the following day’s 
corresponding true return in terms of a leftover term. Finally, excluding the unusual 
period of the Korean financial market crisis, as price limits are relaxed, the proportion 
of stock prices in the sample which follow a random walk increases. That is, the stock 
market as a whole approaches a random walk. With price limits of ±15% from 7 
December 1998 and expectations of them being relaxed further in the short term, it 
seems that these wider limits are likely to have relatively little influence on whether
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or not stock prices follow a random walk. As more data become available it will be 
useful test other hypotheses. For example, it is sometimes argued that there is more 
information available for large capitalisation stocks. Do the prices of large 
capitalisation stocks follow a random walk while those of small capitalisation stocks 
do not?
Overall, the evidence indicates that price limits can prevent stock price 
evolving from a random walk process and hence the stock market is inefficient. In 
spite of the price limits in Korean Stock Exchange have been modified several times 
as the bands have widened, they have played a role in hindering the Korean stock 
market from becoming informationally efficient. Consequently, whatever the pros and 
cons of price limits are, one should not ignore the fact that the behaviour of stock 
prices is not likely to be efficient as long as price limits remain as rule in stock 
market.
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Table 7.1 M odification o f  Daily Price Limits
Date regime introduced
Base Price 2 Dec 88 8 Jun 92 1 Apr 95 25 Nov 96 2 Mar 98 7 Dec 98
< 2,999 100
(3.3%-5.0%)
100
3,000 - 4,999 200
(4.0%-6.7%)
200
5,000 - 6,999 300
(4.3%-6.0%)
300
7,000 - 9,999 400
(4.0%-5.7%)
400
10,000 - 14,999 600
(4.0%-6.0%)
600
15,000 - 19,999 800
(4.0%-5.3%)
800
20,000 - 29,999 1,000
(3,3%-5.0%)
1,000
30,000 -39,999 1,300
(3.3%-4.3%)
1.300
40,000 - 49,999 1,600
(3.2%-4.0%)
1,600
50,000 - 69,999 2,000
(2.9%-4.0%)
2,000
70,000 - 99,999 2,500
(2.5%-3.6%)
2.500
100,000-149,999 3,000
(2.0%-3.0%)
3,000
150,000-199,999 4,000
(2.0%-2.7%)
4,000
200,000-299,999 6,000
(2.0%-3.0%)
300,000-399,999 8,000
(2.0%-2.7%)
400,000-499,999 10,000
(2.0%-2.5%)
500,000< 12.000 
( - 2.4%)
±6%  of +8%  of +12%  of ±15%  of 
*base prices base prices base prices base prices
Sources: Korea Stock Exchange, Korean Stock-Market, 1996: The Korea Economic D aily , various issues. 
*Base Prices are the previous trading day’s closing prices in Korean won.
Price limits in columns 2 and 3 are maximum deviations either upwards or downwards in Korean won. 
For rates in column 3, refer column 2 unless the rates are indicated in the parentheses.
Up until March 1995, as in shaded columns, price limits had been expressed as an absolute changes 
system. From April 1995 they were expressed as a percentage of the base price.
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Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics and Autocorrelation Test Results for the Entire
Sample Period (March 1988 -  May 1998)
Company code Company Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera
KR7000140004 Hite Brewery -0.00011 0,0254 0.07 5.47 804.0
KR7005180005 Bingrae Co. -0.00004 0.0303 -0.18 5.10 598.0
KR7005300009 Lotte Chillsung Beverage 0.00027 0,0234 -0.06 5.39 754.2
KR7002020006 Kolon Ind. -0.00044 0.0247 -0.07 6.79 1893.8
KR7001460005 BYC 0.00019 0.0219 0.03 5.27 677.9
KR7004460002 Kohab Ltd. -0.00070 0.0294 -0.03 6.56 1663.5
KR7003 240009 Taekwang Industrial 0.00056 0.0225 -0.06 7.18 2297.4
KR7009830001 Hanwha -0.00048 0.0291 0.11 5.36 739.8
KR7005950001 Isu Chemical -0.00010 0.0279 0.17 4.09 170.2
KR7003550001 LG Chemical Ltd. -0.00011 0.0240 0.05 5.99 1176.1
KR7011780004 Korea Kumlio Petro. -0.00055 0.0263 -0.01 5.96 1151.3
KR7003600004 SK -0.00025 0.0226 -0.02 8.10 3427.7
KR7010950004 Ssangyong Oil Ref. -0.00005 0.0227 0.02 6.95 2051.2
KR7000020008 Dongwha Phann. -0.00003 0.0290 0.06 5.14 605.7
KR7001060003 Choongwae Phann. -0.00002 0.0265 -0.14 5.27 686.8
KR7002000008 Hankook Glass 0.00008 0.0238 0.10 5.32 711.8
KR7005930003 Samsimg Electronics 0.00029 0.0242 -0.55 15.08 19364.1
KR7002610004 LG Electronics Inc. -0.00001 0.0252 0.10 6.27 1408.4
KR7007410004 Daewoo Electronics -0.00035 0.0254 0.35 5.50 884.3
KR7001830009 Anam Eletronics -0.00060 0.0305 -0.002 5.53 844.8
KR7006400006 Samsimg Display Device 0.00006 0.0237 0.03 8.55 4049.7
KR7009150004 Samsung Electric-Mech. -0.00016 0.0253 0.15 6.35 1487.0
KR7005380001 Hyundai Motor -0.00001 0.0232 0.25 5.94 1168.5
KR7000270009 Kia Motors -0.00071 0.0295 -0,21 7.58 2787.8
KR7003620002 Ssangyong Motor -0.00054 0.0291 0.19 4.73 412.4
KR7008400004 Jindo Corp. -0.00085 0.0316 0.01 5.91 1116.4
KR7005790001 Mando Machinery -0.00035 0.0264 -1.36 21.58 46405.9
KR7000720003 Hyundai Construction -0.00026 0.0250 0.19 4.90 493.3
KR7000280008 Dongali Constniction -0.00066 0.0278 -0.06 6.97 2072.4
KR7000210005 Daelim Ind. -0.00060 0.0264 0.13 5.23 668.3
KR7003810009 Daewoo Corp. -0.00053 0.0254 0.12 5.50 827.1
KR7000830000 Samsung Corp. -0.00041 0.0246 0.14 5.76 1011.5
KR7001120005 LG International Corp. -0.00053 0.0264 0.16 5.18 636.0
KR7004060000 Segye Corp. -0.00063 0.0322 -0.04 5.10 581.8
KR7015580004 Shinlian Bank -0.00053 0.0256 0.20 6.59 1442.4
KR7000010009 Choheung Bank -0.00081 0.0291 0.36 15.58 20883.0
KR7000030007 Comercial Bank -0.00107 0.0267 -0.26 8.60 4084.2
KR7008890006 Boram Bank -0.00074 0.0286 -1.73 38.94 171502.7
KR7005020003 Korea L T Credit Bank -0.00071 0.0275 -0.92 35.87 142604.8
KR7006800007 Daewoo Securities -0.00039 0.0273 -0.09 8.01 3312.1
KR7003540002 Daishin Securities -0.00047 0.0284 0.01 7.53 2701.0
KR7005740002 LG Secutities -0.00042 0.0282 -0.08 7.74 2957.1
KR7000810002 Samsung F&M Insurance 0.00006 0.0237 0.03 8.55 4049.7
KR7000060004 Oriental F&M Insurance -0.00056 0.0292 -1.00 18.47 32019.4
KR7000540005 Ssangyong F&M Insurance -0.00054 0.0302 0.02 4.99 519.2
KR7003690005 Korea Reinsurance -0.00046 0.0263 -0.53 11.07 8719.8
KR7005490008 POSCO 0.00012 0.0211 0.12 7.04 2095.6
KR7000200006 Daewoo Heavy Ind. -0.00034 0.0270 -0.45 13.33 14143.2
KR7015760002 KEPCO 0.00003 0.0227 0.10 5.75 865.1
KR7017670001 SK Telecom 0.00125 0.0238 0.003 6.10 1065.8
KR7003490000 KAL -0.00030 0.0250 -0.25 10.75 7936.3
KR7001150002 STC Corp. -0.00040 0.0295 0.03 4.06 337.3
KR7007190002 Sinho Paper Mfg. -0.00064 0.0334 -0.53 9.64 5938.3
KR7006570006 Daelim Trading -0.00002 0.0294 -0.02 3.91 109.1
KR7004170007 Shinsegye Dpt. -0.00011 0.0237 0.04 6.55 1657.7
The .05 critical value for the Jarque-Bera test is 5.99.
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Table 7.3 Standard Deviations o f  Daily Stock Returns for Subperiods
Absolute changes system Fixed percentage rates system
Company code Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2 Subperiod 3 Subperiod 4 Subperiod 5 
(Price limits: (Price limits: (Price limits: (Price limits: (Price limits:
±2.0-±6.7% ) ±2.0-±6.7% ) ±6%) ±8%) ±12%)
KR7000140004 0.0179 0.0249 0.0197 0.0378 0.0404
KR7005180005 0.0234 0.0262 0.0296 0.0438 0.0513
KR7005300009 0.0146 0.0217 0.0274 0.0346 0.0268
KR7002020006 0.0183 0.0212 0.0211 0.0372 0.0474
KR7001460005 0.0146 0.0201 0.0245 0.0323 0.0307
KR7004460002 0,0215 0.0244 0.0199 0.0342 0.0663
KR7003240009 0.0127 0.0171 0.0268 0.0345 0.0425
KR7009830001 0.0196 0.0253 0.0229 0.0435 0.0639
KR7005950001 0.0219 0.0265 0.0240 0.0411 0.0491
KR7003550001 0.0185 0.0215 0.0190 0.0377 0.0397
KR7011780004 0.0220 0.0239 0.0189 0.0379 0.0490
KR7003600004 0.0165 0.0203 0.0185 0.0344 0.0326
KR7010950004 0.0168 0.0197 0.0147 0.0388 0.0369
KR7000020008 0.0198 0.0242 0.0272 0.0425 0.0589
KR7001060003 0.0194 0.0246 0.0241 0.0416 0.0454
KR7002000008 0.0179 0.0216 0.0195 0.0399 0.0366
KR7005930003 0.0149 0.0185 0.0273 0.0356 0.0420
KR7002610004 0.0198 0.0214 0.0198 0.0367 0.0512
KR7007410004 0.0198 0.0227 0,0196 0.0370 0.0411
KR7001830009 0.0208 0.0223 0.0273 0.0439 0.0639
KR7006400006 0.0169 0.0183 0.0199 0.0342 0.0512
KR7009150004 0.0180 0.0209 0.0208 0.0378 0.0549
KR7005380001 0.0178 0,0195 0.0157 0.0358 0.0407
KR7000270009 0.0182 0.0204 0.0175 0.0444 0.0604
KR7003620002 0.0197 0.0246 0.0247 0.0489 0,0475
KR7008400004 0.0206 0.0262 0.0210 0.0472 0.0699
KR7005790001 0.0199 0.0202 0.0208 0.0431 0.0523
KR7000720003 0.0207 0.0216 0.0163 0.0375 0.0417
KR7000280008 0.0195 0.0217 0.0183 0.0393 0.0635
KR7000210005 0.0192 0.0236 0.0211 0.0385 0.0560
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KR7003810009 0.0213 0.0229 0.0203 0.0370 0.0408
KR7000830000 0.0170 0.0216 0.0210 0.0384 0.0430
K R7001120005 0.0198 0.0240 0.0222 0.0378 0.0440
KR7004060000 0.0263 0.0293 0.0260 0.0433 0.0535
K R7015580004 0.0215 0.0206 0.0160 0.0350 0.0468
K R 7000010009 0.0191 0.0215 0.0174 0.0384 0.0784
KR7000030007 0.0197 0.0205 0.0171 0.0373 0.0618
KR7008890006 0.0259 0.0212 0.0221 0.0377 0.0471
KR7005020003 0.0204 0.0204 0.0148 0.0349 0.0839
KR7006800007 0.0223 0.0205 0.0205 0.0431 0.0495
KR7003 540002 0.0220 0.0206 0.0227 0.0431 0.0528
KR7005740002 0.0225 0.0211 0.0230 0.0432 0.0556
KR7000810002 0.0197 0.0195 0.0235 0.0361 0.0392
KR7000060004 0.0241 0.0256 0.0246 0.0394 0.0516
KR7000540005 0.0215 0.0257 0.0256 0.0429 0.0568
KR7003 690005 0.0218 0.0225 0.0217 0.0383 0.0418
KR7005490008 0.0158 0.0190 0.0156 0.0324 0.0330
KR7000200006 0.0202 0,0273 0.0203 0.0396 0.0476
K R 7015760002 0.0183 0.0204 0.0150 0.0311 0.0298
K R 7017670001 0.0170 0.0179 0.0214 0.0365 0.0289
KR7003490000 0.0175 0.0208 0.0157 0.0393 0.0525
KR7001150002 0.0224 0.0263 0.0242 0.0412 0.0577
K R7007190002 0.0191 0.0297 0.0264 0.0506 0.0767
KR7006570006 0.0239 0.0281 0.0258 0.0397 0.0590
K R7004170007 0.0155 0.0196 0.0212 0.0385 0.0451
Average 0.0196 0.0224 0.0213 0.0390 0.0475
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Table 7.4 Number o f  Days o f  Up- and Down-Limit M oves
Company Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Total
Hite Brewery 68 142 13 43 7 273
Bingrae Co. 150 160 23 58 9 400
Lotte Chillsung Beverage 57 274 15 25 1 372
Kolon Ind. 83 114 11 27 8 243
BYC 136 336 8 14 2 496
Kohab Ltd. 96 100 3 31 46 276
Taekwang Industrial 136 406 26 14 5 587
Hanwlia 86 104 12 65 21 288
Isu Chemical 106 122 12 46 7 293
LG Chemical Ltd. 76 75 8 19 2 180
Korea Kuinlio Petro. 97 73 9 69 10 258
SK 69 127 9 39 7 251
Ssangyong Oil Ref. 54 65 4 54 4 181
Dongwha Phann. 95 132 42 60 23 352
Choongwae Pharm. 76 204 26 60 5 371
Hankook Glass 75 99 5 48 3 230
Samsimg Electronics 58 175 17 40 10 300
LG Electronics Inc. 82 71 0 52 12 217
Daewoo Electronics 94 88 6 40 11 239
Anam Eletronics 97 67 12 68 39 283
Samsung Display Device 70 146 7 34 11 268
Samsimg Electric-Mech. 119 123 21 37 14 314
Hyundai Motor 92 102 1 32 8 235
Kia Motors 72 62 8 69 47 258
Ssangyong Motor 81 106 37 87 11 322
Jindo Corp. 85 123 6 75 46 335
Mando Machinery 99 94 12 55 9 269
Hyundai Construction 132 122 9 26 5 294
Dongali Construction 102 123 9 51 36 321
Daelim Ind. 109 105 5 73 9 301
Daewoo Corp. 109 85 10 44 2 250
Samsung Corp. 70 127 8 36 6 247
LG International Corp. 92 91 2 40 9 234
Segye Corp. 192 170 16 69 21 468
Shinhan Bank 58 68 1 32 10 169
Cholieung Bank 72 68 2 44 33 219
Comercial Bank 77 50 6 36 26 195
Boram Bank 112 54 7 42 16 231
Korea L T Credit Bank 82 91 0 28 14 215
Daewoo Securities 143 93 14 43 6 299
Daishin Securities 126 71 8 65 15 285
LG Secutities 134 83 2 46 12 277
Samsung F&M Insurance 136 297 25 32 5 495
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Oriental F&M Insurance 132 185 29 40 12 398
Ssangyong F&M Insurance 136 137 26 56 17 372
Korea Reinsurance 138 120 18 32 5 313
POSCO 70 132 4 32 3 241
Daewoo Heavy Ind. 77 101 6 54 7 245
KEPCO 53 97 4 30 4 188
SK Telecom 125 367 21 34 6 553
KAL 77 75 3 33 12 200
STC Corp. 127 158 15 49 18 367
Sinho Paper Mfg. 51 195 24 108 50 428
Daelim Trading 140 173 4 46 10 373
Shinsegye Dpt. 70 174 12 35 7 298
Average
Average Percentage Rate
97.3
7.8
132.8
16.0
11.7
2.4
45.8
12.5
13.7
5.1
301.3
9.4
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Figure 7.1 Average Number o f  Days o f  Limit Moves
150 132
100
50
13.7
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Figure 7.2 Average Number of Successive Days of Limit Moves
Period 1 Period 2 Period 4 Period 5Period 3
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Table 7.5 Frequency o f  Successive Days o f  Up- and Down-Limit M oves
Frequency o f  
successive downs
Frequency o f  
successive ups
Company 2 3 4 > 5 2 3 4 > 5
Hite Brewery 11 2 1 21 5 1 3
Bingrae Co. 21 1 2 3 26 8 3 6
Lotte Chillsung Beverage 23 3 3 3 21 5 6 7
Kolon Ind. 14 1 1 12 5 2 3
BYC 26 6 4 8 15 19 7 13
Kohab Ltd. 13 1 2 23 5 4 1
Taekwang Industrial 23 9 6 8 27 18 7 19
Hanwha 9 4 2 24 8 1 1
Isu Chemical 11 1 3 21 10 1 3
LG Chemical Ltd. 5 17 2
Korea Kumho Petro. 9 3 1 19 3 2
SK 8 3 23 4 2 1
Ssangyong Oil Ref. 6 4 13 2 3 2
Dongwha Phann. 18 6 1 22 7 5 3
Choongwae Phann. 20 5 1 3 21 10 6 5
Hankook Glass 12 1 20 8 1
Samsimg Electronics 11 2 3 20 8 3 3
LG Electronics Inc. 9 1 14 5 1
Daewoo Electronics 9 15 5 4
Anam Eletronics 8 5 2 15 5 2 3
Samsung Display Device 15 2 1 21 8 4
Samsung Electric-Mech. 15 4 1 28 10 1 1
Hyundai Motor 10 2 1 22 5 1
Kia Motors 15 3 1 22 5 3
Ssangyong Motor 13 4 1 17 8 5 4
Jindo Corp. 12 7 5 1 22 9 6 3
Mando Machineiy 16 1 1 18 7 2 I
Hyundai Construction 8 1 3 24 10 3 1
Dongah Constniction 19 1 2 2 22 4 5 3
Daelim Ind. 11 2 1 17 5 3 1
Daewoo Corp. 12 18 6 4 1
Samsung Corp. 11 1 1 15 11 3 2
LG International Corp. 9 14 7 1 2
Segye Corp. 28 3 2 2 27 15 5 6
Shinlian Bank 8 1 12 6 1
Choheung Bank 4 16 7 1
Commercial Bank 3 1 1 11 3 1 2
Boram Bank 6 17 5 3 1
Korea Long Tenn Credit Bank 8 15 7 3
Daewoo Securities 8 1 19 6 4 2
Daishin Securities 7 1 1 18 10 1 4
LG Securities 7 1 13 12 2 2
Samsimg F&M Insurance 31 6 4 3 32 8 1 14
Oriental F&M Insurance 25 2 1 1 30 15 3 3
Ssangyong F&M Insurance 19 2 1 29 14 5 2
Korea Reinsurance 12 2 1 20 10 3 1
POSCO 9 2 24 6 4 1
Daewoo Heavy Ind. 16 17 5 2 1
KEPCO 13 14 9 2
SK Telecom 24 14 7 6 22 14 11 16
KAL 6 4 12 6 2 1
STC Corp. 20 2 3 1 23 7 2 7
Sinlio Paper Mfg. 18 8 3 2 27 9 4 7
Daelim Trading 18 7 1 1 28 6 3 3
Shinsegye Dpt. 12 4 23 6 2 6
212
Table 7.6 Variance Ratio Tests for Period 1 (2 March 1988 - 7 June 1992)
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code q = 2 q =  6 q = 12 q = 18
*3-IICP
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 1.056 0.925 0.813 0.739 0.711
(2.58)* (-1.04) (-1.22) (-1.06) (-0.88)
KR7005180005 1,115 1.187 1.291 1.340 1.326
(5.33)* (1.60) (1.89) (1.53) (1.02)
KR7005 300009 1.170 1.430 1.623 1.728 1.804
(7.94)* (5.70) (3.84) (2.57) (2.27)
Textiles & KR7002020006 1.113 1.101 1.030 1.040 1.037
Wearing Apparel (4.59)* (1.22) (0.18) (0.16) (0.10)
KR7001460005 1.294 1.751 2.171 2.484 2.718
(14.23)* (10.27) (7.32) (6.60) (5.61)
KR7004460002 1.052 0.953 0.875 0.889 0.846
(2.37) (-0.66) (-0.83) (-0.46) (-0.50)
KR7003240009 1.322 2.009 2.374 2.671 2.973
(17.21)* (16.29) (10.04) (8.29) (7.15)
Chemicals & KR7009830001 1.030 1.014 0.984 1.043 1.038
Chemical Products (1.42) (0.20) (-0.11) (0.18) (0.11)
KR7005950001 1.060 1.125 1.179 1.223 1.166
(2.73)* (1.73) (1.21) (0.96) (0.50)
KR700355000! 0.9934 0.874 0.791 0.811 0.801
(-0.32) (-1.65) (-1.28) (-0.72) (-0.63)
KR7011780004 1.080 1.056 1.068 1.081 1.074
(3.83)* (0.77) (0.35) (0.35) (0.23)
KR7003600004 1.070 1.096 1.044 1.054 1.017
(3.00)* (1.17) (0.26) (0.19) (0.05)
KR7010950004 0.999 0.873 0.764 0.745 0.724
(-0.03) (-1.61) (-1.45) (-0.97) (-0.90)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.029 1.033 1.010 1.007 0.986
(1.24) (0.44) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.04)
KR7001060003 1.051 0.983 0.931 0.891 0.897
(2.27) (-0.22) (-0.45) (-0.30) (-0.30)
Non-metallic Mineral KR7002000008 1.052 0.968 0.875 0.868 0.871
Products (2.37) (-0.42) (-0.82) (-0.55) (-0.36)
Electrical & KR7005930003 1.110 1.109 1.036 1.088 1.104
Electronic Products (4.63)* (1.41) (0.21) (0.32) (0.30)
KR7002610004 0.997 0.958 0.875 0.877 0.862
(-0.12) (-0.56) (-0.75) (-0.48) (-0.44)
KR7007410004 0.992 0.954 0.867 0.862 0.876
(-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.85) (-0.56) (-0.38)
KR7001830009 1.044 1.065 1.005 1.018 0.939
(1.99) (0.88) (0.04) (0.08) (-0.20)
KR7006400006 1.115 1.182 1.178 1.205 1.174
(4.85)* (1.92) (0.90) (0.67) (0.48)
KR7009150004 1.110 1,168 1.189 1.252 1.238
(4.66)* (2.12) (1.10) (1.03) (0.75)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.143 1.288 1.268 1.315 1.288
(6.36)* (4.05) (1.71) (1.30) (0.87)
KR7000270009 1.082 1.111 1.029 1.077 1.101
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Construction 
Wholesale Trade
Banks
Securities
Insurance
Basic Metal Industries
Machinery
Electricity
(3.66)* (1.51) (0.18) (0.30) (0.30)
KR7003620002 1.038 1.004 0.914 0.936 0.935
(1.63) (0.05) (-0.55) (-0.26) (-0.22)
KR7008400004 1.051 1.108 1.169 1.193 1.161
(2.26) (1.42) (1,35) (0.83) (0.50)
KR7005790001 1.022 0.873 0.781 0.764 0.748
(1.09) (-1.61) (-1.23) (-0.70) (-0.50)
KR7000720003 1.138 1.267 1.329 1.367 1.333
(6.43)* (3.80) (2.25) (1.62) (1.06)
KR7000280008 1.097 1.281 1.354 1.423 1.397
(4.36)* (3.81) (2.28) (1.69) (1.23)
KR7000210005 1.067 1.021 0.951 0.993 0.974
(2.98)* (0.27) (-0.30) (-0.03) (-0.08)
KR7003810009 1.063 1.139 1.132 1.120 1.115
(2.88)* (1.83) (0.93) (0.48) (0.33)
KR7000830000 1.063 1.064 0.915 0.921 0.889
(2.67)* (0.86) (-0.52) (-0.32) (-0,33)
KR7001120005 1.051 1.061 0.968 0.977 0.981
(2.28) (0.83) (-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.06)
KR7004060000 1.142 1.810 1.008 0.970 0.960
(6.64)* (1.13) (0.06) (-0.13) (-0.12)
KR7015580004 1.027 1.018 0.910 0.937 0.972
(0.94) (0.17) (-0.41) (-0.18) (-0.08)
KR7000010009 1.022 0.997 0.952 0.996 1.027
(1.05) (-0.04) (-0.30) (-0.02) (0.08)
KR7000030007 1.031 0.957 0.894 0.930 0.942
(0.67) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.26) (-0.16)
KR7008890006 1.047 1.134 1.099 1.071 1.066
(1.68) (1.22) (0.77) (0.20) (0.14)
KR7005020003 1.052 1.063 1.029 1.083 1.110
(2.10) (0.87) (0.16) (0.29) (0.29)
KR7006800007 1.084 1.225 1.222 1.263 1.295
(3.36)* (2.90) (1.31) (0.99) (0.74)
KR7003540002 1.053 1.126 1.121 1.165 1.214
(2.23) (1.52) (0.70) (0.61) (0.60)
KR7005740002 1.102 1.196 1.209 1.280 1.357
(3.96)* (2.33) (1.21) (0.98) (1.09)
KR7000810002 1.142 1.291 1.467 1,614 1.713
(5.43)* (3.25) (2.98) (2.53) (2.08)
KR7000060004 1.064 1.149 1.234 1.290 1.363
(2.78)* (1.69) (1.71) (1.09) (0.75)
KR7000540005 1.133 1.198 1.180 1.226 1.287
(5.59)* (2.41) (1.12) (0.94) (0.81)
KR7003690005 1.075 1.141 1.249 1.322 1.380
(2.94)* (1.51) (1.38) (1.07) (1.49)
KR7005490008 1.127 1.097 1.001 1.019 1.028
(6.01)* (1.27) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08)
KR7000200006 1.013 1.013 0.972 0.992 1.030
(0.54) (0.17) (-0.19) (-0.03) (0.09)
KR7015760002 1.033 0.916 0.814 0.802 0.811
(1.41) (-1.05) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.42)
Communication KR7017670001 1.302 1.756 2.177 2.329 2.366
(10.52)* (7.63) (5.80) (4.01) (2.93)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.067 1.130 1.205 1.253 1.271
(3.06)* (1.93) (1.27) (1.03) (0.86)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 1.097 1.226 1.244 1.296 1.304
(4,61)* (3.39) (1.75) (1.33) (1.03)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007190002 1.200 1.595 1.744 1.750 1.704
(8.21)* (7.69) (4.82) (2.89) (2.05)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 1.091 1.069 1.063 1.063 1.078
(4.03)* (0.97) (0.40) (0.27) (0.26)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.147 1.368 1.431 1.448 1.378
(6.01)* (5.10) (3.04) (1.87) (1.16)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z(q)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parentheses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 1245) distribution of 2.57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0.
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Table 7.7 Variance Ratio Tests for Period 2 (8 June 1992 -  31 March 1995)
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code q = 2 <1 ~ 6 q = 12 q = 18 q = 24
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 1.073
(2.37)
1.015
(0.15)
0.908
(-0.46)
0.847
(-0.50)
0.860
(-0.35)
KR7005180005 1.098
(3.06)*
1.152
(1.50)
1.070
(0.33)
1,042
(0.13)
0.985
(-0.03)
KR7005300009 1.272
(9.02)*
1.797
(8.44)
2.228
(6.59)
2.524
(5.27)
2.738
(4.31)
Textiles & 
Wearing Apparel
KR7002020006 1.073
(2.48)
1.027
(0.34)
0.934
(-0.37)
0.932
(-0.22)
0.915
(-0.23)
KR7001460005 1.301
(9.61)*
1.723
(7.23)
1.695
(3.39)
1.557
(1.84)
1.490
(1.16)
KR7004460002 1.020
(0.68)
0.915
(-0.91)
0.875
(-0.62)
0.851
(-0.47)
0.770
(-0.55)
KR7003240009 1.424
(13.45)*
2.088
(10.59)
2.414
(6.71)
2.637
(5.20)
2.735
(4.09)
Chemicals & 
Chemical Products
KR7009830001 1.043
(1.38)
0.937
(-0.64)
1.001
(0.00)
1.063
(0.20)
1.061
(0.14)
KR7005950Q01 1.035
(1.17)
0.918
(-0.87)
0.859
(-0.72)
0.841
(-0.54)
0.822
(-0.42)
KR7003550001 1.040
(1.35)
0.932
(-0.73)
0.907
(-0.46)
0.875
(-0.39)
0.882
(-0.29)
KR7011780004 0.984
(-0.54)
0.784
(-2.29)
0.711
(-1.39)
0.671
(-1.06)
0.645
(-0.85)
KR7003600004 1.143
(4.99)*
1.170
(1.87)
1.253
(1.38)
1.260
(0.94)
1.308
(0.81)
KR7010950004 1.087
(2.92)*
1.026
(0.27)
0.874
(-0.61)
0.767
(-0.77)
0.729
(-0.64)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.109
(3.50)*
1.102
(1.06)
1.048
(0.25)
1.009
(0.03)
1.018
(0.04)
KR7001060003 1.192
(6.29)*
1.506
(4.88)
1.625
(2.96)
1.634
(1.97)
1,605
(1.48)
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products
KR7002000008 1.109
(3.47)*
1.011
(0.11)
0.974
(-0.14)
0.964
(-0.12)
1.004
(0.01)
Electrical & 
Electronic Products
KR7005930003 1.178
(6.02)*
1.327
(3.50)
1.303
(1.62)
1.311
(0.91)
1.418
(0.90)
KR7002610004 1.080
(2.80)*
0.972
(-0.31)
0.996
(-0.02)
1.008
(0.03)
1.038
(0.10)
KR7007410004 1.039
(1.36)
0.933
(-0.73)
0.892
(-0.59)
0.893
(-0.35)
0.867
(-0.31)
KR7001830009 0.997
(-0.11)
0.816
(-1.91)
0.663
(-1.72)
0.611
(-1.27)
0.603
(-0.98)
KR7006400006 1.208
(7.32)*
1.279
(2.99)
1.275
(1.38)
1.291
(0.97)
1.338
(0.86)
KR7009150004 1.173
(5.78)*
1.144
(1.38)
0.991
(-0.04)
0.920
(-0.25)
0.945
(-0.14)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.158
(5.45)*
1.219
(2.44)
1.092
(0.48)
1.045
(0.15)
1.069
(0.17)
KR7000270009 1.031 0.929 0.795 0.747 0.749
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(1-07) (-0.80) (-1.01) (-0.82) (-0.61)
KR7003620002 1.085
(2.91)*
1.074
(0.80)
1.124
(0.65)
1.139
(0.44)
1.105
(0.26)
KR7008400004 1.095
(3.12)*
1.165
(1.78)
1.021
(0.10)
0.980
(-0.06)
0.994
(-0.01)
KR7005790001 1.032
(1.04)
0.928
(-0.72)
0.801
(-0.99)
0.731
(-0.89)
0.696
(-0.72)
Construction KR7000720003 1.146
(5.12)*
1.306
(3.48)
1.266
(1.46)
1.259
(1.92)
1.283
(0.73)
KR7000280008 1.176
(5.92)*
1.245
(2.70)
1.143
(0.77)
1.079
(0.27)
1.092
(0.23)
KR7000210005 1.048
(1.61)
0.999
(-0.02)
0.936
(-0.32)
0.910
(-0.30)
0.892
(-0,26)
Wholesale Trade KR7003810009 0.993
(-0.23)
0.873
(-1.44)
0.806
(-1.11)
0.798
(-0.68)
0.809
(0.48)
KR7000830000 1.147
(4.93)*
1.127
(1.32)
1.032
(0.16)
1.047
(0.16)
1.090
(0.21)
KR7001120005 0.998
(-0.08)
0.882
(-1.22)
0.722
(-1.41)
0.651
(-1.12)
0.630
(-0.92)
KR7004060000 1.051
(1.66)
1.093
(0.98)
1.195
(1.01)
1.245
(0.79)
1.203
(0.50)
Banks KR7015580004 1.016
(0.59)
0.945
(-0.57)
0.852
(-0.77)
0.874
(-0.43)
0.898
(-0.26)
KR7000010009 1.047
(1.62)
0.965
(-0.37)
0.915
(-0.43)
0.920
(-0.26)
0.909
(-0.23)
KR7000030007 1.020
(0.70)
0.985
(-0.17)
0.827
(-0.94)
0.803
(-0.63)
0.794
(-0.50)
KR7008890006 0.971
(-0.98)
0.892
(-1.18)
0.704
(-0.90)
0.621
(-0.90)
0.621
(-0.89)
KR7005020003 1.109
(3.96)*
1.101
(1,11)
1.081
(0.43)
1.025
(0.08)
0.969
(-0.08)
Securities KR7006800007 1.092
(3.33)*
1.153
(1.81)
1.037
(0.20)
1,084
(0.29)
1.171
(0.43)
KR7003 540002 0.999
(-0.03)
0.967
(-0.37)
0.870
(-0.66)
0.882
(-0.38)
0.896
(-0.27)
KR7005740002 1.042
(1.42)
1.073
(0.78)
0.991
(-0.05)
1.009
(0.03)
1.049
(0.12)
Insurance KR7000810002 1.335
(10.76)
2.124
(11.48)*
2.675
(8.07)
2.974
(6.44)
3.113
(5.24)
KR7000060004 1.131
(4.42)*
1.181
(1.86)
1.244
(1.19)
1.290
(0.97)
1.256
(0.66)
KR7000540005 1.130
(4.15)*
1.108
(1.14)
1.024
(0.12)
0,996
(-0.01)
0.951
(0.12)
KR7003690005 1.095
(3.28)*
1.135
(1.49)
1.055
(0.28)
1.001
(0.00)
0.946
(-0.14)
Basic Metal Industries KR7005490008 1.210
(6.77)*
1.382
(4.12)
1.562
(2.85)
1.693
(2.26)
1.813
(2.07)
Machinery KR7000200006 1.040
(1.13)
1.116
(1.01)
1.075
(0.34)
1.054
(0.19)
1.085
(0.24)
Electricity KR7015760002 1.175
(6.28)*
1.482
(5.58)
1.672
(3.75)
1.757
(2.58)
1.841
(2.25)
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Communication KR7017670001 1.441 2.250 2.821 3.181 3.505
(14.17)* (13.07) (9.31) (7.29) (6.19)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.078 1.113 1.097 1.116 1.162
(2.68)* (1.22) (0.50) (0.38) (0.39)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 1.047 1.080 1.101 1.137 1.212
(1.48) (0.85) (0.52) (0.46) (0.54)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007190002 1.047 1.092 1.023 1.054 1.058
(1.51) (0.98) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 1.149 1.175 1.092 1.163 1.222
(4.73)* (1.82) (0.46) (0.54) (0.54)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.250 1.560 1.652 1.648 1.630
(8.67)* (6.04) (3.56) (2.37)* (1.66)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z(q)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parentheses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 831) distribution of 2.57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0.
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Table 7.8 Variance Ratio Tests for Period 3 (1 April 1995 -  24 November 1996)
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code cmII q = 6
cm“-iII q — 18
>cmII
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 0.987
(-0.34)
0.924
(-0.56)
0.846
(-0.49)
0.819
(-0.44)
0.832
(-0.27)
KR7005180005 1.061
(1.32)
1.126
(0.84)
1.068
(0.22)
0.983
(-0.04)
0.961
(-0,09)
KR7005300009 1.068
(1.84)
0.959
(-0.31)
0,888
(-0.44)
0.908
(-0.19)
0.928
(-0.13)
Textiles & 
Wearing Apparel
KR7002020006 1.086
(1.95)
1.033
(0.27)
0.878
(-0.39)
0.872
(-0.30)
0.792
(-0.36)
KR7001460005 0.930
(-1.68)
0.632
(-2.72)*
0.518
(-1.89)
0,490
(-1.26)
0.456
(-0.98)
KR7004460002 0.927
(-1.66)
0.807
(-1.56)
0.698
(-1.06)
0.650
(-0.83)
0.627
(-0.73)
KR7003240009 0.991
(-0.23)
0.786
(-1.59)
0.615
(-1.31)
0.597
(-1.03)
0.546
(-0.80)
Chemicals & 
Chemical Products
KR7009830001 1.020
(0.50)
1.027
(0.23)
0.971
(-0.11)
0.897
(-0.25)
0.861
(-0.27)
KR7005950001 1.068
(1.75)
1.080
(0.63)
0.896
(-0.35)
0.847
(-0.36)
0.807
(-0.34)
KR7003550001 1.122
(2.86)*
1.095
(0.69)
1.038
(0.14)
0.902
(-0.22)
0.807
(-0.36)
KR7011780004 0,935
(-1.92)
0.832
(-1.36)
0.792
(-0.72)
0.704
(-0.72)
0.635
(-0.69)
KR7003600004 1.036
(1.07)
1.031
(0.25)
0.925
(-0.28)
0.950
(-0.10)
0.894
(-0.20)
KR7010950004 0.992
(-0.22)
0.866
(-0.90)
0.737
(-0.92)
0.716
(-0.66)
0.650
(-0.58)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.137
(3.78)*
1.156
(1.31)
1.123
(0.52)
1.157
(0.45)
1.100
(0.21)
KR7001060003 1.032
(0.89)
0.969
(-0.23)
0.889
(-0.42)
0.900
(-0.26)
0.795
(-0.38)
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products
KR7002000008 0.993
(-0.17)
0.979
(-0.15)
0.938
(-0.24)
0.919
(-0.20)
0.873
(0.24)
Electrical & 
Electronic Products
KR7005930003 1.177
(5.58)*
1.319
(2.34)
1.215
(0.56)
1.290
(0.64)
1.255
(0.35)
KR7002610004 1.147
(3.74)*
1.080
(0.60)
1.109
(0.34)
1.190
(0.44)
1.268
(0.45)
KR7007410004 0.931
(-1.86)
0.875
(-1.04)
0.735
(-0.95)
0.707
(-0.72)
0.601
(-0.73)
KR7001830009 1.198
(5.41)*
1.458
(3.94)
1.400
(1.55)
1.308
(0.79)
1.223
(0.40)
KR7006400006 1.105
(2.24)
1.066
(0.46)
1.116
(0.39)
1.150
(0.36)
1.094
(0.15)
KR7009150004 1.063
(1,57)
1.107
(0.86)
1.107
(0.38)
1.080
(0.22)
0.973
(-0.05)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.091
(1.90)
1.037
(0.25)
1.012
(0.04)
1.075
(0.19)
1.089
(0.16)
KR7000270009 1.051 0.949 0.860 0.858 0.823
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(1.36) (-0.40) (-0.52) (-0.34) (-0.30)
KR7003620002 1.023
(0.73)
1.155
(1.51)
1.197
(0.82)
1.270
(0.72)
1.293
(0.59)
KR7008400004 0.967
(-0.83)
0.876
(-1.00)
0.655
(-1.20)
0.587
(-0.98)
0.562
(-0.72)
KR7005790001 0.938
(-1.54)
0.856
(-1.06)
0.821
(-0.66)
0.816
(-0.43)
0.788
(-0.38)
Construction KR7000720003 1.100
(2.74)*
1.134
(1.26)
1.059
(0.26)
0.919
(-0.22)
0.799
(-0.47)
KR7000280008 1.098
(2.61)*
1.106
(0.88)
1.052
(0.19)
0.956
(-0.11)
0.922
(-0.14)
KR7000210005 1.047
(1.09)
0.924
(-0.57)
0.783
(-0.75)
0.799
(-0.50)
0.796
(-0.36)
Wholesale Trade KR7003810009 0.921
(-2.14)
0.787
(-1.68)
0.730
(-0.94)
0.675
(-0.79)
0.605
(0.70)
KR7000830000 1.098
(2.23)
1.012
(0.10)
0.935
(-0.23)
0.960
(-0.09)
0.987
(-0.02)
KR7001120005 0.979
(-0.47)
0.803
(-1.45)
0.696
(-1.14)
0.633
(-0.81)
0.594
(-0.68)
KR7004060000 1.049
(1.18)
1.055
(0.43)
0.842
(-0.61)
0.836
(-0.38)
0.736
(-0.47)
Banks KR7015580004 0.980
(-0.49)
0.833
(-1.50)
0.716
(-1.06)
0.632
(-0.90)
0.567
(-0.75)
KR7000010009 1.013
(0.29)
0.931
(-0.59)
0.805
(-0.67)
0.820
(-0.39)
0.723
(-0.45)
KR7000030007 1.005
(0.12)
0.958
(-0.35)
0.845
(-0.48)
0.862
(-0.28)
0.806
(-0.32)
KR7008890006 0.996
(-0.10)
1.030
(0.25)
0.975
(-0.10)
0.967
(-0.08)
0.924
(-0.14)
KR7005020003 0.977
(-0.54)
0.897
(-0.54)
0.854
(-0.54)
0.815
(-0.42)
0.681
(-0.59)
Securities KR7006800007 1.120
(3.15)*
1.177
(1.38)
1.132
(0.49)
1.115
(0.27)
1.018
(0.03)
KR7003540002 1.028
(0.68)
1.119
(0.93)
1.186
(0.67)
1,157
(0.38)
1.071
(0.13)
KR7005740002 1.059
(1.52)
1.184
(1.37)
1.244
(0.91)
1.195
(0.44)
1.096
(0.16)
Insurance KR7000810002 1.154
(4.00)*
1.316
(2.37)
1.220
(0.74)
1.346
(0.80)
1.334
(0.60)
KR7000060004 1.039
(0.86)
1.025
(0.18)
0.977
(-0.09)
0.887
(-0.27)
0.751
(-0.45)
KR7000540005 1.078
(1.88)
1.058
(0.41)
0.983
(-0.06)
0.990
(-0.02)
0.935
(0.11)
KR7003690005 1.128
(3.54)*
1.213
(1.86)
1.220
(0.79)
1.206
(0.53)
1.160
(0.27)
Basic Metal Industries KR7005490008 1.130
(3.23)*
0.981
(-0.15)
0.875
(-0.41)
0.945
(-0.12)
0.948
(-0.10)
Machinery KR7000200006 0.965
(-0.88)
0.916
(-0.68)
0.846
(-0.53)
0.806
(-0.96)
0.705
(-0.55)
Electricity KR7015760002 1.125
(3.61)*
1.062
(0.57)
0.913
(-0.29)
0.757
(-0.61)
0.671
(-0.66)
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Communication KR7017670001 1.199 1.229 1.228 1.265 1.228
(5.57)* (1,82) (0.84) (0.64) (0.40)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.062 0.995 0,893 0.922 0.932
(1.61) (-0.04) (-0.38) (-0.20) (-0.12)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 1.051 1.025 0.974 1.035 0.988
(1.21) (0.18) (-0.10) (0.09) (-0.02)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007I90002 1.043 1.106 0.993 0.915 0.832
(1.08) (0.85) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-0.29)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 1.013 1.034 1.037 1.005 0.945
(0.29) (0.27) (0.13) (0.01) (-0.09)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.117 1.074 1.063 1.157 1.149
(2.67)* (0.56) (0.23) (0.35) (0.32)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z($)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parentheses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 486) distribution of 2.57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0
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Table 7.9 Variance Ratio Tests for Period 4 (25 November 1996 -  1 March 1998)
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code q = 2 q = 6 q = 12 q = 18 q = 24
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 1.316
(9.16)
1.997
(9.40)*
2.354
(7.04)
3.008
(6.06)
3.116
(4.62)
KR7005180005 1.306
(7.60)
2.049
(8.49)*
2.816
(7.00)
3.207
(5.46)
3.238
(4.03)
KR7005300009 1.094
(2.42)
1.095
(0.81)
0.989
(-0.05)
0.996
(-0.01)
1.154
(0.31)
Textiles & 
Wearing Apparel
KR7002020006 1.140
(3.60)*
1.071
(0.60)
0.946
(-0.22)
0.856
(-0.37)
0.907
(-0.18)
KR7001460005 0.954
(-1.15)
0.699
(-2.42)
0.623
(-1.40)
0.592
(-0.92)
0.533
(-0.76)
KR7004460002 1.201
(6.07)*
1.249
(2.22)
1.061
(0.27)
0.917
(-0.23)
0.960
(-0.08)
KR7003240009 0.945
(-1.27)
0.677
(-2.43)
0.541
(-1.42)
0.490
(-1.09)
0.495
(-0.81)
Chemicals & 
Chemical Products
KR7009830001 1.208
(5.44)*
1.474
(3.96)
1.413
(1.67)
1.394
(1.00)
1.265
(0.51)
KR7005950001 1.099
(2.37)
1.247
(1.93)
1.024
(0.09)
0.954
(-0.11)
0.960
(-0.07)
KR7003550001 1.148
(3.36)*
0.898
(-0.77)
0.843
(-0.60)
0.843
(-0.38)
0.881
(-0.21)
KR7011780004 1.187
(5.60)*
1.543
(4.94)
1.455
(2.09)
1.490
(1.43)
1.601
(1.22)
KR7003600004 1.093
(2.18)
0.965
(-0.29)
0.863
(-0.55)
0.899
(-0.24)
0.982
(-0.03)
KR7010950004 1.243
(6.74)*
1,676
(5,98)
1.934
(3.83)
1.997
(2.71)
2.137
(2.27)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.359
(9,51)*
2.023
(8.85)
2.725
(7.07)
2.977
(5.33)
3.002
(3.86)
KR7001060003 1.192
(4.94)*
1.177
(1.47)
1.267
(1.05)
1.215
(0.56)
1.229
(0.44)
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products
KR7002000008 1.115
(2.60)*
1.096
(0.69)
1.029
(0.11)
0.970
(-0.07)
0.922
(-0.14)
Electrical & 
Electronic Products
KR7005 930003 1.262
(6.84)*
1.255
(2.17)
1.301
(1.25)
1.475
(1.19)
1.595
(1.14)
KR7002610004 1.136
(3.31)*
1.021
(0.16)
0.915
(-0.33)
0.863
(-0.33)
0.929
(-0.12)
KR7007410004 1.158
(3.93)*
1.094
(0.77)
1.086
(0.34)
1.103
(0.26)
1.185
(0.34)
KR7001830009 1.336
(8.42)*
1.779
(6.23)
1.977
(3.74)
2.225
(3.00)
2.367
(2.43)
KR7006400006 1.265
(7.58)*
1.298
(2.76)
1.249
(1.07)
1.442
(1.23)
1.650
(1.32)
KR7009150004 1.236
(5.90)*
1.277
(2.31)
1.231
(0.89)
1.250
(0.37)
1.406
(0.73)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.211
(5.43)*
1.102
(0.83)
0.871
(-0.50)
0.808
(-0.51)
0.817
(-0.35)
KR7000270009 1.159 0.999 0.814 0.749 0.747
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Construction 
Wholesale Trade
Banks
Securities
Insurance
Basic Metal Industries
Machinery
Electricity
(4.20)* (-0.01) (-0.72) (-0.64) (-0.48)
KR7003620002 1.127 1.147 1.125 1.108 1.059
(2.90)* (1.05) (0.45) (0.26) (0.10)
KR7008400004 1.256 1.637 1.905 2.018 2.035
(6.22)* (4.79) (3.43) (2.52) (1.83)
KR7005790001 1.255 2.075 2.700 2.862 2.517
(7.53) (10.07)* (6.96) (4.84) (3.01)
KR7000720003 1.167 1.296 1.183 1.046 0.923
(4.24)* (2.33) (0.72) (0.12) (-0.15)
KR7000280008 1.169 1.230 1.215 1.161 1.083
(4.65)* (2.07) (0.88) (0.43) (0.16)
KR7000210005 1.175 1.211 1.260 1.305 1.349
(4.48)* (1.74) (1.01) (0.80) (0.65)
KR7003810009 1.212 1.233 1.075 1.010 1.002
(5.35)* (2.01) (0.30) (0.03) (0.00)
KR7000830000 1.121 1.066 0.935 0.874 0.883
(3.04)* (0.57) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.22)
KR7001120005 1.123 1.001 0.844 0.764 0.771
(3.03)* (0.07) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.42)
KR7004060000 1.273 1.691 1.814 2.020 2.124
(7.21)* (5.80) (3.43) (2.65) (2.17)
KR7015580004 1.101 0.846 0.527 0.454 0.432
(2.76)* (-1.36) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-1.07)
KR7000010009 1.053 0.878 0.701 0.650 0.644
(1.28) (-0.96) (-0.06) (-0.86) (-0.58)
KR7000030007 1.112 1.087 1.004 0.846 0.780
(2.81)* (0.72) (0.02) (-0.37) (-0.38)
KR7008890006 1.084 0.962 0.930 0.865 0.858
(2.22) (-0.34) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.27)
KR7005020003 1.068 0.880 0.697 0.787 0.836
(1.68) (-0.98) (-1.26) (-0.59) (-0.32)
KR7006800007 1.163 1.338 1.425 1.506 1.541
(3.78)* (2.61) (1.62) (1.23) (0.94)
KR7003 540002 1.184 1.412 1.268 1.318 1.328
(4.44)* (3.24) (1.03) (0.80) (0.60)
KR7005740002 1.173 1.426 1.579 1.650 1.646
(4.11)* (3.33)* (2.14)* (1.60) (1.13)
KR7000810002 1.312 1.442 1.220 1.209 1.227
(8.27)* (3.81) (0.88) (0.56) (0.44)
KR7000060004 1.179 1.256 1.251 1.250 1.211
(4.20)* (2.01) (0.98) (0.59) (0.39)
KR7000540005 1.175 1.357 1.427 1.326 1.265
(4.39)* (2.91) (1.63) (0.80) (0.50)
KR7003690005 1.109 0.854 0,773 0.734 0.713
(2.72)* (-1.25) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-0.54)
KR7005490008 1.058 0.840 0.647 0.621 0.636
(1.52) (-1.39) (-1.24) (-0.94) (-0.68)
KR7000200006 1.163 1.072 1.065 1.080 1.162
(3.76)* (0.58) (0.23) (0.19) (0.28)
KR7015760002 1.057 0.848 0,745 0.792 0.903
(1.56) (-1.41) (-1.05) (-0.58) (-0.20)
Communication KR7017670001 1.145 1.055 0.845 0.810 0.829
(3.56)* (0.46) (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.32)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.233 1.353 1.365 1.214 1.275
(6.04)* (3.02) (1.47) (0.54) (0.52)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 1.205 1.682 2.006 2.125 2.037
(5.43) (5.76)* (4.12) (2.94) (2.05)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007190002 1.203 1.390 1.455 1.616 1.798
(4.71)* (2.92) (1.63) (1.46) (1.38)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 1.093 1.122 0.850 0.781 0.729
(2.19) (0.81) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.44)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.191 1.328 1.346 1.487 1.668
(5.04)* (2.85) (1.49) (1.32) (1.32)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z(q)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parendieses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 366) distribution of 2,57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0
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Table 7.10 Variance Ratio Tests for New Period 4 (25 November 1996 -  
31 October 1997) Excluded the Korean Financial Market Crisis
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code q = 2 q = 6 q = 12 q = 18 q = 24
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 1.101
(2.49)
1.278
(1.48)
1.087
(0.21)
0.996
(-0.01)
0.980
(-0.03)
KR7005180005 1.105
(2.22)
1.240
(1.45)
1.283
(0.73)
1.237
-0.380
1.374
-0.440
KR7005300009 0.957
(-1.00)
0.790
(-1.29)
0.591
(-1.47)
0.557
(-0.83)
0.610
(-0.57)
Textiles & 
Wearing Apparel
KR7002020006 1.001
(0.02)
1.042
(0.25)
0.820
(-0.53)
0.657
(-0.63)
0.707
(-0.34)
KR7001460005 0.925
(-1.47)
0.687
(-2.26)
0.565
(-1.22)
0.523
(-0.77)
0.514
(-0.51)
KR7004460002 0.884
(-1.89)
0.689
(-2.00)
0.717
(-0.94)
0.739
(-0.36)
0.773
(-0.24)
KR7003240009 0.925
(-1.60)
0.729
(-1.67)
0.554
(-1.32)
0.490
(-0.90)
0.528
(-0.56)
Chemicals & 
Chemical Products
KR7009830001 0.940
(-1.35)
0.791
(-1.32)
0.764
(-0.58)
0.691
(-0.49)
0.583
(-0.53)
KR7005950001 0.974
(-0.43)
0.978
(-0.13)
0.854
(-0.39)
0.760
(-0.43)
0.804
(-0.28)
KR7003550001 1.014
(0.27)
0.838
(-0.92)
0.629
(-1.00)
0.566
(-0.72)
0.584
(-1.52)
KR7011780004 1.057
(1.38)
0.762
(-1.57)
0.567
(-1.09)
0.457
(-0.91)
0.463
(-0.64)
KR7003600004 1.138
(2.94)*
1.203
(1.25)
1.012
(0.03)
1.100
(0.14)
1.209
(0.23)
KR7010950004 0.988
(-0.27)
1.057
(0.32)
0.964
(-0.09)
0.852
(-0.26)
0.723
(-0.35)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.186
(3.88)*
1.209
(1.36)
1.211
(0.58)
1.061
(0.11)
1.010
(0.01)
KR7001060003 1.112
(2.29)
1.180
(1.09)
1.105
(0.30)
0.864
(-0.25)
0.830
(-0.22)
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products
KR7002000008 1.140
(2.60)*
1.280
(1.61)
1.191
(0.56)
1.154
(0.30)
1.179
(0.23)
Electrical & 
Electronic Products
KR7005 930003 1.267
(5.93)*
1.430
(3.27)
1.230
(0.68)
1.370
(0.66)
1.434
(0.54)
KR7002610004 1.101
(2.15)
1.137
(0.89)
1.122
(0.36)
1.195
(0.34)
1.289
(0.31)
KR7007410004 1.065
(1.38)
1.018
(0.12)
0.859
(-0.41)
0.839
(-0.25)
0.981
(-0.02)
KR7001830009 1.146
(3.00)*
1.178
(1.10)
1.148
(0.42)
1.041
(0.06)
0.974
(-0.03)
KR7006400006 1.171
(4.10)*
1.228
(1.45)
0.768
(-0.74)
0.758
(-0.41)
0.779
(-0.27)
KR7009150004 1.088
(1.81)
1.036
(0.23)
0.972
(-0.08)
1.078
(0.14)
1.213
(0.22)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.123
(2.35)
1.117
(0.74)
0.931
(-0.20)
0.939
(-0.10)
0.927
(-0.09)
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KR7000270009 1.132
(3.29)*
1.264
(1.98)
0.986
(-0.05)
0.956
(-0.09)
0.971
(-0.05)
KR7003620002 1.076
(1.43)
0.994
(-0.03)
0.822
(-0.48)
0.710
(-0.53)
0.620
(-0.48)
KR7008400004 1.161
(3.35)*
1.381
(2.24)
1.416
(1.17)
1.352
(0.58)
1.243
(0.30)
KR7005790001 0.977
(-0.53)
0.861
(-0.93)
0.712
(-0.75)
0.625
(-0.75)
0.632
(-0.40)
Construction KR700072Q003 1.173
(3.40)*
1.157
(0.88)
1.010
(0.03)
0.994
(-0.01)
0.936
(-0.07)
KR7000280008 1.222
(4.96)*
1.217
(1.42)
1.093
(0.28)
0.994
(-0.01)
0.858
(-0.16)
KR7000210005 1.033
(0.62)
0.863
(-0.78)
0.708
(-0.74)
0.563
(-0.70)
0.491
(-0.59)
Wholesale Trade KR7003810009 1.114
(2.33)
1.066
(0.45)
0.866
(-0.37)
0.809
(-0.31)
0.820
(-0.23)
KR7000830000 1.033
(0.69)
0.991
(-0.06)
0.789
(-0.06)
0.776
(-0.39)
0.739
(-0.33)
KR7001120005 1.140
(2.64)*
1.137
(0.81)
0.824
(-0.42)
0.734
(-0.46)
0.754
(-0.30)
KR7004060000 1.080
(1.51)
0.874
(-0.71)
0.747
(-0.70)
0.618
(-0.62)
0.586
(-0.56)
Banks KR7015580004 1.032
(0.72)
0.800
(-1.27)
0.604
(-0.97)
0.543
(-0.80)
0.543
(-0.66)
KR7000010009 1.067
(1.29)
1.034
(0.20)
1.021
(0.06)
0.970
(-0.06)
1.030
(0.03)
KR7000030007 1.105
(2.03)
1.016
(0.09)
1.038
(0.11)
1.016
(0.03)
1.081
(0.10)
KR7008890006 0.949
(-0.90)
0.716
(-1.54)
0.658
(-0.86)
0.585
(-0.83)
0.519
(-0.52)
KR7005020003 0.981
(-0.33)
0.786
(-1.25)
0.674
(-0.92)
0.693
(-0.50)
0.701
(-0.35)
Securities KR7006800007 1.119
(2.07)
1.349
(2.04)
1.495
(1.51)
1.676
(1.20)
1.837
(1.10)
KR7003540002 1.049
(0.83)
1.018
(0.06)
1.018
(0.06)
1.027
(0.05)
1.060
(0.07)
KR7005740002 1.086
(1.47)
1.336
(1.52)
1.508
(1.52)
1.617
(1.15)
1.701
(0,91)
Insurance KR7000810002 1.220
(4.92)*
1.317
(1.80)
0.801
(-0.52)
0.698
(-0.50)
0.668
(-0.47)
KR7000060004 1.078
(1.42)
1.101
(0.58)
0.876
(-0.33)
0.743
(-0.42)
0.722
(-0.32)
KR7000540005 1.010
(0.21)
0.897
(-0.58)
0.783
(-0.51)
0.754
(-0.38)
0.686
(-0.41)
KR7003690005 1.018
-0.390
0.854
(-0.91)
0.729
(-0.68)
0.666
(-0.58)
0.579
(-0.58)
Basic Metal Industries KR7005490008 1.060
(1.47)
1.067
(0.43)
0.723
(-0.67)
0.705
(-0.59)
0.793
(-0.21)
Machinery KR7000200006 1.082
(1.73)
1.173
(1.20)
1.312
(0.93)
1.435
(0.77)
1.594
(0.75)
Electricity KR7015760002 0.962
(-0.84)
0.885
(-0.74)
0.802
(-0.52)
0.883
(-0.22)
1.013
(0.02)
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Communication KR7017670001 1.121 1.137 0.929 0.971 1.022
(2.21) (0.81) (-0.16) (-0.05) (0.03)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.088 0.936 0.791 0.804 0.880
(1-79) (-0.43) (-0.58) (-0.36) (-0.13)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 1.035 1.074 1.042 0.859 0.759
(0.65) (0.46) (0.10) (-0.23) (-0.28)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007190002 1.065 0.984 0.905 0.784 0.778
(1.30) (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-0.30)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 0.990 1.032 0.739 0.670 0.673
(-0.21) (0.17) (-0.70) (-0.56) (-0.42)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.076 1.208 0.918 0.895 0.907
(1.65) (1.43) (-0.27) (-0.18) (-0.11)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z(</)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parentheses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 273) distribution of 2.57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0
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Table 7.11 Variance Ratio Tests for Period 5 (2 March 1998 -  5 December 1998)
Industry Company Aggregation interval
code q ~ 2 q = 6 q = 12 q = 18 q = 24
Foods & Beverage KR7000140004 1.026
(0.47)
0.765
(-1.27)
0.708
(-0.77)
0.729
(-0.50)
0.728
(-0.31)
KR7005180005 1.035
(0.67)
0.974
(-0.13)
0.975
(-0.06)
0.975
(-0.04)
0.770
(-0.30)
KR7005300009 0.980
(-0.40)
0.969
(-0.21)
0.990
(-0.03)
1.114
(0.27)
1.095
(0.11)
Textiles & 
Wearing Apparel
KR7002020006 1.050
(0.97)
0.878
(-0.59)
0.799
(-0.64)
0.861
(-0.24)
0.834
(-0.21)
KR7001460005 0.932
(-1.22)
0.742
(-1.32)
0.858
(-0.35)
1.004
(0.01)
1.099
(0.10)
KR7004460002 1.221
(4.00)*
1.307
(1.77)
0,984
(-0.04)
1.026
(0.04)
1.062
(0.07)
KR7003240009 1.040
(0.81)
0.867
(-0.73)
0.625
(-0.89)
0.630
(-0.73)
0.619
(-0.43)
Chemicals & 
Chemical Products
KR7009830001 1.151
(3.10)*
1.183
(1.03)
1.085
(0.22)
1.337
(0.51)
1.501
(0.52)
KR7005950001 1.063
(1.16)
0.793
(-1.09)
0.652
(-1.04)
0.697
(-0.52)
0.742
(-0.28)
KR7003550001 1.103
(1.82)
0.973
(-0.13)
0.788
(-0.48)
0.820
(-0.26)
0.840
(-0.16)
KR7011780004 0.852
(-3.45)*
0.782
(-1.27)
0.615
(-0.90)
0.608
(-0.61)
0.651
(-0.41)
KR7003600004 0.811
(-4.32)*
0.755
(-1.34)
0.735
(-0.58)
0.749
(-0.36)
0.779
(-0.24)
KR7010950004 1.064
(1.04)
0.983
(-0.08)
0.988
(-0.03)
1.046
(0.08)
1.123
(0.15)
Medicine KR7000020008 1.094
(1.79)
1.393
(2.35)
1.699
(1.75)
1.950
(1.81)
1.953
(1.33)
KR7001060003 1.110
(2.09)
0.956
(-0.23)
0.802
(-0.49)
0,773
(-0.42)
0.622
(-0.46)
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products
KR7002000008 0.951
(-1.01)
0.839
(-0.73)
0.708
(-0.67)
0.785
(-0.31)
0.802
(-0.29)
Electrical & 
Electronic Products
KR7005 930003 1.203
(3.14)*
1.163
(0.99)
1.005
(0.01)
1.199
(0.28)
1.250
(0.31)
KR7002610004 1.062
(1.10)
0.942
(-0.26)
0.737
(-0.65)
0.744
(-0.40)
0.707
(-0.29)
KR7007410004 0.980
(-0,42)
0.823
(-0.83)
0.551
(-0.99)
0.541
(-0.73)
0.529
(-0.47)
KR7001830009 1.185
(3.38)*
0.989
(-0.07)
0.910
(-0.25)
0.935
(-0.12)
0.958
(-0.06)
KR7006400006 1.129
(2.27)
1.237
(1.20)
1.132
(0.32)
1.312
(0.47)
1.316
(0.36)
KR7009150004 1.032
(0.59)
1.038
(0.19)
0.791
(-0.48)
0.901
(-0.15)
0.888
(-0.12)
Transport Equipment KR7005380001 1.121
(2.36)
0.907
(-0.43)
0.658
(-0.68)
0.595
(-0.63)
0.597
(-0.48)
KR7000270009 1.200 1.580 0.145 1.494 1.751
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(3.75)* (3.01) (1.26) (0.86) (0.91)
KR7003620002 1.124
(2.24)
1.132
(0.64)
1.101
(0.22)
1.095
(0.15)
1.130
(0.16)
KR7008400004 1.173
(3.04)*
1.269
(1.37)
0.916
(-0.21)
0.872
(-0.20)
0.945
(-0.07)
KR7005790001 0.970
(-0.52)
0.786
(-1.05)
0.813
(-0.49)
0.827
(-0.30)
0.851
(-0.18)
Construction KR7000720003 0,849
(-2.51)
0.719
(-1.32)
0.763
(-0.57)
0.897
(-0.17)
1.011
(0.01)
KR7000280008 1.263
(5.16)*
1.280
(1.64)
1.069
(0.19)
1.082
(0.14)
1.101
(0.12)
KR7000210005 1.070
(1.12)
0.967
(-0.15)
0.868
(-0.32)
0.986
(-0.02)
1.117
(0.14)
Wholesale Trade KR7003810009 0.912
(-1.45)
0.807
(-0.94)
0.660
(-0.81)
0.612
(-0.61)
0.581
(-0.44)
KR7000830000 0.930
(-1.23)
0.833
(-0.69)
0.858
(-0.30)
0.890
(-0.18)
0.861
(-0.16)
KR7001120005 1.093
(1.53)
1.057
(0.29)
1.122
(0.26)
1.286
(0.49)
1.415
(0.53)
KR7004060000 1.050
(0.87)
0.919
(-0.41)
0.783
(-0.52)
0.816
(-0.34)
0.868
(-0.15)
Banks KR7015580004 1.019
(0.35)
1.108
(0.50)
1.192
(0.50)
1.233
(0.39)
1.226
(0.24)
KR7000010009 1.041
(1.06)
1.079
(0.37)
1.181
(0.53)
1.336
(0.60)
1.385
(0.55)
KR7000030007 1.122
(2.18)
1.263
(1.43)
1.299
(0.79)
1.428
(0.81)
1.464
(0.62)
KR7008890006 1.101
(1.86)
1.098
(0.51)
1.115
(0.29)
1.252
(0.42)
1.205
(0.25)
KR7005020003 0.949
(-2.02)
0.870
(-0.72)
0.804
(-0.52)
0.834
(-0.33)
0.870
(-0.15)
Securities KR7006800007 1.006
(0.10)
0.997
(-0.02)
0.752
(-0.55)
0.829
(-0.30)
0.828
(-0.21)
KR7003540002 1.113
(1.92)
1.123
(0.66)
1.215
(0.52)
1.456
(0.78)
1.502
(0.63)
KR7005740002 1.049
(0.84)
1.128
(0.68)
1.168
(0.38)
1.331
(0.56)
1.320
(0.38)
Insurance KR7000810002 1.041
(0.81)
0.975
(-0.14)
0.824
(-0.49)
0.922
(-0.13)
0,923
(-0.13)
KR7000060004 1.062
(1.25)
1.128
(0.74)
1.175
(0.45)
1,261
(0.45)
1.344
(0.48)
KR7000540005 1.030
(0.50)
1.151
(0.79)
1.161
(0.37)
1.186
(0.31)
1.135
(0.18)
KR7003690005 1.032
(0.50)
0.939
(-0.37)
1.085
(0.22)
1.131
(0.20)
1.144
(0.17)
Basic Metal Industries KR7005490008 1.021
(0.47)
0.953
(-0.25)
0.813
(-0.44)
0.997
(-0.01)
0.994
(-0.01)
Machinery KR7000200006 0.948
(-0.87)
0.759
(-0.90)
0.576
(-0.92)
0.631
(-0.53)
0.613
(-0.43)
Electricity KR7015760002 0.899
(-2.05)
0.708
(-1.43)
0.456
(-1.50)
0.470
(-0.88)
0.579
(-0.45)
Communication KR7017670001 0.992 0.806 0.694 0.781 0.823
(-0.18) (-1.33) (-0.87) (-0.35) (-0.18)
Air Transport KR7003490000 1.026 0.859 0.833 0.982 1.051
(0.38) (-0.68) (-0.39) (-0.04) (0.05)
Rubber & Plastics KR7001150002 0.939 0.831 0.821 0.943 1.029
(-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.48) (-0.10) (0.04)
Paper & Paper Products KR7007190002 1.216 1.290 1.109 1.081 1.105
(3.87)* (1.58) (0.27) (0.12) (0.12)
Fabricated Metal Products KR7006570006 1.065 0.990 0.978 1.107 1.140
(1.41) (-0.06) (-0.06) (0.16) (0.19)
Retail Trade KR7004170007 1.033 0.994 0.906 1.005 1.004
(0.61) (-0.03) (-0.24) (0.01) (0.00)
For each company and each aggregation interval the table reports the estimated variance ratio together 
with the Lo and MacKinlay Z(<7)* statistics under the heteroscedasticity assumption in parentheses.
* indicates where the maximum absolute value in the set of tests statistics exceeds the .05 critical 
value of the SMM (0.05; 5; 231) distribution of 2.57 and hence the variance ratio is significantly 
different from 1.0
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Table 7.12 Average Variance Ratios
Aggregation interval
<7 = 2 <7 = 6 <7=12 # = 1 8  q -  24
Period 1
1.086
(0.070)
1.155
(0.239)
1.146
(0.335)
1.184
(0.392)
1.196
(0.436)
Period 2
1.110
(0.103)
1.169
(0.317)
1.160
(0.460)
1.171
(0.540)
1.191
(0.593)
Period 3
1.046
(0.071)
1.019
(0.149)
0.931
(0.184)
0.931
(0.203)
0.881
(0.215)
Period 4
1.169
(0.085)
1.250
(0.355)
1.246
(0.533)
1.273
(0.642)
1.297
(0.650)
Period 4 excluding crisis
1.068
(0.081)
1.044
(0.190)
0.914
(0.232)
0.874
(0.271)
0.855
(0.307)
Period 5
1.046
(0.097)
0.994
(0.190)
0.892
(0.247)
0.989
(0.282)
1.014
(0.304)
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the cross section of variance ratios. They provide an 
indication of the cross-sectional dispersion of the variance ratios but, since the variance ratios are not 
cross-sectionally independent, these standard deviations cannot be used to carry out the usual 
significance tests.
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Table 7.13 Results Summary; The Heteroscedastic Random Walk Null Hypothesis
Price limits Number which reject
Proportion 
which accept
Period 1 Range from ± 2.0% to ±6.7% 33 40.0%
Period 2 Range from ±2.0% to ±6.7% 31 43.6%
Period 3 ±6% 15 72.7%
Period 4 ±8% 44 20.0%
Period 4 excluding crisis* ±8% 12 78.2%
Period 5 ±12% 10 81.8%
* Excluding the period from one month before the IMF bail-out to the end of the subperiod, November 
1997 -  February 1998.
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Appendix 7.1 GAUSS Program for Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variance Ratio 
Test
r k ' k ' k ' k ' £ r ' k * k - k - k J c - k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k : - k ' k ' k ‘k - k ' ' k l c ' k
File: Vratio.p
H e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y - c o n s i s t e n t  V a r i a n c e  R a t i o  T e s t
This version: 4th June 1998.
Written by Hyun-Jung Ryoo 
h p 6 @ s o a s .ac.uk
load p []= a :samselc.dat; /*** data file ***/
output file=a:samselc.out reset; 
format /ml /ldn 16,4;
^ & i c i c & & ^ ^ ^ & ^ ^ ^ & ^ ^ ^ & ^ ^ & ^ ' k ' f c ' 3 e ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k mk ' k ' k ' k ' k , ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' & ' i r ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k ' k
P [1:rows(p),1]=log(p[1:rows(P),1]);
R=P[2:rows(P)]- P [1:rows(P)-1]; 
q=2;
proc(3)=VRATIO (p,r,q); /*** name of the procedure ***/
local
mu,ssa,sa,devone,dev,sc,vr,psione,psitwo,psi,k, thone, thtwo,th,psista 
r;
MU=(P[rows(P)]- P [1])/(rows(P)-1);
SSA=R[1:rows(P > —1] '*R[l:rows(P)—1];
SA=SSA/ (rows (P) -2) ;
DEVONE=(P[q+1:rows(P)]- P [1:rows(P)-q])-q*MU*ones(rows(P)-q,1); 
DEV=DEVONE'*DEVONE;
SC=DEV/(q*(rows(P)-q)*(1-(q/(rows(P)-1) ) ) ) ;
VR=SC/SA; /*** variance ratio ***/
Homoscedasticity-consistent variance ratio statistic
PSIONE=(rows(p)-l)A (l/2)*(VR-1);
PSITWO=( (2*((2*q)-l)* (q-1)) / (3*q) )A (1/2) ;
PSI=PSIONE/PSITWO; /*** PSI statistic ***/
H e t e r o s c e d s t i c i t y - c o n s i s t e n t  v a r i a n c e  r a t i o  s t a t i s t i c  
k=l;
do until k>(q-l);
th=4*(1-k/q)A2*(rows(P)-1)/ssaA2*
((R[k+1:rows(P)-1]-MU*ones(rows(P)-l-k,l))A2 ) '*
( R [ 1 : r o w s ( P ) —1 —k ] - M U * o n e s ( r o w s ( P ) - 1 - k ,  1 ) ) A2 ; 
k=k+l; 
e n d o ;
PSISTAR=(rows(P)-1)A (1/2)*(VR-1)/THA (-1/2); /***PSI(*)statistic ***/ 
retp(vr,psi,psistar);
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endp;
(vr,psi,psistar}=VRATIO (p,r,q);
print;"< samselc >"; 
print;" (q=2)";
print;; "VR ";;VR;"PSI ";;PSI;"PSI* ”;;PSISTAR;
Lag(q)=6 
{vr,psi,psistar}=VRATIO (p,r,6); 
print;11 (q=6) " ;
print;;"VR ";;VR;"PSI ";;PSI;"PSI* ";;PSISTAR; 
/ '
Lag(q)=12 
{vr,psi,psistar}=VRATIO(p,r, 12) ; 
print;"(q=12)";
print;;"VR ";;VR;"PSI ";;PSI;"PSI* " ;;PSISTAR;
Lag(q)=18 
{vr,psi,psistar}=VRATIO (p,r,18); 
print;" (q=18)";
print;;"VR ";;VR;"PSI ";;PSI;"PSI* ";;PSISTAR;
f"
Lag(q)=24 
{vr,psi,psistar}=VRATIO (p,r,24}; 
print;" (q=2 4 )";
print;;"VR ";;VR;"PSI ";;PSI;"PSI* ";;PSISTAR;
'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k
''k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'b'k'k
output off;
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8 The Impact of Stock Index Futures on the Korean 
Stock Market
8.1 Introduction
Stock index futures are perceived as one of the most successful financial innovations 
of the 1980s. Trading in them was first introduced in February 1982 by the Kansas 
City Board o f Trade in the US and other developed markets soon followed. In the 
Pacific Basin, for example, a futures contract based on the Australian All Ordinaries 
Index started trading on the Sydney Futures Exchange in February 1983. Index 
futures were listed in Hong Kong in May 1986 and in Singapore four months later. 
New Zealand followed in January 1987 when Barclays Share Price Index Futures 
were listed on the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange. Trading in Nikkei 
225 Index Futures were introduced on the Osaka Securities Exchange in September 
1988 (see Table 8.1). In contrast, much of the futures trading in emerging markets is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Although Korea is one of the fastest growing emerging 
markets, it was not until 3 May 1996 that a futures contract based on the Korea Stock 
Price Index 200 (KOSPI 200) was introduced on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). 
Trading in these stock index futures has grown remarkably. By the end of 1998, 
average daily trading volume was 61,279 contracts (value 1.39 million won). 
According to FIBV (1999), by December 1998 the stock index futures market in
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Korea had become the second largest in the world in terms of average trading volume, 
after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
The impact of derivative trading on spot price volatility has been widely 
investigated for developed markets. For stock index futures, research has focused on 
comparing spot price volatility in periods before and after the introduction of futures 
(for example; Edwards, 1988; Harris, 1989b; and Antoniou and Holmes, 1995). In 
particular, one of the primary concerns of previous studies has been the issue of 
whether futures trading destabilises the underlying spot market. Although some 
studies find increased volatility, the weight of the empirical evidence shows no 
increase in volatility following the introduction of trading in stock index futures. 
Among others, Freris (1990) examines the impact effect of Hang Seng Index Futures 
on the behaviour of the Hang Seng Index using data for the period from 1984 to 1987 
and finds that the introduction of stock index futures trading had no measurable effect 
on the volatility o f the stock price index. Lee and Ohk (1992) examine the effect of 
introducing index futures trading on stock market volatility in Australia, Hong Kong, 
Japan, the UK and the US using daily index data for periods of approximately four 
years spanning the start of trade in index futures. They find that for the three largest 
markets, return volatility increased significantly after the stock index futures were 
listed on the underlying index, but for the Australian market there was no significant 
difference and stock return volatility actually decreased in Hong Kong. Using 
international portfolios, they further found that although the creation of stock index 
futures generally exerts a volatility-increasing influence on the behaviour of cash 
market stock returns, it makes the stock market relatively more efficient because 
volatility shocks are more quickly assimilated in that market. Kamara, Miler and 
Siegel (1992) investigate the effect of futures trading on the S&P 500 on the stability
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of the underlying index. Their results suggest that, although the volatility of monthly 
returns remained unchanged, the volatility o f daily returns in the post-futures period
was higher than in the pre-futures period,
S' IJ VJV'* °
A group of papersyfocus on extreme volatility. Becketti and Sellon (1989)
i/"
distinguish normal volatility and jump volatility. The former refers to the ordinary ups 
and downs in stock prices and the latter to occasional and sudden extreme changes in 
prices, such as the market collapse in October 1987. They find no evidence of an 
increase in normal volatility in the 1980s although there is some evidence that jump 
volatility did increase. Further evidence is provided by Becketti and Roberts (1990). 
Their empirical findings on the introduction of the S&P 500 stock index futures in 
1982 suggest that there is little or no relationship between stock market volatility and 
either the existence of, or the level of activity in, the stock index futures market. 
Darrat and Rahman (1995) also focus on jump volatility which is based on a method 
for identifying outliers. Using Granger causality tests on stationary series, they find 
that trading of S&P500 futures does not cause volatility in stock prices. Schwert 
(1990) finds little evidence that the introduction of stock index futures is associated 
with an upward trend in stock volatility except for the period from October 1987 to 
October 1989.
One of the important roles attributed to futures markets is that of 'price 
discovery’; that is, the futures market reflects new information before the spot market. 
If new market information disseminates in the futures market before the stock market, 
then the introduction of a futures market increases the amount of information 
reflected in the spot price. In brief, empirical evidence suggests that market 
information tends to disseminate in futures prices prior to, and at greater speed than, 
in the stock prices (see Kawalle, Koch and Koch, 1987, and Chan, 1992). This might
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be explained by the fact that trading futures has the advantages o f a highly liquid 
market, low transaction costs, easily available short positions, low margins and rapid 
execution. Thus, informed traders may find that they can act faster and at lower cost 
in the futures market than the cash, resulting in a lead-latd. relationship between I
lcJfutures and spot prices.
The lead-lag relation between movements of spot and futures prices has been 
widely investigated with the methods used varying across studies. For example, 
Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987), Abhyankar (1998) and Tang, Mak and Choi (1992) 
use modified/non-modifed granger causality tests. Whereas Wahab and Lashgari 
(1993), Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996) and Pizzi, Economopoulos and O’Neill 
(1998) use cointegration and error correction models. However, irrespective of 
methodology, the results can be summarised concisely; market information tends to 
disseminate in futures prices prior to, and at greater speed than, in stock prices.
Much of the extensive research including those papers discussed so far, 
focuses on developed markets (see Harris, 1989b; Morris, 1989; Yau, Schneeweiss 
and Yung, 1990; Bailey, 1991; and Hiraki, Maberly and Taube, 1998 for further 
details). Very little work has investigated the impact of stock index futures trading in 
emerging markets. This chapter contributes to this sparse literature; it is the first to 
examine the impact on the Korean spot market of trading in futures. It focuses on 
three aspects. First, the impact of futures trading on price volatility in the spot market 
is examined. Secondly, long-run equilibrium and short-run adjustment are discussed 
using tests of cointegration and causality. Thirdly, lead-lag relationships are analysed. 
This chapter differs from previous studies which use closing prices for futures and 
spot prices, by using data with matched closing times. This is desirable because in 
Korea trading in index futures and trading in stocks finish at different times. By using
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matched closing times, the comparison of nonsynchronous closing prices of the spot 
index and futures contract, which might lead to a significant source of error, is 
avoided.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the 
methodology. In section 8.3, we briefly introduce the KOSPI 200 futures contract and 
discuss the data. Results are presented and discussed in section 8.4. Finally, section 
8.5 provides conclusions.
8.2 Methodology
The impact of futures trading on price volatility in the underlying spot market index is 
examined by adopting the generalized ARCH (GARCH) process in which the 
conditional variance of u  at time t  is dependent not only on past squared 
disturbances but also on past conditional variances. Empirical evidence, for example, 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), Huang, Liu and Yang (1995) and Ryoo (1997), 
finds that returns in stock markets exhibit heteroscedasticity. Therefore, following 
Holmes (1996), a GARCH representation would seem to be an appropriate means by 
which to capture market-wide price volatility. Consider the model
Rs,: =  Cto +  C ti R p,t +  l i t  (8.1)
*/, I'P m ~ N (0 , ht) (8-2)
in which RSft is spot price returns, the change in the logarithm of the spot price index
in period t, Rp,t is returns on the market proxy variable (for which there is no
associated futures index), u, is an error term representing unexplained price changes 
and 4* is the information set available at time t .  Since the proxy variable covers 
market-wide influences on price changes, the error term captures the impact of factors
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specific to the market on which the futures contract is written and its variance 
provides a measure of market-wide price volatility
ht = ao + a in t i  + /? tht-i (8.3)
The impact o f new information or ‘news’ is captured by the coefficient a {. An 
increase in after the introduction of futures trading suggests news is impounded
into prices more rapidly, lin contrast, a fall in implies news is impounded more
/
slowly.
Engle and Bollerslev (1986) and Engle and Mustafa (1992) show for the 
GARCH(1,1) model, that the persistence of volatility shocks depends primarily on 
cci + Pi • Consequently, by estimating the model for the periods pre- and post-futures 
trading and comparing the parameters of the variance equations we are able to 
determine how futures trading impacts on volatility. An increase in ai + fi, following 
the introduction of futures trading indicates increased persistence of volatility shocks.
The Engle-Granger approach is used to test for the existence of a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between stock and futures prices based on the relationship
s t = ao + P 0f t  + Zt (8-4)
where s t and f t are the logarithms of contemporaneous spot and futures prices at 
time t and z t is the disequilibrium error, the deviation from long-run equilibrium.
Following Engle and Granger (1987), if both s t and f  t are cointegrated then 
they are generated by Error Correction Models (ECMs) of the form
n n
R i t ^ a i  + 'Z.Pij &■•-! +  H T u R t ‘-i +  Xi zu-i +  v«, (8.5)
]=1 J=1
and
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Rf.t = a2 + Y JP21 R p -j  +  R « -i +  z f-> +  vf  (8-6)
;=/ /=/
in which R Stl = s t - s t„n  Rj;t = / , - / N/, vf is a stationary disturbance and Zl-i the 
correction term. The ECMs are useful because short- and long-run effects are separate 
and both can be estimated. The coefficients on lagged returns in equations (8.5) and 
(8.6), p }. and f i 2j, represent the short-run elasticities of Rsj and R fJ with respect to
RfJ and R st respectively. The respective long-ain elasticities are obtained from 
cointegrating regressions. The coefficients on the disequilibrium errors, Xj and A,, 
measure the speed of adjustment of s t and f t respectively to the error in the previous 
period. With cointegration, at least one of the Xt. ^  0.
Using the ECMs, three casality tests, Granger (1969), Sims (1972), and 
Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983),granger.(1969)!, are carried out between the stock 
index spot and futures markets. While these testing procedures are theoretically 
equivalent, they are different in practice, because they must be estimated using finite 
parameterisations of the autoregression (for Granger), distributed lags (for Sims) and 
two-sided distributed lag augmented with lagged dependent variables^Jfor Geweke, 
Meese and Dent), which do not directly corresponded.
For example, in equation (8.5), if Xi is zero and all y t. are zero, then Rft
does not Granger cause R s t . The test equation is
00 00
Rs., = a, + 'EP,J R,.,.i +  2 X  Rp-j +  X, h '-i  +  Vs.! (8.7)
j = l  J = 1
with Ho: X j= 0 andy tJ = 0 for ally. Alternatively, the Sims test equation is
oo
R s,t= a i + 'Yj  7 u R f .n  Xi z s.t-i ^  v.t.( (8.8)
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and tests the null hypothesis, that is, H0: A/ = 0 an6 / ^  = 0 for ally < 0. Similarly, the 
Geweke, Meese and Dent test equation is
00 oO
R,.t=a,+^Pu R*‘-t+  Z  rv Rt'-t+  x> *’■'-<+  v«> 8^-9)j-t y=-«>
with H0: Xi = 0 and y If = 0 for ally < 0.
A lead-lag relation is described by the model
/= +  n
R1,, = a +  bi +  e, (8.10)
/  =  -  «
where R s t are spot index returns and R j:t are returns on futures. The coefficients 
with positive subscripts, b+i, are lead coefficients and those with negative subscripts, 
b-t, are lag coefficients. If the lead coefficients are significant, spot index returns lead 
futures whereas if the lag coefficients are significant, futures returns lead spot index 
returns. Both Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Chan (1992) have noted that computed 
raw returns may suffer from infrequent trading bias and so misleading results from 
equation (8.10). Consequently, the lead-lag relation is estimated using return 
innovations where the portion of spot index price changes due to infrequent trading of 
component stocks is filtered out.
8.3 The Data and Their Properties
The Korea Stock Price Index 200 (KOSPI 200) is the underlying stock index for 
traded futures and options contracts on the KSE. The KOSPI 200 is a sampled, 
constituent market capitalisation-weighted index that tracks the continuous price 
performance of 200 actively traded, large capitalisation common stocks listed on the 
KSE. These shares account for approximately 70 to 80 percent of domestic market
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capitalisation so that the index reflects the overall market performance. In order to 
avoid unintended bias, the constituent stocks are rigorously revised over time. The 
base figure was set at 100.00 as of 3 January 1990.
Trading of KOSPI 200 futures is implemented under an order-driven, 
continuous trading system. Since trading is executed through a computerised system 
there is no physical trading floor. KOSPI 200 futures expire four times a year, in 
March, June, September and December. The last trading day is the second Thursday 
of each contract month. One index point equals 500,000 Korean won and settlement 
of the contract is in cash. There are two trading sessions, morning and afternoon. 
Until 5 December 1998, both stock and stock index futures contracts were traded on 
weekdays between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. in the morning session. In the afternoon 
session, stocks were traded from 1:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. and index futures were 
traded between 1:00 p.m. and 3:15 p.m. except on the last day of each contract month, 
when futures trading closed at 2:50 p.m..27 On Saturdays, both stock and index 
futures were traded from 9:30 a.m. until 11:30 a.m. and 11:45 a.m., respectively. 
Since 7 December 1998. There has been no Saturday trading and the morning session 
for weekdays has been extended from 9:00 a.m. until mid-day.
With the introduction of stock index futures trading, there were daily price 
limits for futures contracts of ±5% of the previous trading day’s closing price. On 2 
March 1998 this was relaxed to ±7% and on 7 December 1998 to ±10%. There is also 
a system of circuit breakers. When the price of the previous trading day’s most active 
contract reaches ±5% of that day’s closing price for one minute, the trading of all 
futures contracts is halted for the next five minutes. Also, when the KOSPI continues
27 The last trading of each futures contract month is the second Thursday in March, June, September 
and December.
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(for one minute) to lose 10% or more of its value compared to the previous day’s 
closing price, futures trading is halted for twenty minutes. For the next ten minutes 
following the cooling-off period, orders are collected and then matched.
For our analyses, both daily and five-minute data are used. Actual daily 
closing and minute-by-minute data on KOSPI 200 and KOSPI 200 futures prices 
were obtained from the KSE. To examine the impact of futures trading on stock price 
volatility, daily closing price indices are used for the period beginning on 1 
September 1993 and ending on 28 December 1998. The pre-futures period to 2 May 
1996 consists of 785 observations and the post-futures period from 3 May 1996 has 
779 observations.
To estimate the GARCH model in equation (8.1), a market proxy variable is 
required. The stock price index chosen should reflect general, market-wide 
fluctuations and be less affected by price volatility specific to the cash market. 
Although there are several potential indices, only a few are available for the entire 
sample period. The Arithmetic Stock Price Average (ASAP), collected from Stocks 
published by the KSE, is used.
For tests of cointegration and causality and the analysis of lead-lag 
relationships, this thesis uses five-minute data from the start of futures trading on 
3 May 1996, to the end of December 1998. The data available from the KSE include 
minute-by-minute KOSPI 200 spot and futures series. Index futures data based on the 
nearby contract is used since this is the most active in terms o f trading volume. Five- 
minute data are generated in order to minimise the effects of the errors-in-the- 
variables problem induced by the use of nonsynchronous data. Also, the first five 
minutes of trading is excluded. There are two principal reasons for this. First, 
overnight returns are measured over a longer time period than five-minute returns.
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Secondly, the stale quote problem at the start of trading is avoided. If the calculated 
opening values for the stock index reflect mainly the closing price on the previous 
trading day, it is likely that stale prices are used in calculating the opening values of 
the spot index. Since spot market trading finishes 15 minutes earlier than futures 
market trading (except on the last trading day of each futures contract when the 
futures market closes 10 minutes earlier than spot market) our data are sampled by 
matching the closing times of the two markets. The five-minute, matched spot-fiitures 
series for the KOSPI 200 contains 35,087 observations: 8,751 in 1996, 13,054 in 
1997, and 13,282 in 1998.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 lnterday Returns
Table 8.2 provides descriptive statistics for daily KOSPI 200 spot returns for the 
entire, pre-futures and post-futures periods. For the entire and post-futures periods, 
the average daily return is negative in contrast to the pre-futures period when it is 
positive. Following the introduction of index futures the standard deviation of returns 
more than doubles. The third and fourth moments of daily returns series for all 
periods indicate that the empirical distributions are not normally distributed; they are 
skewed to the right and leptokurtic. This is also confirmed by the results of Jarque- 
Bera test of normality.28 Spot returns have significant autocorrelation coefficients in 
all periods.
28 The Jarque-Bera statistic is calculated as:
where T is the number of observations, S  represents skewness and K  is kurtosis.
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Initially, the extent to which the movement of stock prices has altered since 
the introduction of the KOSPI 200 futures is examined. One possible way to identify 
abnormally small or large values, stock price jumps, is to measure the frequency of 
changes outside a band. Those changes are identified as jumps because they are 
considered abnormal, exceptional changes. Following Becketti and Roberts (1990), 
and others, we identify jumps in stock returns as outliers and use the method 
discussed in Hoaglin, Iglewicz and Tukey (1986). This involves constaicting a band 
on a robust measure of the dispersion of price observations in the sample. 
Observations are defined as outliers or jumps if either they are less thanO ^-A i Dq 
or if they are greater than Ou + 1.5 £)Q, where 0 L and 0 {J denote the first and third 
quartiles in the data set and D q  = Qu~Ql1 the interquartile range. Using this
technique, a daily jump is defined as any day in which the KOSPI 200 rises more than 
0.0339% or falls below -0.0343%. Our results are reported in Table 8.3. Over the 
entire period, 7.29% of daily returns are jumps but they are not uniformly distributed 
through the period. When the sample is divided into pre- and post-fiitures periods, the 
results are particularly interesting. For the pre-fiitures period, only 0.26% of daily 
returns were jumps whereas, surprisingly, 14.38% of daily returns were jumps for the 
post-futures period; there is a much higher frequency of outliers in the post-futures 
period than in the pre-futures period. However, it is not clear that the futures market is 
responsible for this increase in jump volatility. One way to examine this is to examine 
whether outliers are more frequent when futures trading is active than when it is not. 
If stock index futures are a major source of jump volatility, then volatility should be 
high when the volume of futures trading is high, and low when the volume of futures 
trading is generally low.
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In order to examine the relationship between volume and volatility we first 
detrend futures trading volume. Following Andersen (1996), a trend component is 
estimated from which a ‘normal’ or expected volume series is derived. Each daily 
observation on futures trading volume is then divided by the ‘normal’ value for that 
day to obtain a detrended series. A two-month centred moving average is used to 
generate the ‘normal’ series. As expected given the method of normalisation, the 
mean of the detrended series is close to unity irrespective of sample period and the 
standard deviation is relatively stable except for the period o f the Korean financial 
market crisis in the second half of 1997. Figure 8.1 provides graphs of the number of 
daily jumps in the KOSPI 200 spot index per month and the median detrended trading 
volume each month. From this figure, it seems that trading volume is unrelated to the 
frequency of outliers. This is confirmed by the sample correlation coefficient 
between the frequency of stock price outliers and detrended futures trading volume; 
this is 0.010 and not significantly different from zero. Also, the correlation between 
daily stock price volatility and daily detrended futures trading volume is 0.038 and 
also low. Previously, other factors have been found to affect volatility. For example, 
stock market volatility is often influenced by recent episodes of volatility and this 
volatility clustering is usually captured in ARCH models. Additionally, 
macroeconomic variables such as the growth rate of industrial production, inflation 
volatility, the volatility of the term structure of interest rates and the volatility of risk 
premia have all been proposed as potential determinants of stock prices (Chen, Roll 
and Ross, 1986). It seems therefore that futures trading does not increase jump 
volatility.
Although jump volatility is not affected, futures trading might affect general 
volatility in the stock market. To examine this, we estimate over the entire period a
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GARCH(1,1) model which includes a dummy variable, D t , in the variance equation 
where D t takes the values zero and one for the pre- and post-futures periods 
respectively. The results are reported in Table 8.4. The estimated coefficient on the 
dummy variable, is positive and significant implying that the introduction of 
stock index futures resulted in an increase in volatility in the stock market.
Results for separate GARCH(1,1) models for the pre- and post-futures periods 
are also reported in the second and third rows of Table 8.4. For both periods, the 
coefficients of the variance equations are significant and although the intercepts are 
very small they are nonzero. The estimated coefficient cq increases from 0.05436 to 
0.08783 in the post-futures period, which confirms the result of the previous GARCH 
estimation of higher stock market volatility when futures are traded. The coefficient 
a x relates today’s price changes to yesterday’s market-specific price changes and as 
these depend on the arrival of information yesterday, can be viewed as a ‘news’ 
coefficient. Since a x increases following the introduction of futures trading, this 
suggests that futures trading results in information being impounded into spot prices 
more quickly. In these circumstances, an increase in spot market volatility following 
the introduction of stock index futures trading is not necessarily bad. The 
unconditional variance, given by a 0 / ( I - a ,  -  /3X),  increases from 0.00005 in the pre­
futures period to 0.0004 in the post-futures period—further evidence that spot market 
volatility increased following the introduction of futures trading.
The persistence of volatility shocks depends primarily on ai + P t - F°r the
pre-futures period, we find ai + P , = 0.9804 , implying high persistence of volatility, 
and increasing slightly to 0.9937 following the introduction of futures trading. This 
surprising result merits further investigation. If a market reflects information rapidly,
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the persistence should decrease. Our post-futures period includes the Korean financial 
market crisis, an unusually volatile period. The effects of this unusual period are 
removed by re-estimating the model over the period from 3 May 1996 until 31 
October 1997. These are the last set of results reported in Table 8.4 and they are 
compared with those for the pre-futures period. Following the introduction of futures 
trading, the news coefficient, a x, increases from 0.0544 to 0.1660; volatility 
persistence decreases from 0.9804 to 0.942 and the unconditional variance increases 
0.00005 to 0.0001, That is, information is impounded into prices more quickly; the 
persistence of information is reduced, and spot market volatility increased.
8.4.2 Intraday Returns
Descriptive statistics for KOSPI 200 spot index and futures five-minute returns, 
together with autocorrelation coefficients up to the twelfth order (one hour), are 
reported in Table 8.5.1. For each period, the mean returns for spot and futures are of 
similar magnitude. However, futures returns are more volatile having greater standard 
deviation. The empirical distributions are not normally distributed but skewed and 
more-sharply peaked than the normal distribution. Given the large sample size, these 
measures of skewness and kurtosis result in large Jarque-Bera statistics. For example,
for spot returns for the entire period this statistic is 1.2x10' .  The Ljung-Box 
statistics show that the returns series have significant autocorrelation coefficients in 
all periods. For the KOSPI 200 spot index, autocorrelation coefficients at lag one are 
significantly large and positive. The autocorrelation coefficient at lag one is 0.333 in 
1996, falling to 0.277 in 1997 and 0.162 in 1998. This suggests that, over the sample 
period, either the problem of non-synchronous trading becomes relatively less 
important or the spot market processes market-wide information more efficiently as
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the market matures. Unlike the spot index, the magnitude of the KOSPI 200 futures 
autocorrelation coefficients is quite small, although Ljung-Box statistics indicate that 
they are significantly different from zero (see Table 8.5.2).
As presented in Table 8.6, Phillips-Perron unit root tests for the logarithm of 
the KOSPI 200 spot and futures series, s t and f t respectively, find the series are 1(1)
for the entire period and three subperiods. Engel-Granger cointegration tests are 
reported in Table 8.7. For each period, the forward and reverse regressions are 
presented, together with the cointegrating regression augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(CRADF) statistic and its associated lag order. This was selected by testing down to 
eliminate autocorrelation in the test regression. The null hypothesis of non­
cointegration is rejected at the .05 level for all the periods considered. The prices in 
the two markets are linked in the long-run and the long-run coefficients are close to 
one, irrespective of the sample period.
Accepting that each pair of spot and futures prices forms a cointegrated 
system, ECMs are estimated for the entire period and three subperiods by the Engle- 
Granger two-step method and the results reported in Table 8.8.1. The Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion (SBC) and Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) were used to determine 
lag lengths.29 Under certain regularity conditions it can be shown that the SBC and 
HQC are consistent in the sense that for large enough samples and assuming the true 
model belongs to the set of models over which one is searching, they lead to the 
correct model choice. These two criteria selected lag lengths of the same order; five 
for all periods except 1996 for which four was chosen. As expected, at least one of
29 The SBC and HQC are computed as 
SBC = 71n(<T2 ) + tf lnT1 
HQC = 71n(cr2) + 2« InflnF)
where T is the number o f usable observations, cr2 is the residual sum of squares mid n is the number of 
parameters estimated.
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the lagged disequilibrium errors has a significant coefficient in each period 
confirming that the spot and futures markets respond to the previous period’s 
deviation from equilibrium. For the entire period, both coefficients on the lagged 
disequilibrium terms are significant. This implies that both markets adjust to long-run 
equilibrium. For the subperiods, the coefficients on disequilibrium errors are 
insignificant in 1997 in panel A and in 1996 and 1998 in panel B. This lack of 
significance indicates that the current period spot (futures) return does not respond to 
disequilibrium in the previous period. Consequently, any adjustment in the current 
period’s spot (futures) return is caused by lagged spot and futures returns. Irrespective 
of sample period, Granger causality tests on ECMs do not support unidirectional 
causality from one market to another because /^-statistics in both panel A and panel B 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients jointly equal to zero. There is bidirectional 
causality, feedback between markets. As reported in Table 8.8.2 and 8.8.3, this is 
further supported by Sims (1972) tests and Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983) 
causality tests. The results indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis that the sets of 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Although bidirectional causality observed in our 
test, the magnitude of /-statistics suggests that the lead from futures to spot returns is 
mildly more robust than that from spot to futures returns.
Lead-lag relationships between the stock index and stock index futures 
markets, together with Wald tests of coefficient restrictions, are reported in 
Table 8.9.1 and 8.9.2. Since raw returns series can cause a spurious lead-lag relation 
because of infrequent trading of stocks within the index portfolio, consequently, 
misleading results from equation (8.10). To overcome this problem, our models use 
stock index return innovations, I s l , and the future return innovations, I f  l . Initially,
several ARMA(p,<7) processes were estimated including the ARMA(2,3) model used
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by Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996). However, all 
of these were less successful at eliminating autocorrelation than a simple AR(1) 
process. The higher-order ARMA models resulted in low explanatory power and 
correlograms showed significant residual autocorrelation. Thus, the lead-lag relation 
is estimated with return innovations generated by an AR(1) process using the 
following model which is based on equation (8.10)
h,, = a + £ V /,* i  + e, (8.11)
/  =  - 8
The choice of eight leads and lags for our models is based on preliminary evidence 
from cross-correlation coefficients which are small and insignificant at longer leads 
and lags. The dependent variable is KOSPI 200 spot return innovations. The 
independent variable is KOSPI 200 futures return innovations. Focusing first on the 
results using raw returns, as shown in Table 8.9.1, the contemporaneous relationships 
are found to be strong between the spot and futures markets in all subperiods. The 
estimated contemporaneous coefficients, bo, are large (0.3990, 0.4203 and 0.4524 for 
1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively) and significant at the 5% level (/-statistics of 
70.99 for 1996, 81.14 for 1997 and 83.64 for 1998). The estimated coefficients on 
b.i, associated with a futures market lead of five minutes, are also large and 
significant. The leading effect of futures market seems to persist even at lag 2, albeit 
at lower levels than at lag 1. Although the magnitude of the coefficients declines, the 
evidence suggests that futures price movements tend to lead price movements in the 
spot market by as much as 35 minutes. This issue, however, is re-examined with the 
use of KOSPI 200 return innovations and KOSPI 200 futures return innovations 
generated from AR(1) processes since raw returns series can cause a spurious lead-lag 
relation because of infrequent trading of stocks within the index portfolio.
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As presented in Table 8.9.2, the results show that the futures market leads the 
spot market but the lead is not as long as indicated by raw returns. The 
contemporaneous coefficients are 0.4020, 0.4156 and 0.4475, with /-statistics of 
71.41, 81.63 and 82.03 for 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. The increase on 
contemporaneous coefficient for KOSPI futures return innovations suggest that the 
integration of the index futures and the spot market has continuously been grown over 
the sample periods. The results for individual subperiods show that in successive 
years, the lead time has increased by five minutes each year but with the magnitude 
of the earliest significant coefficient declining. Some of the lead coefficients (/+/) are 
significant, providing evidence of the spot market leading the futures market. The 
relations for successive years show this lead declining. Although the effect is small 
compared to the lead of futures returns it supports the notion that occasionally the 
spot leads the futures. The evidence indicates that the futures market tends to lead the 
spot market by as much as 30 minutes. In addition, the reported / '’-statistics, which 
test that all the lead coefficients, £+/, and the all the lag coefficients, b+t, are jointly 
zero, show that both of them have p-values smaller than 0.1% in all subperiods. 
Clearly, although there is weak evidence that the spot index leads the futures index, 
there is stronger evidence that the stock index futures market leads the stock market.
8.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the impact on the spot market of trading in stock index 
futures in Korea in May 1996 and several important results were found. First, the 
results show that futures trading increases the speed at which information is 
impounded into spot market prices. Secondly, there has been an increase in volatility
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and a decrease in the persistence of volatility following the introduction of stock 
index futures. Although the volatility increase might be due to destabilising effects of 
futures trading associated with speculation, stock index futures add a new dimension 
to the market by providing a new instrument to facilitate hedging. Thirdly, the 
evidence indicates that futures trading does not result in increased jump volatility, 
abnormally large increases or decreases in stock prices. Fourthly, there is a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the KOSPI 200 spot and futures prices with 
bidirectional causality between spot and futures markets. This differs from most of 
the literature on developed markets which finds unidirectional causality from futures 
to spot markets. Fifthly, returns in these two markets are largely contemporaneous but 
with weak evidence that the spot market leads the futures market and stronger 
evidence that the stock index futures market leads the spot market. This suggests that 
news disseminates first in the futures market and then in the spot market. In 
summary, it would seem that the impact of futures trading has been beneficial for the 
Korean stock market.
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Table 8.1 Introduction o f  Stock Index Futures Trading in the Pacific Basin
Country Stock index futures Exchange Listing date
Australia All Ordinaries Index Futures The Sydney Futures Exchange Feb. 1983
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index Futures The Hong Kong Futures Exchange Jun. 1986
Japan
Nikkei Stock Average Futures The Osaka Securities Exchange Sep. 1988
Topix Index Futures The Tokyo Stock Exchange Sep. 1988
Korea Korea Composite Stock Price Index 200 Futures The Korea Stock Exchange May 1996
New Zealand Barclays Shares Price Index Futures
The New Zealand Futures 
and Options Exchange Jan. 1987
Singapore Nikkei Stock Average Futures The Singapore International Monetary Exchange Sep.1986
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Table 8.2 Descriptive Statistics for Interday KOSPI 200 Spot Returns 
(September 1993 -  December 1998)
Statistic Entire Period Pre-futures Post-futures
Mean -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0006
Standard Deviation 0.0187 0.0104 0.0243
Skewness 0.1619 0.1283 0.1938
Kurtosis 7.1618 3.4752 4.9023
Jarque-Bera
Autocorrelation Coefficients 
(Ljung-Box Q Statistic)
1134.84* 9.5253* 122.33*
1 0.153 (36.79)* 0.113 (9.98)* 0.160 (20.02)*
2 -0.045 (40.01)* -0.077(14.67)* -0.041 (21.33)*
3 -0.006 (40.08)* 0.055 (17.06)* -0.018 (21.60)*
4 -0.042 (42.84)* -0.004(17.07)* -0.049 (23.49)*
5 -0.089(55.37)* 0.036 (18.11)* -0.114 (33.75)*
6 -0.066 (62.13)* 0.023 (18.54)* -0.085 (39.44)*
7 -0.013 (62.41)* -0.101 (26.63)* 0.002 (39.44)*
8 0.018 (62.91)* -0.062 (29.67)* 0.033 (40.29)*
9 0.085 (74.29)* 0.101 (37.84)* 0.081 (45.42)*
10 0.044 (77.28)* 0.037 (38.91)* 0.043 (46.90)*
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table 8.3 Outliers in Interday Returns on KOSPI 200 Spot
Pre-futures Post-futures
Sample Period 1 Sept 1993 -  2 May 1996 3 May 1996 -  28 Dec 1998
Observations 784 779
Low Outliers 1 (0.13%) 56(7.19%)
High Outliers 1 (0.13%) 56 (7.19%)
All Outliers 2 (0.26%) 112(14.38%)
Note: Low outlier and high outlier is defined as any day in which the KOSPI 200 falls below -  
0.0343% and rises more than 0.0339% compared to the previous trading day’s KOSPI 200, 
respectively.
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Figure 8.1 Frequency of Jumps in Stock Price Volatility and Detrended 
Futures Trading Volume
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Table 8.4 GARCH (1,1) model
Period
R s,t-cio + ai Rp.t + Ut h< = ao+ ai u i i + P , h t-i + Si Dt
Cto di do di P i S ,
Entire -0.00022 0.87047 0.000001 0.06933 0.91969 0.000002
(-1.04) (56.85)* (2.93)* (6.23)* (79.92)* (2.55)*
Pre-futures -0.00005 0.86207 0.000001 0.05436 0.92604
(-0.21) (35.40)* (2.31)* (3.15)* (44.66)*
Post-futures -0.00068 0.86853 0.000003 0.08783 0.90590
(-1.50) (42.15)* (2.17)* (5.73)* (61.68)*
New Post-futures a -0.00147 0.70016 0.000008 0.16602 0.77604
(-3.09)* (23.26)* (2.18)* (4.35)* (14.17)*
/-statistics are presented in parentheses,
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
a period ends 31 October i997 to exclude the Korean financial market crisis .
259
£
$
on
<Uv-<
3
p
Ph
Ccd
3
CL,
on
oo
<NI—I
Px
on
O
W
0)
"3
c
(3
cd
Lx
Cd
+ -»on
a>
m>
‘-P
' d
oc/i
4)
Q
V )
00
<u
15
£
83
PL
00
ON
O n
o
o ,C/5
3
3
U -
r -ono \
o
Ox00
00 r- -d- covo co cNo o NOt"-ooo
o
o’
X—1 On
"d-
n o
ON
ON
oCl
C/5
[ §
o
CLon
* * * * * * * * * * *
CN CO 0 0 0 0 t- c o NO c o o c o t " CO o
v o CN o cN XX o o r**4 o o 1—Ho o o oo VO CO o o © o o o o o © o o p
p o’ -d-’ o' o' o’ o o o’ o’ o o’ o o' o’
NO '4*  
c o  r j*
CO NO - +
p 1 c o voo vo p
© xx’ p -'o -d*
* * * * * * * * * * * *
0 0 NO -d- o X o o 0 0 0 0 X CO r- CO x j. CN
r - vo NO CN CO o o o CN »—* XX o oo 0 0 o o o o o © O o o © © ©
r x in’ o o’ o' o’ o’ o o' o' o’ o’ o o
CO 00 NO r-
CO r- -d- r-o NO CNo o’ VO o’o’ 1 VO
CN C O X in
V0 NO Xo o -d; O no
oo
©
o’
c o ’
CO CO -d- x ii—H -d’ NO ooo o t- V0o(—1 © o’ vo
© o 1 CN
of •d* VO CN
xH CO ON NOo o ON CNooo
o
o'
o’ -d"
O n
Co
\Pcd
‘g
Q
"p
V0 0 0  ND CNo o o
o o o o
* * 
in  co 
no >n
o o o  o’
* * * * * * * * * * *
*  *  *
p- O *—< 
-ct O  ^o o o 
o’ o’ o’
* * * * *  •55-
NO CN O O —< o  ■—i <n O O O Oo O O o 
o’ o’ o' o’I I
CO CN v o CN O n ,—i xX ,—[o o o o o O o o
p p o p O O o p
o’ o’ o’ o’ o’ o’ o’ o’
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(N CN in xX -tf rO o -d" XX CN ON XX r- CO in x^ CN CN _X C ONO 0 0 ON C O o xX C O CN XX xX O o r- o o o o o o o
XX o o o p O © O © O p p o o o o p o p oo' o' o' o' © O* o' o’ o' o’ o’ o’ o’ o’ o' o’ o o o
CO NOo
p
NO
xx
o
CNo
p
-+o
p
oo
o
p
NOo
p
NOoo
o’ o> o’ o' o o> o’ o
* * * * * * * * * * *
ON CO -+ CO N- o o >n "1* CN o o ON CN r-- <no o o 1—I o >—, 1—1•—, CN ,—t o o o oo o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
o’ o’ o o o’ o' c> o' o’ o’ o' o’ o' o' o
* * * * •IC­ * * * * * * * *
CO i n r- NO ON CN - f CO xX N* r - CN <N ON XX
*—i CO CN o o •—, ,—1 CN '—1 CN CO .—, o xXo o o o o o o O O O O O O o o
o' o' o’ o' o’ o' o’ o’ o’ o' ci o' o' o’ o'
c o NO o o i n i n 0 0 T f o - oo 0 0 CO o r- O n O n c ^ i n CN o O n
CO -J - NO o c o NO C~ NO i n CO CN o O xX o o o O
CO CN p o p O p p o p p o O o p p p p O
o’ o' o’ o o’ o’ o’ o’ o’ o O* o' o o’ o' o’ o* o’ o o
* * * * * * * * * * *
o CO o CN in N* CO NO NO NO
*—< o o ,—t o i—, o o o o oo o o o p o o o o o p
o' o’ o’ o' ol o' ci o’ ci o' o’
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ON rf o NO N" t" c o O ' o r~ in in xX C " c o ON r- r- •no CN r- * + CN O x xX o XX o o N; XX o o o o
CN O o o O o p p p p p p o p o o o o o
o’ o’ o’ o' o' o' o' o’ o' o’ o’ o’ o’ o o’ o o’ o’ o’ o’
OSc/fao
'3
Souo
<!
V I NO b  CO O * “  "
Vi
«
o
o
rS
sooo
5
<
—' c n c o ' + vonoc- . qo
26
0
ooo oo
CNoo
CNO
O
o o’ o’ o’
* * * *
<n co CN coo o o oo o o o
o' o' o' o
co CO CO
O O o oO O p p
o’ o’ o’ o'
to
o
p
1—-H
p
ooo
o
N*oo
o’ o’ o o'
* * * *
■"3- <n oo
<No o O o
o’ o o' o'
oo
o
o
COo
o
CNoo
o' o' o' o'
MD
CN
* * * *
C O C O N" ' Oo o o oo o o p
o' o' o’ o*
* *
N" 00 r-~o o oo p o
o’ o’ o’
N-OO
0J
5«n<u
'B
oc
' I
VEh
e
B
3p4
c/3
e
p-i
ooCMh—H
OhOOo
T3
§
s->ocuco
oo
CN
i—i
Ph00
O
W
£
CD
<D
id
d-i<si
"Oci
a<D<D
I
m
C<D
' o
<uo
O
d
.2
03
U
fco
U
o)-l
U
. 2
* 3 .
6dOO
wi
00
a>
3
d
H
oo
o \
ON
C"
ON
ON
NO
O n
ON
C8 +-*
CO
d )
g
pp00
a
p
po
§13
t:o
CJ
2
v
«
co
d )
xo
ppbJD
G
P
o
1-4
U
B
CO
d)
o
ppojq
p
P
ot-4
u
B
co
di
x0  
m1
00
p
P
P
w
/■—\ N 4™\ ^ -^-V 4--4 V 4--4 4—4 4—, 4—,00 i t CN (N P On' NO CO CN Tt o O o ' O d CN d —-* NO M- CN d P P i ti t r - i t On i—i 00 o l-H NO o o o o o O o <n NO O O o CN 00 "n
o ' ■d d d d d d d d d o ' d d d d d d d d d d d . d d d
'  ' -—-  ^ ' ■>— '  ' ' ' ' ' ' ' N—' 4—4 4--4 N 4 w 4--4
in CN CN m- N't N , , o CN CN 00 CN CN o co Cn -t- in ON NO CO 00in t—* NO o ON o <n oo co CN 00 NO ON NO ro 00 CN -+ —1 00 "O’ o CO O cn
d d d d i—I o ’ d N't CN d d ro ro CN CN CO d o co* •n CO d dt—« CN CN o O —4i— in
N-
* * se­ se- se­ se- se se
cn oo o i t o CN m- co o in cs CN en ”+ NO ro r - 00 O CN CN 1—1 in i tNO CN t> oo CN —4 NO ON CO M" 00 cN l> NO r - -i- (N in ro o in o ino o o o I—t o o t—1 ■—i o CN in ro 00 O', o o CN o oo o © o o o o o O o o O ■n co o O o o o o O o o o o
o ' © d■ o '1 d di d d o ’ o '1 d■ di d d d di di di di d d d d oi d
--—\ >-—v
CN P as On" CN- P oo" p ro i—i O o o o O d d i—i d d ,—i ,—i *—i PNO i t i—i r - CN in ON ON NO r-i o o o o o O in o o •n NO r - CN oo n
o ' d d o ' o ' d d d d o d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d'n ' n—-' n—- n—' '—* N~-^ ' ^ ' ' ----
i t CN NO o 00 o CN CO *+ CO o -+ NO Cn •n _ o OO N* NO NOCN in r - o in CO o o ■—1 ro in CN o N- CO CN -+ Cs oo CO CN o o ~t
O d d d I—! © d d d CN K in in N- N-' ON d co" d d d d d d d—4 NO NO —i —4CN C" CON-
* se­ se- se- se- se se se
ro co NO CO t-' - t CN n 00 N- o es NO o cN ~+ CN —c in CO NO CN o 1-4-1 CNi t NO r—H CN o in O o CO ro -t* -+ i—i CN in oo in r-' *+ -+ N" co CN ino o r-H o 1—1 o o o o t—i (N ro r~- -+ in CO o —4 CN o O o o O oo O o o o o o t- -J o_ o_ O O in CN O o o o o o o o c o
o 'i d d d di d■ d d di di di o ' d d d d di di di d di di di T d
4--V4—4i—i t I t 00 CN !—H o o ' o ' 00 o OO o ' o ' d d d d d os' os' P P i t C\o o o NO in o o o o o_ ’—i ■—1 o o o O o o o CN o o in o
o ' d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d
'—" '—' ' —' '—' '—' '—' '—' '—' N—" N—'' ■—'
CN ON i t 00 CN i t CO ON ON in o oo ON *+ CN o CN o o oo CO oo i to 1—J o I—I i t CN t" N- co O n NO r~- r - o in o CN C n 'n o CO CN
d NO I t d d d -i-' co’ in CN (N NO —1 NO ro NO 00 - j- CN 4—' ■n in d CN*—H CN CN CO C" CN r-' oo r - CNON NO in COCN
se * ■se­ se * * * * •X- se­ SC- se se se se se
cn NO en in ON 00 o _ i 00 in ~i* CN CN C n es - t oc in co NO — o „ NO COoo NO 1—4 NO 00 11 1 CN co oo - t CN NO ■n NO in -+ ro NO CO in - t NO 00cN CN CN o o CN ■"it in m *—-i r— —i r - r~ *+ o - f C n •n (N (N oo O © o o © o o o o o O ■n CN CN CN O o o O O O o o
o ’ d d d o ’1 di o ’1 d■ d■ o '■ d■ o ' d o ' d d d d d d d■ di di di di
4—-. ✓—\ 4—\ 4—4 -■—■cn cn in ' •n CO IN CO no' CO o p o ' d d «—* d in d CN* P .—i P P P<n cn 00 On NO " t NO o '—1 o O o o o o c CN o O o (N CO r - ro
o ’ d d d d d o ' d d o ’ d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d
o NO CO o CO CN CO O n N t" O n NO 00 CN oo oc - t •n NO o o CO oi t ON © o CN in CN NO (N O CO r - CO CN oo CN co o CN NO 00 — 00
o ’ d d o ' d d d ro' d cn" ~t -+' oo NO r-- NO OC —i CO in ro’ ,—i d d d(N i—i ONi— -—1 N-—4 CO
* se- se- se- se se se se
to CN o CO NO 00 NO O - t O CN in C n o o o CO •n NO o CO C n 00ro >n i-m o CN CO CN O *+ oo NO ■—i CN 00 C n -+ in nD C n CN CN NO 'i t •—i i to O o o O o o »—t o o CN — NO CN —i O O i— O o o O oo O o O o o o O o o O O in CN o o o o o O o o o o
o ' o ' o ' d d di o ’ d o ’ di di o '1 o ’ o ’ d d di di di d d d d di o
CN
=
o O n 00 r - NO in - t CO CN - o - r CN1 CO1 *•+■ ini NO1 r -■ oo1 C ni oi ■
(N
i
N® .S9s _,in *0
P i o
8 n
§  «
CJ U iCT3 qj
5Jp  00 
irt c j  Ot/j C
RJ 8.2 C
,5 oo
*  CO
26
2
Ta
bl
e 
8.6
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of 
Ph
ill
ip
s-
Pe
rro
n 
Un
it 
Ro
ot
 T
est
s 
for
 L
og
 
of 
Fi
ve
-M
in
ut
e 
In
te
rv
al
 K
OS
PI
 2
00
 
Sp
ot 
and
 
Fu
tu
re
s 
Pr
ic
es
&
e2
N
<ts
N
N
N
t S
N
©
N
©
N
N
>■*4
is
i ?
N
C".
oc
r- vo
vo
o
oo
r-'
o
CN
Ov cnoo
cn
oo
in
Ov
o1 oi CNi CNi i Oi o ’ o' i
"Ct o F"“1 X x cn XT
o ’1 Ol o1 o ’i o ’i
o ’1 o' o'
oo^1
cn
ov
o
Ov
OO
vo Ov
Ov
*n
cn
Tc|-
N
in
o
N- ■n
cn cn o ’ O o ’ o ’ X-
vo
r-
CN
OO
CN
«n
in
CN X oovo oo
m
oo
f—t 1—< o o ’ o'i o' o ’ o' CNdd
(N
OO
IN
OO
oo
>n
CN
CN VD
vo cn
vo
Ov
N
vo
oo
1 1 oi o ’i o ’ o ’1 oi OI CNI
cn
o
VO
r~- Ov
•n
cn Ovcn
CN
-n-
«n
X
Ov
Ov
i 'Cf1 o ’> o ’i o ’ o1 i i t
‘O
cn
ov
CN
vo
X
oo
X
oo
oc r-~
N
•n
N
•n
oo
VO
,—l cn cn
”
o ’ o'
VO
r-
N
oo
VD
o
cn
N*
<N
Ov oc
X
VD
N-
•n
CN
(N rN o ’ O VD
l>
OV
CN
CN
O
CN
r-
«n
O CN
CN X
N
VO
OO
cn
o 1 1 CN 1 ' ”* o ’ o ’
(±
3
r-
o
VO
CN
in •n
VO
Ov
O voN
■n
•n -1
1
)
o1 Oi CNi i CNi
CNi o' o ’
cn
d t
oo
vo
cn in
Ov
o
CN
OC
N
m, >n
cn
r-
<n X
o1 i Oi i Oi i o ’i o ’t cni
cn
Ov
oc 00
X
r-
Ov
o
X
N"
vo
cn
oo
o
■n
oo
<ni int N‘*i CNi mi o ’i i (N1
"O
. S‘x
a VI
t
+2 o(X
ea3s
w
03 fx
VO o 35ON ft 3 OM/3
t- . o  d !
Cv CL 3  
CN l / l  U .
£24-> 3OO o  31ON 0  p  os c / i  Ll.
ox
•n
o
r_3
Q
u
’ts
4~its
EE II 
~ XT
e
N
<DT3O
O
IX
I
l1^
+
l~3.
I
its
3:
-  N  
IS T3i- CO eS
O ' •OH ^  
CJ W
■£ N
II
i
t s
"o
Ed
<D
*ts
N
'S
*■
N
o
II
V
tn
V5»t/)<L)
*
N
oI
*
=5,
7
4-
t s
*o
EC
©
N
o
II
istj.
X i ^  i5L
*X o o
EC EC EC
OJ CJ
nss. ; a .  A-fc-i "h*
'w -'  ^ '  > w
N  N  N
ro
vO
CN
ts
$
H
.s
<a
+
T
<L> ,0
OJX3O
a<D
£t-iO
26
4
Table 8.7 Engle-Granger Cointegration: KOSPI 200 Spot and Futures
Period Cointegrating regression R2 CRADF Lag order
Entire st = 0.179 + 0.958/, 0.994 -7.97* 10
/ ,=  -0.160+ 1.038.57 0.994 -7.99* 10
1996 5,= 0.050 + .0988/, 0.983 -4.78* 2
/ =  0.027+ 0.9945, 0.983 -4.72* 2
1997 5,= 0.482 + 0.887/, 0.980 -5.62* 6
/ ,=  -0.448+ 1.1055, 0.980 -5.67* 6
1998 5,= 0.373 + 0.904/ 0.994 -7.50* 6
/= -0 .3 8 6 +  1.0995, 0.994 -7.52* 6
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table 8.8.1 Error Correction Models: KOSPI 200 Spot and Futures
Panel A: Panel B:
D ependent Variable is Spot Returns D ependent Variable is Futures Returns
Entire 1996 1997 1998 Entire 1996 1997 1998
Constant 0.000
(-0.73)
0.000
(-1-70)
0.000
( - 1.02)
0.000
(0.75)
Constant 0.000
(-0.59)
0.000 
(-2.92) *
0.000
(-0.92)
0.000
(0.90)
R s.t-1 0.007
(1.07)
0.111 
(8 .22) *
0.174 
(16.01) *
-0.126 
( -11.66) *
R /j- i 0.075 
(11.33) *
0.093 
(6 .86) *
0.063 
(5.78) *
0.077 
(7.08) *
R s,t-2 -0.144  
(-21 .88) *
0.058  
(4.25) *
-0.102 
(-9.29) *
-0.210 
(-19.43) *
R f t -2 0.033 
(4.83) *
0,112 
(8.17) *
0.048  
(4.44) *
0.025 
(2.15) *
R s,t-3 -0,099  
(-15.06) *
0.042  
(3.15) *
-0.065 
(-5.94) *
-0.155 
(-14.31) *
R f t -3 0.007
(1.01)
0.089 
(6.55) *
-0.034 
(-3.07) *
0.027  
(2.31) *
R s.t-j -0.059  
(-9.07) *
-0.009
(-0.73)
-0.078 
(-7.13) *
-0.072 
(-6.76) *
R / t -4 0.001
(0 . 12)
0.042 
(3.17) *
0.002
(0.18)
0.000
(-0 .02)
R s,t-s -0.052  
(-8.36) *
- -0.052 
(-5.03) *
-0.061 
(-6.18) *
R f j-3 0.000
(0.04)
- -0.005
(-0.50)
0.002
(0.24)
0.222 
(45.22) *
0,134 
(15.08) *
0.101 
(13.07) *
0.315 
(38.35) *
Rs.t-i -0.072 
(-8.07) *
-0.087 
(-4.22) *
0.007
(0.44)
-0.112 
(-7.79) *
R / ,-2 0.140  
(27.74) *
0.109  
(12.06) *
0.120 
(15.42) *
0.182 
(20.82) *
R*.'-: -0.042 
(-4.73) *
-0.111 
(-5.40) *
-0.072 
(-4.67) *
-0.035 
(-2.46) *
Rf.t-3 0.078  
(15.26) *
0.078 
(8 .68) *
0.043 
(5.51) *
0,121 
(13.64) *
Rs.t-3 -0.006
(-0.64)
-0.039
(-1.91)
0.027
(1.74)
-0.023
(-1.57)
R/.t-j 0.047 
(9.26) *
0.052 
(6.05) *
0.045 
(5.73) *
0.059 
(6 .68) *
Rs,t-4 0.001
(0.07)
-0.051 
(-2.62) *
-0.007
(-0.44)
0.007
(0.46)
0.043 
(8.64) *
- 0.036  
(4.61) *
0.049 
(5.77) *
Rs.t-s 0.006
(0.75)
- 0.000
(0.03)
0.012
(0.95)
K t - \
-0.003 
(-4.91) *
-0.003 
(-3.30) *
-0.001
(-0.77)
-0.012 
(-5.96) * 5 / . m
-0.003 
(-3.16) *
0.000
(0.24)
-0.006 
(-4.53) *
-0.002
(-0.98)
G ranger C ausality Test
H 0: all lag  coeffic ien ts on are zero. H0: all lag coeffic ien ts on are zero.
F- statistic 536.89 118.01 87.44 341.60 19.14 24.14 4.58 14.17
(0 ,00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00 ) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) *
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Figures in parentheses are /-statistics.
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Table 8.8.2 Error Correction Models: KOSPI 200 Spot and Futures
Panel A:
D ependent Variable is Spot Returns 
Entire 1996 1997 1998
Panel B:
Dependent Variable is Futures Returns 
Entire 1996 1997 1998
Constant 0.000
(-0.35)
0.000
(-0.97)
0.000
(-0.48)
0.000
(0 .20)
Constant 0.000
(0 .10)
0.000
(-1.35)
0.000
(-0.02)
0.000
(0.04)
Rft+5 0.007  
(2.08) *
- 0.005
(0 .88)
0.010
(1.83)
Rs,t+5 0.023 
(4.28) *
- 0.022 
(2,32) *
0.018 
(2.18) *
Rft+4 0.006
(1-78)
-0.021 
(-3.71) *
0.002
(0.41)
0.011 
(2.07) *
R.yt+4 0.013 
(2.31) *
0.058  
(4.73) *
0.030 
(2.96) *
0.005
(0.57)
Rft+3 0.001
(0.29)
-0.020 
(-3.56) *
0.007
(1.38)
0.000
(-0.09)
R.s-j’j 0.042  
(7.48) *
0.076 
(6 .00) *
0,030  
(2.91) *
0.052 
(6.09) *
Rft+2 -0.016  
(-4.93) *
-0.037 
(-6.63) *
-0.020 
(-3.88) *
-0.012 
(-2 .22) *
Rs,t+2 0.110 
(19.54) *
0.103 
(8.04) *
0.131 
(13.OS) *
0.103 
(12.15) *
Rf.t+i -0.026 
(-7.84) *
-0.029 
(-5.08) *
0.001
(0.13)
-0.041 
(-7.56) *
Rs,t+i 0.211 
(37.59) *
0.132  
(10.26) *
0.083 
(8.29) *
0.292 
(34.27) *
Rf.‘ 0.437 
(134.26) *
0.397 
(70.16) *
0.421 
(81.43) *
0.453 
(84.16) *
R sj 0.716 
(127.26) *
0.856 
(66 .68) *
0.790 
(78.46) *
0.690 
(80.56) *
R/.t-i 0.210 
(64.24) *
0.151
(26.65) *
0.147 
(28.33) *
0.252 
(46.40) *
Rx.t-i -0.150 
(-26.74) *
-0.250  
(-19.44) *
-0.158 
(-15.68) *
-0.129 
(-15.16) *
Rft-2 0.082 
(25.24) *
0.126 
(22.20) *
0.096 
(18.51) *
0.069 
(12.84) *
Rs,t-2 0.030 
(5.26) *
-0.154  
(-12.03) *
-0.022 
(-2.17) *
0.068 
(8.02) *
R f t s 0.012 
(3.55) *
0.099 
(17.57) *
0.033 
(6.31) *
-0.010
(-1.84)
R s,I-3 0.038 
(6.75) *
-0.050  
(-3.92) *
0,037 
(3.64) *
0.046 
(5.40) *
Rft-4 -0.008  
(-2.56) *
0.078 
(13.77) *
0.000
(-0.09)
-0.024
(-4.42)
Rs.t-1 0.021 
(3.72) *
-0.031 
(-2.52) *
0.043 
(4.25) *
0.020 
(2.33) *
R f t s -0.004
(-1.18)
- -0.006
(-1.08)
-0.010
(-1.89)
R s.iS 0.02 
(3.67) *
- 0.020
(2 . 11)
0.024 
(2.91) *
V i
-0,006  
(-10.28) *
-0.002 
(-2.91) *
-0.005 
(-5.09) *
-0.019 
(-11.65) * z f J - \
-0.009 
(-12.32) *
-0.004  
(-3.62) *
-0.008 
(-7.4S) *
-0.023 
(-12.56) *
S im s C ausality Test
H0: all lead coeffic ien ts o f  R f  are zero. H 0: all lead coeffic ien ts o f  R s are zero.
F-statistic 19.61 
(0 .00) *
28.64 
(0 .00) *
3.53 
(0 .00) *
14.27 
(0 .00) *
472.78  
(0 .00) *
107.47 
(0 .00) *
79.73 
(0 .00) *
310.62 
(0 .00) *
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Figures in parentheses are f-statistics.
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Table 8.8.3 Error Correction Models: KOSPI 200 Spot and Futures
Panel A: Panel B:
Dependent Variable is Spot Returns Dependent Variable is Futures Returns
Entire 1996 1997 1998 Entire 1996 1997 1998
Constant 0.000
(-0.48)
0.000
(-0.39)
0.000
(-0.60)
0.000
(0.33)
Constant 0.000
(0.13)
0.000
(-1.45)
0.000
(-0.02)
0.000
(0.09)
R s,t-i 0.037 
(6.93) *
0.139 
(13.03) *
0.171 
(19.57) *
-0.077 
(-8.92) *
R ft- i -0.139 
(-25.91) *
-0.069 
(-6.47) *
-0.044 
(-5.02) *
-0.222 
(-25.44) *
R s,t-2 -0.125 
(-23,56) *
0.099 
(9.24) *
-0.072 
(-8.10) *
-0.194 
(-22.37) *
R f t -2 -0.099 
(-18.43) *
-0.017
(-1.55)
-0.062 
(-7.14) *
-0.151 
(-16.97) *
Rs,t-3 -0.097 
(-18.10) *
0.056 
(5.26) *
-0.076 
(-8.63) *
-0.144 
(-16.55) *
R f t s -0.069 
(-12.80) *
-0.004
(-0.38)
-0.079 
(-9.01) *
-0.086 
(-9.59) *
R s.t-j -0.059 
(-11.23) *
0.011
(1.10)
-0.075 
(-8.49) *
-0.074 
(-8.67) *
R p - } -0.048 
(-9.00) *
-0.023 
(-2.26) *
-0.041 
(-4.70) *
-0.061 
(-6.86) *
Rs,t-5 -0.054 
(-10.92) *
- -0.053 
(-6.37) *
-0.066 
(-8.34) *
R ft-5 -0.040 
(-7.52) *
- -0.039 
(-4.57) *
-0.040 
(-4.69) *
R ft+ 5 0.007 
(2.12) *
- 0.005
(0.97)
0.009
(1.78)
R s,t-S 0.025 
(4.61) *
- 0.023 
(2,40) *
0.017 
(2.11) *
R ft+ 4 0.005
(1.65)
-0.019 
(-3.35) *
0.001
(0.26)
0.012 
(2.12) *
R s,t—t 0.017 
(3.06) *
0.062 
(5.05) *
0.032 
(3.21) *
0.008
(0.93)
R ft+ 3 0.001
(0,38)
-0.015 
(-2.73) *
0.006
(1-24)
0.002
(0.39)
R sj~3 0.046 
(8.40) *
0.081 
(6.36) *
0.032 
(3.23) *
0.054 
(6.56) *
R f,t+2 -0.015 
(-4.76) *
-0.031 
(-5.60) *
-0.022 
(-4.28) *
-0.009
(-1.72)
R s,t~: 0.119 
(21.39) *
0.110 
(8.55) *
0.137 
(13.71) *
0.115 
(13.90) *
R f,t+ i -0.024 
(-7.48) *
-0.020 
(-3.52) *
0.005
(1.06)
-0.040 
(-7.60) *
R v - i 0.232 
(41.56) *
0.141 
(10.93) *
0.094 
(9.33) *
0.321 
(38.45) *
R /.t 0.437 
(136.14) *
0.407 
(73.33) *
0.420 
(83.49) *
0.449 
(85.45) *
R , t 0.759 
(132.77) *
0.868 
(66.92) *
0.806 
(79.67) *
0.769 
(87.49) *
Rf,t-i 0.190 
(47.69) *
0.101 
(14.36) *
0.074 
(11.81) *
0.281 
(42.44) *
R sj- i -0.021 
(-3.00) *
-0.186 
(-11.68) *
-0.105 
(-8.52) *
0.075 
(6.83) *
R /,t-2 0.126 
(30.74) *
0.066 
(9.22) *
0.099 
(15.86) *
0.171 
(24.38) *
R s.t-2 0.101 
(14,42) *
-0.155 
(-9,72) *
0.034 
(2.74) *
0.174 
(15.83) *
R /j- s 0.075 
(18.08) *
0.042 
(5.99) *
0.057 
(9.06) *
0.108 
(15.20) *
R$J-3 0.090 
(12.99) *
-0.060 
(-3.SI) *
0.096 
(7.86) *
0.119 
(10.93) *
R f* * 0.047 
(11.34) *
0.035 
(5.15) *
0.044 
(6.93) *
0.059 
(8.29) *
Rs.r-J 0.061 
(8.82) *
-0.022 
(-1.45) *
0.066 
(5.42) *
0.079 
(7.36) *
R f t s 0.043 
(10.69) *
- 0.039 
(6.24) *
0.048 
(6.94) *
R s.,3 0.050 
(7.69) *
- 0.048 
(4.14) *
0.06 
(6.07) *
V i
-0.005 
(-8.14) *
-0.003 
(-3.89) *
-0.004 
(-4.22) *
-0.013 
(-8.05) *
T
* / J - 1
-0.006 
(-S.63) *
-0.003 
(-3.08) *
-0.007 
(-6.00) *
-0.014 
(-7.82) *
Geweke-Meese-Dent Causality Test
Hq: all lead coefficients of Rft are zero. Ho: all lead coefficients of RSit are zero.
F  -statistic 18.02 18.37 4.26 14.09 569.66 116.58 90.82 389.52
 (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00) * (0 .00)
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
Figures in parentheses are f-statistics.
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Table 8.9.1 Lead-Lag Relationships: KOSPI 200 Spot Returns and Futures Returns
Entire period 1996 1997 1998
Coefficient ^-statistic Coefficient ^-statistic Coefficient f-statistic Coefficient /-statistic
a -4.64^ -0.33 - 4 . 2 S -6 -0.44 -1.25'5 -0.55 2.80'6 0.18
bs 0.0039 1.18 0.0015 0.26 0.0012 0.24 0.0038 0.70
b7 -0.0059 -1.82 -0.0035 -0.63 -0.0093 -1.80 -0.0048 -0.89
be 0.0010 0.29 -0.0128 -2.28 * 0.0029 0,57 0.0026 0.47
bs 0.0061 1.88 -0.0123 -2.20 * 0.0035 0.67 0.0092 1.69
b j 0.0051 1.56 -0.0198 -3.52 * 0.0008 0.15 0.0102 1.88
b3 0.0003 0.09 -0.0184 -3.28 * 0.0059 1.14 -0.0018 -0.33
b2 -0.0166 -5.10 * -0.0348 -6.21 * -0.0214 -4.15 * -0.0120 -2.21 *
bs -0.0261 -8.00 * -0.0269 -4.79 * 0.0001 0.01 -0.0413 -7.64 *
bo 0.4367 133.94 * 0.3990 70.99 * 0.4203 81.14 * 0.4524 83.64 *
b.j 0.2124 65.15 * 0.1540 27.38 * 0.1475 28.47 * 0.2607 48.21 *
b-2 0.0836 25.64 * 0.1240 22.15 * 0.0961 18.55 * 0.0727 13.44 *
b-3 0.0124 3.79 * 0.0951 16.95 * 0.0321 6.21 * -0.0076 -1.41
b-< -0.0074 -2.27 * 0.0720 12.83 * -0.0003 -0.06 -0.0214 -3.96 *
b-s -0.0026 -0.81 0.0541 9.64 * -0.0048 -0.92 -0.0068 -1,26
b-e -0.0063 -1.92 0.0325 5.80 * -0.0118 -2.29 * -0.0073 -1.35
b-7 0.0070 2.13 * 0.0216 3.86 * -0.0025 -0.48 0.0123 2.28 *
b-s 0.0049 1.49 0.0063 1.12 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0094 1.74
Ho : all lead coefficients are zero
F -  statistic 13.14* 14.76* 2.76* 9.10*
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Ho : all lag coefficients are zero
F -  .statistic 638.05* 282.26* 162.91* 322.43*
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
Results are reported for the lead-lag regressions with the use o f intraday five-minute KOSPI 200 spot 
returns as the dependent variable, and lead, contemporaneous, and lag five-minute KOSPI 200 futures 
returns as the independent variables.
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Table 8.9.2 Lead-Lag Relationships: KOSPI 200 Spot Returns Innovations and
Futures Returns Innovations
Entire period 1996  
Coefficient f-statistic Coefficient f-statistic
1997
Coefficient f-statistic
1998
Coefficient f-statistic
a 4 .10‘7 0.03 1.65'7 0.02 -9.40"8 -0.01 1.04'6 0.04
b$ 0.0012 0.37 0.0025 0.45 -0.0041 -0.82 0.0031 0.56
67 -0.0085 -2.59 * -0.0053 -0.95 -0.0135 -2.65 * -0.0061 -1.16
be -0.0003 -0.10 -0.0105 -1.87 0.0012 0.24 0.0019 0.35
bs 0.0020 0.62 -0.0077 -1.37 -0.0017 -0.33 0.0047 0.87
b4 -0.0009 -0.29 -0,0163 -2.90 * -0.0075 -1.47 0.0048 0.88
b3 -0.0016 -0.48 -0.0172 -3.07 * 0.0041 0.80 -0.0046 -0.84
b2 -0.0156 -4.78 * -0.0260 -4.62 * -0.0197 -3.88 * -0.0117 -2.13 *
b, -0.0185 -5.66 * -0.0109 -1.93 0.0060 1.17 -0.0336 -6.16 *
bo 0.4330 132.85 * 0.4020 71.41 * 0.4156 81.63 * 0.4475 82.03 *
b.i 0.1435 44.02 * 0.0546 9.71 * 0.0697 13.69 * 0 .200S 36.79 *
b-2 0.0305 9.35 * 0,0664 11.81 * 0.0494 9,69 * 0.0148 2.71 *
b-3 -0.0196 -6,00 * 0.0482 8.58 * -0.0043 -0.85 -0.0333 -6.10 *
b. 4 -0.0172 -5.28 * 0.0337 6.00 * -0.0134 -2.63 * -0.0257 -4.71 *
b-s -0.0058 -1.77 0.0235 4.19 * -0.0098 -1.92 -0.0052 -0.96
b.e -0.0089 -2.73 * 0.0094 1.67 -0.0128 -2.52 * -0.0093 -1.70
b-7 0.0061 1.86 0.0067 1.20 -0.0006 -0.12 0.0111 2.03 *
b-s 0.0015 0.45 -0.0014 -0.25 0.0011 0.21 0.0034 0.63
H 0: all lead coeffic ien ts  are zero
F-statistic 7.75* 6.13* 3.26* 5.89*
(p-value) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .000)
Ho : all lag coeffic ien ts  are zero
F-statistic 269.85* 45.53* 38.97* 184.23*
(p-value) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
Results are reported for the lead-lag regressions with the use o f intraday five-minute KOSPI 200 spot 
returns innovations as the dependent variable, and lead, contemporaneous, and lag five-minute KOSPI 
200 futures returns innovations as the independent variables. The spot return innovations and futures 
return innovations series are based on the residual from an AR(1) model fit to the spot returns and 
futures returns series each day, respectively.
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9 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have investigated the Korean stock market, which is representative of 
typical, fast-growing emerging markets. Although other emerging markets in the 
Pacific Basin have analysed in some of the chapters, the main focus was on the 
empirical analysis of the dynamics of stock market prices and stock returns in Korea 
in the short- and long-runs. The last four decades are covered but the principal 
analysis focuses on the 1980s and 1990s because both the quantitative and qualitative 
growth of the stock market has been dramatic and accelerated in these periods. The 
impact of the Asian financial market crisis in 1997 was also examined. For this 
purpose, the discussion began with the definition of the term ‘emerging stock 
market’ and outline the nature and recent performance of emerging stock markets in 
the Pacific Basin: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan and Korea. 
The development o f the Korean stock market, and how the stock market has changed 
since its internationalisation and opening-up to foreign investors in the last two 
decades were discussed in Chapter 3. Then the behaviour of stock market returns and 
their conditional volatility was analysed using daily data in Chapter 4. The 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and the variance of stock returns was 
analysed in Chapter 5, and the informational efficiency under a changing price limits 
system was investigated in Chapter 6. The long-run behaviour of total returns of six 
emerging and five developed stock markets in the Pacific Basin was examined in
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Chapter 7. Finally the relationship between stock index futures and spot markets are 
analysed in Chapter 8. First the main findings of each chapter are summarised and 
then more general results of the research are identified.
Chapter 2 briefly reviewed emerging stock markets in the Pacific Basin. As 
the emerging markets have grown rapidly, on average, a great deal o f attention has 
been turned to them by investors and academia alike. Nevertheless, little is known 
about what an emerging market means. In this context, the various definitions of what 
constitutes an emerging stock market and a brief review of the nature and recent 
performance of emerging markets focusing on those in the Pacific Basin have 
presented. The definition of emerging markets varied considerably across the 
literature surveyed. However, six emerging stock markets, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand seemed to meet the various classifications 
without much of argument. The speed of quantitative growth of the emerging markets 
in the Pacific Basin has been slow due to the Asian financial market crisis, but their 
qualitative developments through liberalisation, deregulation and changes in 
investment environment are expected to be accelerated.
In Chapter 3, the development of the Korean stock market and its particular 
characteristics were examined in order to provide some background understanding of 
(i) changes in the trading system; (ii) relevant regulation system; and (iii) the 
liberalisation programme in a historical context; and (iv) particular features, for 
instance, Stock Market Stabilisation Fund, price limits system and introduction of 
derivative securities trading. Up until the late 1970s, the stock market played a minor 
role in the economy and closed to foreign investors throughout most of its 
development. Although internationalisation of the market began in the early 1980s, 
portfolio investment by foreign investors was allowed only through special funds
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which bought Korean securities and whose shares traded abroad. The qualitative 
development o f the stock market started in the 1990s when stock market 
liberalisation (which allowed foreign investors’ direct investment on the stock 
market) accelerated and derivative securities trading and a cyber stock trading system 
were introduced. The sudden outset of the Korean financial market crisis in the last 
quarter of 1997, led meltdown of the Korean stock market— but it recovered rapidly 
due to positive developments in the economy and liberalised investment status.
In Chapter 4, the behaviour o f Korean stock market volatility for the period 
from 1975 to 1997 was investigated using a set of models belonging to the class of 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH). The descriptive statistics
confirm that the daily stock market returns are skewed to the left and leptokurtic.
f" V'Consequently, the ARCH class models were used to capture successfully these ■ 
aspects of the abnormal distribution o f the data. One of the interesting findings was 
that there was no structure change in volatility even after the stock market opening, ! 
i.e. liberalisation in 1992. Overall, the class of GARCH models is found to be a better 
fit than the class of ARCH, EGARCH and TARCH models. Among the GARCH 
class models GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) and the GARCH(1, l)-M A(l) seemed to be the best 
fit models. When the tests in order to distinguish forecasting ability among the 
estimated models it appears that GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) is the most accurate forecasting 
model among the six different GARCH class models for the historical forecast for 
1975-1997. However, since there exist negligibly small differences between these two 
models we also estimate forecasts for three subsample periods: pre-opening, the post­
opening, and the post-sample. The results confirm that the GARCH(1,1)-AR(1) and 
GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) are the best forecasting model for the post-opening and the 
post-sampling period, respectively.
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In Chapter 5, the nexus between Korean stock market returns and 
macroeconomic variables was investigated for the period from January 1987 to June 
1997. The findings using innovation accounting analysis are interesting. The results 
show that a substantial proportion of the variance of stock returns was attributable to 
its own innovations in the pre- and post-opening periods. The evidence suggests that 
changes in the exports/imports ratio was an important determinant of the variance of 
stock returns in both the pre-and post-opening periods. In the pre-opening period, 
changes in money growth together with the exports/imports ratio jointly accounted 
for over one third of the variance of stock returns, and a considerable proportion of 
the variance of stock returns are also attributed to changes in the Korean won-US 
dollar exchange rate and interest rate. In the post-opening period, however, the 
results show that changes in the interest rate and the exports/imports ratio have 
relatively more significant influence on stock return variability than those due to 
money growth and exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, the findings suggested that 
changes in the balance of trade was one of the important determinants in forecasting 
the variance of stock returns in the Korean export-oriented economy.
Chapter 6 investigated the long-term equilibrium among eleven emerging and 
developed stock markets in the Pacific Basin over the period starting in March 1988 
and ending in April 2000, a period spanning the Asian financial market crises. Unlike 
existing studies on the long-term relationship among stock markets total returns 
indices, which included dividends paid and reinvested, are used. The unit root tests 
allow for a possible crash and find that four of our series, those for Australia, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia and Malaysia were trend stationary and so random shocks only had a 
temporary effect on these returns. Based on a common currency, the US$, there is no 
cointegration between world returns and each of the remaining 1(1) series. Further test
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results of pairwise cointegration between all 1(1) country returns indices find no 
cointegration except some evidence of cointegration involving Japan and Korea. The 
results are not affected by the Asian financial market crisis. Overall, the findings on 
pair-wise cointegration tests suggest that stock markets in the Pacific Basin are not 
pair-wise cointegrated even after the Southeast Asian financial market crisis. 
Therefore, international diversification of investment portfolios by investors from one 
of the countries to another single country could be justified and beneficial because 
gaining abnormal profits in these markets by diversifying investment portfolios was 
possible and country-specific risk could be reduced. However, the results of 
mutivariate cointegration tests exhibit that there in one cointegrating vector in the pre- j 
crash period whereas two cointegrating vectors are exhibited when the Asian crisis is 
included. Therefore, stock markets in this region are collectively linked in the long- 
run.
In Chapter 7, the multiple variance ratio tests were implemented to examine 
the random walk hypothesis for the Korean stock market under five regimes of daily 
price limits from March 1988 to December 1998. Using a sample of 55 actively 
traded stocks selected to cover a wide range of sectors, the hypothesis is tested under 
each price limit regime. The results showed several striking findings. First, the results 
generally supported the idea that price limits do impact on volatility. The results 
showed that stock price volatility increased when the price limits were widened its 
bands from ±6% to ±8% and further to ±12%. This suggested that tighter price limits 
can reduce volatility, although a less volatile market is not necessarily desirable. 
Second, in general, approximately 10% of returns for the entire sample period in our 
data had been affected by the price limits. This implies that neglecting the presence of 
price limits could result in misleading empirical evidence because price limits can be
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price limits can be a crucial factor affecting stock price movement. It can be quite 
problematic because the time paths of stock prices under price limits might not 
coincide with the time paths which would prevail in the absence of price limits. Thus 
equity prices are prevented from efficiently reaching equilibrium levels. Finally, 
excluding the unusual period of the Korean financial market crisis, as price limits 
were relaxed, the proportion of stock prices in the sample which follow a random 
walk increased. That is, the stock market as a whole approaches a random walk. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that price limits can prevent stock price evolving from 
a random walk process and hence the stock market is inefficient. Although price 
limits in Korean Stock Exchange have been modified several times as the bands have 
widened, they have played a role in hindering the Korean stock market from 
becoming informationally efficient. Consequently, whatever the pros and cons of 
price limits, one should not ignore the fact that the behaviour of stock prices is not 
likely to be efficient as long as price limits remain the norm.
In Chapter 8, the impact on the spot market of trading in stock index futures in 
Korea in May 1996 was investigated and several important results were found. First, 
the results show there has been an increase in volatility and a slight increase in the 
persistence of volatility following the introduction of stock index futures. Although 
the volatility increase might be due to destabilising effects of futures trading 
associated with speculation, stock index futures add a new dimension to the market 
by providing a new instrument to facilitate hedging. Secondly, the evidence indicated 
that futures trading did not result in increased jump volatility, abnormally large 
increases or decreases in stock prices. Thirdly, there was a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the KOSPI 200 spot and futures prices with bidirectional 
causality between spot and futures markets. This differs from most of the literature on
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developed markets which finds unidirectional causality from futures to spot markets. 
Fourthly, returns in these two markets were largely contemporaneous but there is 
evidence that the futures market leads the stock market. This suggested that news 
disseminates first in the futures market and then in the spot market. In summary, the 
impact of futures trading has been beneficial for the stock market; it accelerates the 
speed at which information is impounded into spot market prices.
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